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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT TODAY[1]

I. *A Political and Administrative, not a Theoretical Problem*

UNEMPLOYMENT in the United States presents itself today not as a question for theoretical discussion, but as a problem for political and administrative action. Whether it is a personal or an industrial problem, whether it is accidental or inevitable, whether it is preventable or the price of progress, whether governmental action is necessary and desirable or not, are questions that have been fairly well settled. A century of discussion and investigation by economists, governments and social workers has brought a consensus of opinion among scientific students as to the essential nature of the problem, its causes and effects, the extent to which it is inevitable in modern industry, and the general character of the remedies that must be applied, both preventative and alleviative.

The world over, the theoretical analysis of unemployment is now practically the same; and the same theoretical solutions of the problem are advanced and advocated.[2] Little origination

[1] For reasons that will appear in the course of this article we define unemployment as the inability of able-bodied and willing wage-earners to obtain work on the customary terms and conditions of employment. This definition recognizes the fact that millions of workers are hired and dismissed every year, that both voluntary and involuntary changing of places goes on constantly on a tremendous scale, and that the prime problem, therefore, is not why wage-earners quit or are dismissed but why they cannot find new places.

[2] Compare Georg Adler, "Arbeitslosigkeit und Arbeitslosenversicherung" in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, third edition, vol. i, pp. 1104–1110; Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (1909) Majority Report, part vi, and Minority Report, part ii, chapters iv and v; New York Commission on Employers' Liability and Unemployment, Third Report (1911) pp. 38–53.

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is now to be expected in the analysis of the problem. In the United States everything remains to be done in working out practical laws and administrative machinery to put the theoretically sound remedies into practice. The time for discussion is past and the time for action at hand. Says the Minority Report of the British Royal Commission on the Poor Laws;

> We have to report that, in our judgment, it is now administratively possible, if it is sincerely wished to do so, to remedy most of the evils of unemployment to the same extent, at least, as we have in the past century diminished the death rate from fever and lessened the industrial slavery of young children.[1]

The Majority Report, judging from the nature of its recommendations, reaches the same conclusion, though not in so many words. And Sidney Webb, who for more than fifteen years has given the closest study to unemployment, concludes that "the problem is now soluble, theoretically at once, and practically as soon as we care to solve it."[2]

In this country there is still much deploring of lack of information; but it comes from people who have failed to master the existing data and who seem to think that the mere piling-up of innumerable facts and statistics will of itself disclose causes and point out remedies. As we shall see, there is enough reliable information available which, if properly classified, analyzed and interpreted, yields safe generalizations as to the extent and causes of unemployment in the United States and the general principles that must underlie practical remedies. To a certain extent this available information has already been studied by social scientists and by governmental bodies, and conclusions have been reached that in the main agree with the results found in other countries.

The *Third Report of the New York Commission on Employers' Liability and Unemployment* (1911), the *Report of the Mayor's Commission on Unemployment* of Chicago (1914),

[1] Chapter v, p. 1215.

[2] Preface to A Bibliography on Unemployment and the Unemployed, prepared by F. Isabel Taylor (1909), P. S. King and Son, London, p. vii.

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the analysis of the labor market and unemployment made by Dr. Hourwich in his book on *Immigration and Labor*,[1] and the individual writings of Professor Henry R. Seager of Columbia University, the late Professor Charles R. Henderson of the University of Chicago, and others, all reveal a certain unanimity in explanation of the nature of the unemployment problem and general agreement as to the possible solutions.[2]

The popular cry that something be done to meet the challenge of unemployment is but a reflection of the general belief that we have had enough of discussion.[3] All classes of people—employers, workers, students, officials and public men generally—testified before the United States Commission on Industrial Relations that unemployment is one of the most fundamental causes of industrial unrest. The Commission agreed that some action on the problem must be taken. President Wilson in his Jackson Day speech at Indianapolis, January, 1915, stated that he regarded the efforts of the Department of Labor to deal with the problem as one of the greatest accomplishments of his administration. The Republican party made the widespread unemployment a political issue and maintained that its protection policies offered a remedy. And the Progressive party included a demand for unemployment insurance in its platform.

The demand for state action grows in volume and in force. Not only

[1] Chapters iv and vi.

[2] See also: Report to the Mayor and Aldermen by the Chicago Municipal Markets Commission on A Practical Plan for Relieving Destitution and Unemployment in the City of Chicago (1914).

Supplement on Unemployment to the First Annual Report of the California Commission on Immigration and Housing (1914).

First Annual Report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations (1915).

Frances A. Kellor, Out of Work (Putnam, 1915).

Bulletin No. 109, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

American Labor Legislation Review, May, 1914, and June, 1915.

Annals of the American Academy, May, 1915.

[3] This cry is excellently voiced by J. G. Brooks in "The Challenge of Unemployment," *The Independent*, Mar. 15, 1915; Amos Pinchot, "Who is it up to?" *Harper's Weekly*, and William Hard, "Guilty of Unemployment," *Everybody's Magazine*, March, 1915.

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does the right to work supply the Labor party with its most effective battle-cry, but each of the orthodox parties claims that its policy will lessen the evil. This marks a great change in the attitude both of the populace and of the economists. Whereas a generation ago unemployment was regarded as the result of economic forces beyond the control of the state, today the prevalence of unemployment is attributed to defects in the organization of industrial life which it is the business of statesmen to rectify. This change is due in part to the decrease in that fear of state intervention which was the dominant political creed of the last century, but far more to the increased knowledge of the nature and extent of unemployment which a more careful study and a more accurate analysis has placed at the disposal of reformers. . . . The problem which now confronts practical politicians is the choice of immediate measures to carry into effect the theoretical reforms which all admit to be desirable.[1]

The situation in the United States at present can not be better described than by this summary of conditions in Great Britain just before the national program of labor exchanges and unemployment insurance was developed.

II. *Why we have no Practical Political Program*

Although the time for action is thus most ripe, still we do not find any comprehensive political and administrative program advanced or advocated in this country. There is abundant protest against the evils of unemployment. Demand for relief grows stronger and becomes more effective. Mayors and councils are forced to appoint unemployment committees "to do something." Legislatures enact or amend employment-office laws and appoint investigating commissions. We have bundle days, and much publicity. Money is raised, workshops, employment bureaus and "Hotels de Gink" are established. But as a result nothing is accomplished beyond a doubtful form of charitable relief. No attempts are made to deal with unemployment in a complete and systematic way with measures that supplement each other and cover the whole ground. Aside from the Socialists no political party has an unemployment

[1] Cyril Jackson, Unemployment and Trade Unions, Longmans, Green and Company, 1910, pp. 1–2.

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program, and what is offered by reformers amounts to an enumeration of the various schemes that have been tried at different times for relieving the unemployed, without attempting to sift out those that have proved impracticable or ineffective. Instead of a comprehensive program with its parts knit together into a consistent plan, we get lists of more or less related recommendations presented for adoption by churches, civic bodies, employers, trade unions, and public authorities.[1]

The reasons for this lack of practical action looking toward a complete solution of the problem are not far to seek. In spite of the storm of protest and demand that something be done, which sweeps the country with every wave of industrial depression, there seems to be an underlying feeling in the minds of popular leaders that a real and complete remedy can only be accomplished by a change in the industrial order. Unconsciously the early Socialists' idea that no solution is possible under a system of competition and private industry has been absorbed by leading political and social reformers. It is because the popular cry for action is mixed with this latent feeling of despair that no bold and united attempts to grapple with the problem are made.

To understand this feeling we must look to the doctrines of the earlier economists who laid the basis for so many of our political and social policies. To dispel the idea we must analyze their teaching and show, by way of contrast, how modern study and investigation have made a solution possible, not indeed immediately, but just as soon as we care to adopt certain administrative measures and they have time to work out their results.

III. *The Early Economists' Ideas of Unemployment*

The early economists of the 19th century, both orthodox and radical, agreed essentially in the analysis of unemployment, although they approached it from different directions. The Classical school looked upon unemployment as an incidental phenomenon of the competitive system, and paid little attention to it. Since they believed that the free play of competitive in-

[1] Compare Kellor, Out of Work, ch. xiv and appendices.

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dustry worked out in the long run to the benefit of all classes, unemployment, if it was not due to personal faults, appeared to them merely as a temporary evil due to "friction," or to sudden changes in the industrial organization, which disappeared as soon as normal conditions prevailed. It was therefore negligible, and in any case it was dangerous to meddle with economic laws. The Socialists, on the other hand, laid great stress on unemployment as showing the fundamental weakness of the competitive system. But they, too, saw no value in studying the details of the problem. Unemployment was inevitable under competitive industry, and a system which could not employ all its labor stood condemned and should be abolished. Both schools considered unemployment merely a concomitant of the capitalist system, which did not need separate and detailed study. Their difference lay in the fact that one considered the system good while the other considered it bad.[1] To the one unemployment appeared as an incidental evil which tended to disappear. To the other it was a fundamental weakness which must bring the overthrow of the whole industrial order.

Those Classicists who did go into the subject at all either considered that the workers were compensated for their idle periods, or else they ascribed unemployment to overpopulation. Adam Smith taught that the wages in different occupations vary with constancy and inconstancy of employment. What the bricklayer earns "while he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion." He compared the skill and earnings of bricklayers with those of other wage-earners, and concluded that "the high wages of those workmen [bricklayers], therefore, are not so much the recompense of their skill, as the compensation for the inconstancy of their employment."[2]

His followers contented themselves with repeating these

[1] Compare Georg Adler, cited above, p. 1104, and Seasonal Trades, by various authors, London, 1912, introduction by Juliet Stuart Poyntz.

[2] Wealth of Nations, book i, chapter viii.

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words, and Nassau Senior added the idea that not only was unemployment paid for in higher wages, but the "anxious and desponding moments" are more than compensated by the diminution of toil and opportunities of idleness which most people prefer to steady, regular labor. Senior had served on a Poor Law Commission and had observed the chronic underemployment of casual laborers. He, therefore, felt bound to explain it, and he ascribed it to personal preference for intermittent labor. "We believe, after all, that nothing is so much disliked as steady, regular labour; and that the opportunities of idleness afforded by an occupation of irregular employment are so much more than an equivalent for its anxiety, to reduce the wages of such occupations below the common average."[1]

Malthus, in his essay on population, laid the foundation for the view that unemployment is caused by a surplus of labor beyond the country's needs, and this view underlies the present popular notions in regard to unemployment, although the argument now is exactly the reverse of Malthus's theory.

Ricardo, too, at first feared over-population. It seemed to him that the power of production could not long continue to be greater than the power of population.[2] But in the third edition of his work he added his observations on the effects of machinery, and concluded that a surplus of labor might result from the increased power of production. "The same cause which may increase the net revenue of the country may at the same time render the population redundant, and deteriorate the condition of the labourer." Demand for labor will be in a diminishing ratio with the growth of capital.[3]

Thus the doctrine that labor is superfluous because population grows faster than production, becomes a doctrine that increased productive power creates a surplus of labor.

In Karl Marx's *Capital* we find the basis both for the popular view of a surplus population and the present-day scientific

[1] Senior, Political Economy, 6th edition, 1872, p. 208.

[2] Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, edited by E. C. K. Gonner, London, 1891, p. 76.

[3] *Ibid.*, chapter xxxi, pp. 379–387.

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explanation of a labor reserve to meet fluctuations in industry. Marx ridiculed the idea that population increased faster than the means of life, and turned Malthus's theory around to show that it is the accumulation of capital which "constantly produces . . . a relatively redundant population of labourers, i. e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average need of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus population.[1]"

In analyzing the character and function of the "industrial reserve army," Marx really established the modern scientific theory of employment, the details of which have been worked out by Beveridge, the Webbs, and other scholars. It will be noted that Marx scouts the idea of an absolute overgrowth of population and holds that the unemployed are only "relatively supernumerary." He explains that fluctuations of industry cause only a "transitory production of surplus-population" and he clinches his argument by showing that the so-called "army of the unemployed" is not an absolute over-supply of labor in the sense that it might be removed by a check in the growth of population or by sending the surplus out of the country. Independently of the size of the population, a reserve of unemployed labor is the "necessary condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production," a condition that it must inevitably create "for the changing needs of the self-expansion of capital." "If tomorrow morning labour generally were reduced to a rational amount, and proportioned to the different sections of the working class according to age and sex, the working population to hand would be absolutely insufficient for the carrying on of national production on its present scale."[2]

Marx analyzed the "different forms of the relative surplus population," and showed that

> Every labourer belongs to it during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed. Not taking into account the great periodically recurring forms that the changing phases of the industrial cycle impress on it, now an acute form during crises, then again in

[1] Vol. i, part vii, chap. xxv, sec. 344.

[2] Vol. i, part vii, chap. xxv, sec. 3.

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chronic form during dull times—it has always three forms, the floating, the latent, the stagnant.[1]

He goes on to describe the different kinds of unemployed workers, exactly as we find them today; and his classification is practically the same classification that is made by recent students. What he terms the "floating form" of surplus population is our army of migratory workers, harvest hands and "hoboes." The "latent forms" are the seasonal workers, the labor released from blind-alley employments, those displaced by machinery, improved processes, speeding-up etc. Finally, his "stagnant form" is the army of casual workers and under-employed who give us "the lowest sediment of the relative surplus population . . . [which] dwells in the sphere of pauperism."

Despite this essentially modern analysis, it is generally assumed that Marx believed in an ever-growing army of the unemployed which was absolutely superfluous. But in reality the present-day authorities accept his explanation, as will appear in the next section. The recent studies have merely worked out the details that prove Marx's original analysis. We do not wonder then at the statement that has been made, that nothing has been contributed to the theoretical analysis of the problem of unemployment since Marx.[2]

IV. *Present-day Analysis of Unemployment*

We cannot, however, entirely agree with the above view, because valuable contributions have been made in recent years in analyzing specific types of unemployment and discovering their causes. Mr. Beveridge's exposition of casual labor is a notable example.[3] It is such studies of the details of different kinds of unemployment that have established the principles on which practical remedies can be based. It is these studies that enable us now to present theoretical conclusions on unemployment which transfer the problem from the realm of discussion to that of political action.

[1] Vol. i, part vii, chap. xxv, sec. 4.

[2] Poyntz, Seasonal Trades, cited above, p. 17.

[3] Unemployment, A Problem of Industry, Longmans, Green & Co., 1909, chapter v.

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In the first place, as already indicated, it is generally conceded by scientific men that unemployment is not an insoluble problem. The idea that life is a great lottery in which some unhappy persons draw a blank, as Malthus phrased it, is no longer tenable. The new doctrine is one of maladjustment. The prevailing view is that the distress from want of employment is not beyond the control of the state, but is due to defects in industrial organization which may be rectified.[1]

There are, of course, some more or less permanently unemployed people. These are the mentally defective or physically incapable or both, the "down-and-outs" who have lost the habit of working, and those others who live by their wits, by begging or by crime. During the most prosperous times, when labor is in great demand, these same people are out of work. They are "unemployed" in the same sense that young children, the old, the sick, and the crippled are unemployed. No amount of work that the industrial system might afford can help them. They need charitable relief or hospital or corrective treatment. Theirs is not a problem of unemployment, although in many cases their condition is the effect of unemployment.

A second basic conclusion directly connected with the first is that the problem is not personal but economic. This transfer of emphasis from the individual to the industrial organization has made possible real progress in dealing with unemployment. Until a few years ago it was "the unemployed," and the "problem of the unemployed" which concerned our writers. Mr. Beveridge turned the whole trend of discussion away from the individual and to "Unemployment—A Problem of Industry," as his book, published in 1909, was called. The new view is reflected in the general substitution of the word "unemployment" in titles of books and articles where formerly "unemployed" was used.

"Under the old doctrine which held men accountable personally for social cost, little remedial work except that of improving heredity could be undertaken; but under the new

[1] Scott Nearing, Social Adjustment, Macmillan, 1911, p. 341. See also Simon N. Patten, New Basis of Civilization, Macmillan, 1907.

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doctrine, which attributes maladjustment, not to personal depravity but to economic causes, the world is filled with opportunities for improvement.[1]" "I hold that personal depravity is as foreign to any sound theory of hardships of our modern poor as witchcraft or demoniacal possession; that these hardships are economic, social, traditional, measurable, manageable."[2]

Karl Marx's proposition that there is no absolute overplus of labor, but a fluctuating industrial reserve force, which is only relatively superfluous, i. e., at certain times and in certain industries and places, is another theoretical conclusion which has been established in recent years. Population does not increase out of all proportion to the ability of a country to maintain it.[3] The reserve of more than 100,000 seasonal workers in the state of New York[4] and almost a million in the nation who are laid off by our manufacturing industries every winter and hired again in the summer and fall[5] are in no sense a surplus. They are necessary to the proper conduct of industry. The vast army of migratory and casual laborers which mobilizes in the harvest fields of the grain states and the Inland Empire in the summer, spreads over the country in railroad and construction camps, and winters partly in lumber camps and ice fields, but mostly in cheap city lodging-houses, can hardly be said to constitute an oversupply of labor beyond the country's needs. It is a reserve army that shifts from city to country, from foundry and street work to farm, quarry and construction project in response to a definite demand. It is no more superfluous than is the reserve of funds the law requires banks to keep or the capital that is invested in a lighting plant which operates to only half or three-quarters of its capacity in the summer and is designed to meet the maximum demand that comes only in the winter months.

Popular terminology has dubbed it "the army of the unemployed," but considering the needs of our industrial system it is

[1] Nearing, Social Adjustment, p. 341.

[2] Devine, Misery and its Causes, pp. 11–12.

[3] Beveridge, Unemployment, chapter i.

[4] Third Report, New York Commission on Employers' Liability and Unemployment, 1911, p. 39.

[5] Abstract, Thirteenth Census of the U. S. (1910) p. 459.

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no more unemployed than are firemen who wait in fire-houses for the alarm to sound, or the reserve police force ready to meet the riot call, or the officers and privates of an army which is on a peace footing. Moreover, the personnel of the "army" is constantly changing; practically every wage-earner is in it sometime, and its members are more often employed than unemployed. Shall we say they do not serve when they only stand and wait?

The doctrine that was substituted for the theory of overpopulation, namely, that labor-saving machinery and improved processes create a surplus labor force that has no place in industry, has also been exploded by recent scientific study. No one denies that particular laborers are thrown into the unemployed reserve army by industrial invention, but that such displaced labor cannot be absorbed by the industrial system is disproved by the enormous increase in the number of wage-earners employed in almost all our industries. From 1900 to 1910 our population increased twenty-one per cent, but the average number of wage-earners who found employment in manufacturing and mechanical industries increased forty per cent. And although the decade was marked by a marvelous development of labor-saving machinery and processes, the amount earned by the wage-earners employed increased seventy per cent.[1] In mining, agriculture, trade and transportation the same expansion and increase in the number of wage-earners employed can be seen.[2] If labor were becoming redundant, the effect would show itself in lower earnings.[3]

It is a matter of common experience that new machines are labor displacers. At its introduction an economical device often forces some men to seek new occupations, but it never reduces the general demand for labor. As progress closes one field of employment it opens others, and it has come about that after a century and a quarter of brilliant invention and of rapid and general substitution of machine work for

[1] Abstract, Thirteenth Census, pp. 438–439.

[2] Thirteenth Census, Population, vol. iv, Occupation Statistics, table 15, pp. 54–56.

[3] Compare S. J. Chapman, Work and Wages—in continuation of Lord Brassey's Foreign Work and English Wages, London, Longmans, 1908, pp. 304–384; Beveridge, Unemployment, p. 8.

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handwork, there is no larger proportion of the laboring population in idleness now than there was at the beginning of the period.[1]

It is even contended that the total amount of unemployment and particularly the distress from want of employment has been smaller in our generation than in the past.

> Unemployment is, of course, in the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, no new thing; and there is no reason to suppose even that it prevails to any greater extent, or in any more extreme form, than throughout the past hundred years. . . . Our own impression, indeed, derived from wide and prolonged study of all the facts, is that such years of acute crisis of 1816, 1841, and 1879, witnessed a considerably larger proportion of men out of work, and certainly more widespread destitution and misery than anything that this generation has suffered.[2]

It is doubtful, too, if the United States has ever had such a large proportion of its workers unemployed or such a prolonged period of depression as that which followed the panic of 1837. But reliable statistics are not available to establish this contention conclusively. Sufficient is known, however, to disprove the idea that the progress of industry brings a proportionately greater problem of unemployment or makes its solution more difficult.

It is true that increase of population, invention of machinery and improvements in industrial process and efficiency do make the adjustment of the supply of particular forms of labor to the demand a most difficult problem—even though they do not create an absolutely unusable surplus. But the same inventions, particularly in the field of transportion and in the progressive elimination of skill as a requirement of industry, have increased the mobility of labor to a degree unknown one hundred years ago, while improved efficiency in the conduct of business, scientific management, and the organization of labor has brought also improved methods of adjusting labor supply to demand.

No doubt there are parts of the country which are over-

[1] J. B. Clark, Essentials of Economic Theory, Macmillan, 1907, p. 257.

[2] S. and B. Webb, The Prevention of Destitution, p. 94.

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supplied with labor, particularly ports of entry for immigrants, and certain occupations, especially unskilled and clerical employments, which are overcrowded; but there are other parts of the country and other occupations which are capable of using more labor than they have.[1] There are times of the year when many industries are slack and cannot use all their working forces, and there are years, like 1908 and 1914, when most industries lay off a large part of their labor; but busy seasons and prosperous years absorb the surplus and for a time even show a shortage of help. Many state and city employment offices have been reporting lack of labor in certain lines during the last few months.[2] To adjust these fluctuations, to distribute labor more evenly over the country, and in better proportions among the occupations, to equalize the amount of work among the seasons and the years, is the very essence of our problem.

Finally the conclusion to be drawn from all the recent studies of reported unemployment is that the unemployed man is an industrial factor, not a parasite upon industry, that the unemployed at any particular time are but a sample of irregular reserves of labor. "It is not true that there exists in all states of trade a permanent army of capable unemployed people whose personnel over a short period remains comparatively unvaried."[3] "The principal factor in maintaining the irreducible minimum of unemployment is not the chronic idleness of a few but the incessant loss of time, now by some, now by others, of a comparatively large body of men, most of whom are more often in employment than out of it."[4] This conclusion was anticipated by Marx.[5] And we may quote a report to the

[1] This was the finding of the New York Commission on Employers' Liability and Unemployment; and Reports of the New York State Department of Labor and the Chicago City Club on Vocational Training testify to the same effect.

[2] In August and September, 1915, the Ohio Public Employment Offices reported a general shortage of labor throughout the state. See Monthly Review of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

[3] Chapman, Work and Wages, cited above, p. 351.

[4] Beveridge, Unemployment, p. 72.

[5] See page 8 above.

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United States Commission on Industrial Relations which expresses the same view as a result of a recent study of unemployment throughout the United States.

Our whole problem arises, not because we have too many people in the country but because demand for labor does not remain at the maximum. It fluctuates from day to day, week to week, month to month, season to season, and year to year. Sparsely settled states have just as acute problems of unemployment as the states with very large populations. It is the *irregularity of employment and unsteadiness of income that gives us our problem, not the size of population.* Instead of a permanent "army of the unemployed" we have shifting, intermittently employed reserve labor forces, whose members are constantly changing, so that fully half the wage-earners are in the reserve for part of the year. Unemployment is a constant and inevitable risk for almost all working people, and not a problem of a permanent surplus of workers beyond the country's needs.

If we have an army of the unemployed at all it is a citizen army in which practically all serve, and not a standing army, wholly detached from industry.

It must not be assumed from this summary of the nature of the unemployment problem as established by recent scientific studies that there is no dispute as to the causes of irregularity of employment. The disputed points, however, concern ultimate explanations. Some explain reductions in demand for labor by a theory of over-production. Others ascribe it to under-consumption—the "fallacy of saving" causes the consumptive powers of the country to lag behind its productive powers.[1] Still others explain it by competition and by speculation and over-capitalization; while some advance a theory of social psychology, that it is imitation and the mob mind which causes general over-confidence in investments at certain times, and lack of confidence resulting in depression at other times.[2]

[1] J. A. Hobson, The Problem of the Unemployed (1896), and The Industrial System, Longmans, 1910, chapter xviii.

[2] Beveridge, Unemployment, p. 59 ff.; Seligman, Principles of Economics, Longmans, chapter xxix, sec. 198; Pigou, Unemployment, chap. viii; Georg Adler, in article in *Handwörterbuch* cited above.

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"Political Economy in ascribing it [causes of fluctuation] to anything from oversaving to sun-spots, has vindicated its oft-disputed claim to imagination."[1]

This discussion may be compared to the disputes as to whether God or some natural force causes gravitation. Scientific handling of the problem of unemployment is possible without accepting any of these explanations, just as the laws of physics may be established and used without final conclusions as to how the laws came to be.

Busy and slack seasons, years of prosperity and depression, are now accepted as the characteristic course of modern industry.[2] Accepting the fluctuating movement as a fact, modern students hold that it may be measured, its fluctuations to some extent prevented, and its evil effects removed by paying the labor reserves during the waiting periods. This is the basis of the demand for legislative and administrative action. In the words of the New York Commission on Unemployment: "We must not go on ignoring a fact of such vital importance. It is sufficient for us to know that there is a world-wide movement of trade which affects the industries of our state, causing a great amount of work during some years and a great amount of idleness during others."[3]

V. *Measures to be Adopted in Solving the Problem*

Not only is there general agreement as to the nature and causes of unemployment, but the practical remedies that must be applied have also been established by scientific students. It is here that modern students, including socialist scholars, part

[1] Poyntz, Seasonal Trades, cited above, p. 3.

[2] Marx described it as "a decennial cycle (interrupted by smaller oscillations) of periods of average activity, production at high pressure, crisis, and stagnation." Capital, vol. i, p. 694, Kerr Edition. And a bankers' guide, *The Financial Graphic* (1911), explains the movements thus: "Starting with a period of depression, this is followed by a period of initiation and activity developing a feeling of confidence coincidently with what is called good business. This finally reaches its maximum and is followed by declining markets ultimately resulting in a period of readjustment and sometimes panic with subsequent dullness and depression."

[3] Third Report of the New York Commission on Employers' Liability and Unemployment, p. 43.

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company with Marx. They differ from him in holding that the industrial reserve army is by no means a fatal weakness of the capitalist system, and that it may be maintained in decency and efficiency out of the profits of industry, just as reserves of capital are paid for.

Moreover, it has been pointed out[1] that a labor reserve is necessary to the existence of industry not under private industry alone, but that it would be needed under a coöperative commonwealth as well. Industrial cycles, seasonal fluctuations, and irregular changes in demand due to the invention and discovery of new processes, will occur under any system of industry. Mere change of ownership or direction of industry will not prevent unemployment. The best that can be hoped is that a socialist government would reduce the labor reserve to its lowest limits and provide insurance and protection against the evils of that unemployment which is inevitable. This, however, can also be done under the present system, if the economic classes who favor it can make their political power felt. And the ablest American socialist writer points out that it is increasingly becoming to the interests of employers to conserve their labor resources so that in many countries their leaders are advancing programs for preventing unemployment, and for providing against it.[2]

What, then, are the remedies for unemployment that must be adopted under any system of industry?

(1) There is almost unanimous agreement that the first step toward a solution of the problem of unemployment is the organization of a connected network of public employment bureaus.[3] The labor market must be organized on a modern business basis, to eliminate the waste and unnecessary idleness resulting from irregular and ignorant efforts of individuals to find work or secure help, to supply more detailed and reliable

[1] S. and B. Webb, The Prevention of Destitution, Longmans, 1912, pp. 154–155.

[2] William English Walling, Progressivism and After, Macmillan, 1914, pp. 74–75.

[3] Third Report, New York Commission, p. 66; Mayor's Commission on Unemployment, Chicago, pp. 8, 102; Resolutions adopted at First National Conference on Unemployment, *American Labor Legislation Review*, May, 1914, p. 353; First Annual Report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 42 (1914).

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labor-market information than is now available, and to secure a proper distribution of labor over the country.

(2) It is generally agreed also that the entrance to the labor market must be controlled. The young and the inexperienced must be trained for the existing opportunities in employment, and given information and advice before they enter the industrial world. The way must be pointed out to children and immigrants, in an effort to direct the streams of new labor that come from the schools and from foreign lands away from the overcrowded, stagnant, and decaying trades, into developing industries and promising opportunities. A proportionate distribution of labor among the occupations and industries does not come automatically, but must be deliberately organized.[1]

(3) The regularization of the labor market by the saving and shifting of necessary public work for periods of depression is another remedy advocated by students and popular opinion alike. The plan of relief works created primarily for the unemployed is universally condemned as having shown itself impracticable and undesirable by experience. But the prosecution of necessary public works in times of depression, work which is either saved from former prosperous years or is anticipating the needs of future years, and is conducted under ordinary conditions of employment, discharge and remuneration, is considered one of the most effective preventive remedies for unemployment.[2] It is even contended that the total reduction in the wage bill caused by an industrial depression might easily be offset if not more than three or four per cent of the government orders were saved in prosperous years to be spent in dull years.[3]

(4) Decasualizing labor, making employment more steady by

[1] Frank Parsons, Choosing a Vocation, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1909; Meyer Bloomfield, The School and the Start in Life, Bulletin No. 4, 1914, United States Bureau of Education; Arthur Greenwood, Juvenile Labor Exchanges and After Care, London, P. S. King and Son, 1911; Proceedings of the National Vocational Guidance Association, United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 14, 1914.

[2] Third Report, New York Commission, p. 68; Report of the Chicago Municipal Markets Commission, 1914, pp. 32, 55; Kellor, Out of Work, p. 402, and appendix ii; also Beveridge, Pigou, and the Webbs, cited above.

[3] S. and B. Webb, Prevention of Destitution, p. 113.

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centralizing and reducing the necessary labor reserve, as well as by positive efforts of employers to regularize employment through improvements in methods of hiring and firing, making up stock, developing complementary business and reducing hours of labor in slack periods, are also generally advocated by students of unemployment as well as by scientific managers or efficiency engineers.[1]

(5) Finally the obvious conclusion to which all serious investigations have led, is that some form of insurance must be devised to provide against the inevitable unemployment risk. "A reserve of unemployed workers being necessary and inevitable in the ordinary course of industrial progress," says the New York Commission on Employers' Liability and Unemployment, "the most that a comprehensive remedy for unemployment can accomplish is to provide against loss and worry to the wage-earner in cases of enforced idleness, by affording him a steady income regardless of the fluctuations in the amount of his work."[2]

It is conceded by practically all students of the problem that the complete elimination of unemployment is an impossibility. Indeed, the very analysis shows this to be impossible; for if industrial progress proceeds in cycles of prosperity and depression, busy and slack seasons, rush periods and slowing up, then a reserve of unemployed labor must ever be present to allow for the extension of industrial enterprises and for new undertakings, to meet the needs of the busiest months and years, and to supply the demand for casual workers who are needed not steadily but off and on.[3]

[1] Beveridge, Unemployment, pp. 201–209; Chicago Municipal Markets Commission, p. 38; Pigou, Unemployment, chapter xii; Ida Tarbell, The Golden Rule in Business, *American Magazine*, December, 1914.

[2] Third Report, p. 66; See also, Report of Mayor's Commission on Unemployment, Chicago, 1914, p. 87; H. R. Seager, "English Method of Dealing with the Unemployed," *American Labor Legislation Review*, May, 1914, p. 284; Frances A. Kellor, Out of Work—a Study of Unemployment (1915) p. 508 and chapter xiii; and Report of the Chicago Municipal Markets Commission, pp. 42, 57.

[3] J. B. Clark, Essentials of Economic Theory, p. 452. "In the actual state, which is highly dynamic, such a supply of unemployed labor is always at hand, and it is neither possible nor normal that it should be altogether absent. The well-being of workers requires that progress should go on, and it cannot do so without causing temporary displacements of laborers."

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The principle of insurance has been acknowledged by England, France, Norway, Denmark, and by Belgian and German cities in subsidizing the out-of-work benefits of trade unions. Beveridge[1] and the Webbs also emphasize the need of insurance, but the latter sound a note of warning against centering too much attention on insurance and overlooking preventive measures or considering them as secondary. A program of prevention, they hold, may be made much more effective than is ordinarily assumed possible, and all insurance schemes must be accompanied by machinery for prevention.[2] Unemployment insurance without the preventive measures just described would be like insuring against sickness and neglecting the well-known health measures to prevent disease.

VI. *Conclusion as to Present-Day Problem*

We have, then, a theoretical analysis of unemployment that is commonly accepted by scientific students. Demand for labor increases as fast if not faster than population, but while population grows steadily from year to year, business moves forward in waves or cycles. It fluctuates up and down within the year and from year to year; it moves by fits and starts—up in one direction, down in another. The net general tendency is ever increasing demand for labor, but specifically, individual employers fail and their demand is cut off, some businesses are losing ground, some trades are decaying, and every now and then there is more or less general retrenchment, depression and stagnation.

We have not only this common analysis, but the principles to be applied in effecting a solution are also generally agreed upon. The problem is not how to reduce the population to diminish-

[1] Unemployment, p. 236: "If the solution of the problem of unemployment means that every man should have the certainty of continuous work throughout life, then no solution is to be expected, or indeed, desired. If, however, by a solution is meant that no man able and willing to work should come to degradation or destitution for want of wages, then a solution is, not indeed within sight, but by no means beyond hope. Its direction is certain and its distance not infinite. The demand for labour cannot be stereotyped save in a stagnant industry. The supply of labour may be made immeasurably more capable of following and waiting for the demand."

[2] S. and B. Webb, The Prevention of Destitution, pp. 160, 139.

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ing needs of industry, or how to increase demand for labor to absorb surplus population, but how to secure a more perfect adjustment of particular forms of labor to specific demands. This is the preventive side, or what has been called "improving the capability of the supply of labor to follow the demand." And for that inevitable unemployment which comes from the necessity of maintaining a labor reserve, the problem is how to insure a steady income to the worker during his waiting periods and to place the burden of that maintenance where it properly belongs.

Insurance would seem to be a palliative, but in practice it is as much a preventive measure as any of the others. Just as workmen's compensation stimulated accident prevention and gave us our present splendid safety movement, so unemployment insurance, by making industry pay for its labor reserves will make it profitable for employers to decasualize labor, reduce labor reserves and make employment more steady. A few far-sighted employers are doing that now. They are systematizing methods of hiring and firing, making up stock in dull times, developing complementary lines of business, and reducing hours of labor in slack periods. But the mass of employers will not do this until they are made to pay for their unemployment as they pay for their accidents. When this is done we may even expect an "employment first" campaign among employers.

In addition to this established theoretical solution, we have the outlines of a practical solution recommended by almost all students. Labor exchanges to distribute workers properly, centralize demand and supply, bring man and job quickly together and reduce the labor reserve to its lowest possible minimum; vocational guidance and education to control the stream of new labor entering industry and distribute it in proper proportions among the trades, and remove the overcrowding of some and the undersupplying of others; a governmental policy of saving and shifting public work, to throw it on the market in slack seasons and years of depression, so that labor released by private employers might be absorbed and employment generally kept steady; and finally, insurance funds

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or out-of-work benefits to maintain the necessary labor reserves in decency and efficiency.

We come, then, to our original proposition that unemployment, as it presents itself to us today, is not a problem for theoretical discussion, but a problem for political, legislative, and administrative action. Why continue discussion of problems that have been theoretically solved, so far as they can be solved until the solutions are tested by actual administrative experiment?

In the United States we have become so enamored of discussion of unemployment that we are loth to give it up. Report after report comes forth, books and articles are written, speech after speech is made, all reiterating, more or less accurately, the same conclusions and the same general recommendations. Facts and statistics are piled high, ordinarily without analysis, and writers continue to complain of the deplorable lack of information. But when the material is classified and the details mastered and analyzed, the conclusions are ever the same.

One reason for this is that it is always interesting to recite the experiences of the unemployed, to appeal to the imagination with statements about armies of two million or four million wage-earners out of work. There is something dramatic about a workless army of men trudging the streets and tramping the roads vainly in search of work. That the system of industry is unable to employ all its workers is such a challenge to society that writers and speakers never tire of reiterating it; the public must be interested in a fact of such vital importance. Agitators and reformers play upon it. Charity workers make it the basis of appeals for funds. Political parties find it effective campaign material. If you must get the public ear, here is something dramatic and appealing. It is not so interesting to center attention on practical remedies and details of administration.

Again, it is easy to say: "Establish labor exchanges, they are the 'monuments which serve as pinnacles of observation, revealing the shortest cuts between supply and demand.'" But it is not so easy, in fact it is a dull and difficult task, to erect these monuments so that they will actually stand up and serve the whole community as pinnacles of observation. It is a most

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dramatic cry to demand public work and not charity for the unemployed; but it is quite another thing to get the funds with which to prosecute the public work and it is still more difficult to conduct it so that it will really be work, and not merely a fiction to hide charitable relief. It easy to say that we must have vocational education and vocational guidance for the youth of the land, but what a task it is to remodel the school system to meet the demands of an ever changing industrial life, and what a responsibility to assume to direct and place a child in a position that involves choosing a career!

So we have our economists today continuing the same analysis of unemployment, government commissions recommending the same remedies, social workers and reformers repeating the same facts, picturing the same evils and urging the same reforms. And all the while very little of a permanent, constructive, and remedial nature is accomplished. Our public employment bureaus have in the main been crude and ineffective. Their work, until very recently, has been quite primitive and their methods unbusinesslike; their main activity is with the lowest grades of unskilled and casual laborers and the statistics they publish are often valueless and unreliable.[1]

For a whole century every industrial depression has seen scores of experiments with public work for the unemployed, yet no systematic policy is established, and invariably the funds spent have been merely the cost of maintaining the fiction that work and not relief was given, accompanied by the demoralization that usually results from such a policy.[2]

And now the movements for vocational guidance and unemployment insurance, of more recent origin, threaten to repeat the same history. Advocates content themselves with proving the theoretical soundness of these propositions, repeating the necessity of the measures, and urging in general terms that the

[1] C. B. Barnes: Report of an Investigation of Public Employment Offices. Proceedings of the American Association of Public Employment Offices, Indianapolis meeting, 1914. See also "The Movement for Public Labor Exchanges," *Journal of Political Economy*, July, 1915, p. 707, for an account of the recent improvements.

[2] Relief Works in the United States, published in the *Quarterly Journal of the International Association on Unemployment*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1913.

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government adopt them, with little regard for the administrative machinery necessary to insure their success.

The immediate need in the way of study of the problem of unemployment is not causes, effects, or extent, but detailed methods of effectively organizing, conducting, and administering public employment offices, public work for the unemployed, systems of vocational guidance and unemployment insurance, and uniting them all into one comprehensive plan for preventing unemployment. For the rest, *action* is needed—intelligent use of publicity and manipulation of political situations directed to compel the parties to adopt such a program, to enact it as a whole or in substantial parts into legislation, and to create the essential administrative machinery and the necessary safeguards that will insure successful operation, or, at least, trial under favorable circumstances.

Unemployment in the United States today presents itself as a problem of preparing a comprehensive program for the prevention of unemployment, of outlining the laws with the essential provisions necessary to establish governmental responsibility, of devising the administrative machinery, methods and policies by which the action of the government may be made practical and effective, and thus starting the country toward the final solution of the problem. The present paper is introductory to such a study.

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SINGLE-TAX MOVEMENT IN OREGON

THERE is perhaps no state in the Union where the campaign for adoption of the single-tax in some form has been carried on with more vigor and tenacity than in the state of Oregon. Several factors have here given vitality to the single-tax movement. Chief among these is the presence of a small but aggressive body of men thoroughly imbued with the philosophy of Henry George. The general development of the Pacific Northwest, the progress of agriculture and the rapid growth of cities have resulted in a marked increase in land values with consequent profit to speculators. Idle tracts of land suitable for agricultural purposes, congressional grants reserved from use by railways, extensive holdings of timber and valuable water-power sites all gave point to the single-taxer's argument and supplied illustrations of what he is pleased to call the evils of "land monopoly." Since the adoption of the initiative and referendum in 1902, a system of direct legislation has made it easy to amend the constitution and secure submission of single-tax measures. Danger of conflict with the organic law of the state might be avoided by casting a measure in the form of a constitutional amendment, and a bare majority is sufficient to ratify. This important connection between the initiative and the single-tax movement in the state cannot be made too prominent. It is a matter of common knowledge that W. S. U'Ren, in devising the Oregon System, was actuated more by a desire to secure popular endorsement of his single-tax program than to realize popular control of legislation generally.

But the perseverance of single-tax leaders, even in the face of discouraging votes, has been due in no small degree to liberal contributions from the Fels Fund Commission. It has been charged by the opposition that many paid advocates of single-tax were sustained more by profit than principle. At any rate Joseph Fels recognized in Oregon a suitable field for popular "education" on the principles of taxation, always with

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a view of course to the ultimate adoption of a tax on land value alone. It is estimated that at two elections of 1910–12 contributions from the Fels Fund to Oregon totaled $51,956—a campaign fund of no inconsiderable size.

Oregon experience therefore affords an opportunity for study of different types of tax measures framed by orthodox followers of Henry George but always modified somewhat to suit local conditions or at times strangely disguised to humor prejudices of those not fully converted to the Georgian philosophy but thoroughly dissatisfied with the existing system of taxation. Four successive campaigns also supply abundant material for the study on the one hand of attempts at popularizing the theory of rent and the doctrine of unearned increment, and on the other hand of the efforts to meet these arguments by appeal to economic principle or deep-rooted prejudice with regard to property rights.

I

Although the way was open for the submission of measures to direct vote as early as 1904, no act with single-tax tendencies was referred until the general election of 1908. Steps were taken to prepare and circulate the measure early in January and the movement was backed by a group of advocates who took the name of the Oregon Tax Reform Association.[1] The measure finally agreed upon was cast in the form of a constitutional amendment and aimed to exempt dwelling houses and improvements on farms, city dwellings, manufacturing plant, tools and machinery. It will be seen at once that this measure falls far short of radical single-tax. It did not aim to lay the burden entirely on unimproved value. Business blocks, stock in merchandise, rolling stock and equipment of railways, corporation securities of all kinds and many other forms of personal property, tangible and intangible, were left subject to regular levies. The act was defended as a "departure in the direction of the single-tax," and in the campaign which followed arguments on both sides were not confined to the merits and drawbacks of the specific measure, but the theoretical justice of

[1] *Oregonian*, January 11, 1908.

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laying all taxes on land values was freely discussed. In defense of the amendment and the ultimate principle involved, naturally the conception of unearned increment as socially created value, ownership of land as a special privilege akin to monopoly and the economic evils of land speculation played an important part. While insisting on the fundamental importance of land as a factor in production, single-taxers minimized the importance of private ownership. The system of tenure, whatever form it assumes, must make land "yield to the needs of all men who must live on the land and not the favored few who have set themselves up as owners of what God intended to serve the needs of all."[1] Advocates of the measure not only questioned the original justification of private property in land but treated the present high value of city lots as a socially created value, increasing, too, with the growth of population and the further development of industry. Since one provision of the specific measure was to exempt manufacturers, advocates naturally made prominent the idea that the erection of factories and the growth of industrial centers enhanced the value of land in the vicinity. Franchises of public service corporations, it was claimed, belonged to the same category as land and owed their value to the sheer growth of numbers silently contributing to increased earning power.[2]

While the amendment itself was not sweeping or radical, advocates of the policy had laid a foundation in their argument broad enough to justify the transfer of all tax burdens to unimproved value. Opponents of single-tax feared that the adoption of this measure would encourage the submission of something more radical. Indeed the tone of the affirmative arguments had been such as to arouse suspicion that ultimate confiscation of all land values was aimed at. The program, of which this measure was a specific manifestation, was characterized as "socialistic," aimed at the abolition of land ownership and the inauguration of a leasehold system to take its place.[3]

[1] H. D. Wagnon in *Oregonian*, April 2, 1908.

[2] Statement of Oregon Tax Reform Association, in *Oregonian*, January 11, 1908.

[3] M. C. George in a debate with E. S. J. McAlister, reported in *Oregonian*, May 17, 1908; W. J. Jarrison in *Journal*, May 26, 1908.

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The policy proposed, or at least its ultimate tendency, was assumed to involve a violent reversal of the established system of private ownership. The social expediency of private property in land was strongly urged, especially for a new country like Oregon with vast undeveloped natural resources.

In answer to the single-taxer's argument based on the doctrine of unearned increment, it was urged that other species of property besides land owed their value to the presence of population and access to markets. With improvement in these conditions an increase in selling price was only natural. Reference was made to the herds of cattle which formerly roamed our western plains practically without value. With the advent of railways, livestock became a valuable product because it was "put in virtual proximity to population centers and a number of possible consumers."[1] Advocates of the single-tax of course met this contention by pointing out an essential difference. Most forms of personal property are far less permanent than land, and the supply, instead of being fixed by nature, may be increased through individual effort. Cattle die but acres of land endure and the growth of the community continues *indefinitely* to enhance land values. Moreover, the owner of land may gain through mere passive ownership while cattle require daily care and attention.[2] By showing that unearned increment was not confined to land, opponents of single-tax aimed to establish the necessity for a broader basis of taxation than that supplied by land values alone. Opponents of the measure also emphasized the fact that land values are not everywhere and always on the increase, and that the establishment of factories, for which landowners were asked to pay the tax, did not invariably increase the value of neighboring sites. There are some industrial establishments which have precisely the opposite tendency. Among these may be cited salmon canneries, gas works and smelters, proximity of which is deemed undesirable by real-estate owners. Not infrequently, too, shifting of market conditions, change in sources of supply etc. may result in a

[1] *Oregonian*, editorial, March 29, 1908.

[2] Oregon Tax Reform Association in *Oregon Journal*, April 11, 1908.

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marked decline of land values. If the state undertakes to appropriate the unearned increment, should not the state in justice compensate the "undeserved decrement"?[1] But even if owners profit through the growth of the community and mere passive ownership of land, few have benefited to the extent represented by the present value of their holdings. This same land has been subject to frequent transfer, and values created by society have been acquired through purchase. It is a dangerous doctrine that regards any *bona fide* investment as unearned. This argument not only emphasized the injustice involved in a program of confiscation but also the impracticability of recovering for society the precise increment of value unearned by a whole series of successive owners.[2]

Regarding ownership of land as a special privilege coupled with power to exact a tribute, naturally single-taxers made liberal use of the benefit theory of taxation, and wrung from it justification for heavier, if not exclusive, taxation of land. This involved, of course, rejection of the contributory theory and the rule of apportionment according to ability. "The contention of the single-taxer," says Dr. Cridge, "is that the government is a business organization of the entire people rendering certain services to the individual and that those services should be paid for as a man pays for shoes, sugar or bootblacking, not according to ability but according to value received."[3] To support single-tax policy in its radical form it was necessary not only to reject the faculty theory but to assume that land alone was benefited by the existence and activity of the government and that "labor products are not benefited by the outlay of public money."[4] This proved in practice to be the most vulnerable point in single-tax theory. Not that the opposition indulged in any destructive criticism of the benefit theory now generally

[1] T. C. Humphrey, in *Oregon Journal*, May 25, 1908.

[2] *Oregonian*, editorial, March 31, 1908; Wallace McCamant in speech before People's Forum, Portland, reported in *Oregonian*, May 11, 1908.

[3] A. D. Cridge, in *Oregon Journal*, May 28, 1908; the same idea is expressed by Fred C. Denton in *Journal*, May 22, 1908.

[4] Tom L. Johnson in a letter to Tax Reform Association, published in *Oregon Journal*, Feb. 25, 1908.

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discarded by economic thinkers. Some critics of single-tax policy assumed the truth of the faculty theory of taxation, but did not argue its superior soundness as compared with the benefit theory or insist that acceptance of the one involved rejection of the other. On this point they were inclined to dogmatize or rest on authority, to assume without proof that justice in taxation involves apportionment according to wealth or income. Ownership of personal property was seen to be a source of income as well as is land and, according to sound principle, liable to taxation.[1] Opponents of single-tax who reasoned from the ability theory of taxation were, however, in the minority. With the majority, acceptance of the benefit theory was the rule. Agreeing on the primary premise that taxes are paid for protection, single-taxers and their opponents reached widely divergent conclusions. Personal property, it was argued by the opposition, benefits even more than does land by police and fire protection, being more exposed to loss by theft, arson or the invasion of a foreign enemy. While regarding a tax as a *quid pro quo* the single-taxer proposed to exempt that form of property which benefited in the most conspicuous degree.[2]

Among practical advantages claimed for the exemption measure, the elimination of land speculation, subdivision of large holdings and encouragement to industry by removing the tax on factories, mills and labor products were made prominent. The tax on unimproved value as a means of eliminating the speculator and breaking up large holdings was supported by reference to New Zealand's experience. Advocates of the measure evidently overlooked or ignored the progressive feature of the New Zealand system, and failed to recognize that the colonial land tax was only one of many factors contributing to a satisfactory solution of the land problem.[3]

Chief among the practical advantages claimed for the measure

[1] *Oregonian*, editorial, February 9, 1908.

[2] *Oregonian*, editorial, May 1, 1908.

[3] A. D. Cridge, in *Oregonian*, May 15, 1908, claims, quoting from a New Zealand report, that the local system of rating on unimproved value was largely responsible for the early rebuilding of Wellington after the disastrous fire.

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of 1908 was the expected stimulus it would give to the improvement of the land and the construction of new mills and factories. Reference was made to acres of undeveloped agricultural lands and to the natural advantages of Oregon for manufacturing. Development was held back by a system of taxation that penalized industry. Exempt improvements on land and manufacturing and the industrial future of the state would be assured.[1] To the trained economist the most interesting phase of the discussion was the close resemblance of the arguments to the familiar ones in favor of protection. Both advocates and opponents recognized that the proposed exemption of manufacture was in reality a subsidy in disguise. It was argued by supporters that temporary loss from the assessment rolls would be more than offset by increased growth of manufacture and enhanced value of other assessable property. Moreover, the stimulus given to manufacture would create a home market for raw materials and food supplies. Production at home would also save freight charges on many articles hitherto shipped from eastern markets.[2]

Opponents of the measure frankly conceded that the principle involved was the same as that of the protective tariff locally applied, and that analogous results might follow so far as the encouragement of manufacture was concerned. They maintained, however, that it "most resembled that objectionable phase of the tariff, namely, class privilege." It was pointed out, too, that the redeeming feature of the tariff was its efficacy in raising revenue while the exemption of manufacture would have the opposite effect.[3]

A vigorous appeal was made by friends of the measure for support from the working class. Cheap land, it was argued, would cause some laborers to turn to the soil and become self-supporting. This transfer of labor to land coupled with im-

[1] Oregon Tax Reform Association, statement in *Oregonian*, January 11, 1908; Fred C. Denton, in *Oregon Journal*, January 17, 1908.

[2] Oregon Tax Reform Association in *Journal*, April 3, 1908; Tom L. Johnson, letter published in *Journal*, February 25, 1908; H. D. Wagnon in *Oregonian*, February 23, 1908.

[3] T. C. Humphrey, in *Journal*, May 18, 1908.

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provement of farms, utilization of water power, construction and operation of more factories would relieve the labor situation by creating an extra demand and by reducing at the same time the number of hired laborers.

The workingman was promised not only increased employment and higher money wages but a material reduction in the cost of living. With regard to this point argument on both sides was confusing and betrays an imperfect understanding of the laws of incidence. Single-taxers indeed asserted the claim (essentially sound) that exemption of manufacturers, if general enough, would reduce the price of finished articles, but they failed to make clear that taxes transferred from factories to land would not again be thrown back on the consumer. In fact some single-taxers assumed that the present tax on land value is shifted,[1] and the easy inference was that an exclusive tax on land would be shifted by the same process. Precisely this stand was taken by critics of single-tax doctrine, who maintained that the increased tax on land would "reappear in rents and in the costs of doing business, which, in large degree, must still be paid by labor through prices charged to consumers."[2] This position with regard to the incidence of a land tax will be recognized as unsound by students of public finance, but, so far as the writer knows, no correction was made by followers of Henry George.

A vigorous effort was made by single-taxers to convert the farming class, without whose support no measure could be carried by popular referendum. The amount of capital invested in manufacture represented approximately one-tenth of the entire assessment, and it was not proposed to exempt business blocks except those used for manufacturing purposes. The change of policy would necessitate no considerable increase in the rate of taxation, and farmers with cultivated land would gain more by exemption of improvements than they lost through the increased rate on unimproved value. Even the change to an

[1] Oregon Tax Reform Association, in *Journal*, April 3, 1908.

[2] *Oregonian*, editorial, January 12, 1908; the same notion that all taxes are shifted underlies the argument of Thos. Sladden, in *Oregonian*, May 16, 1908.

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exclusive land tax would reduce the burdens on farmers, who are vastly over-taxed under the present system. In support of this contention the precise fraction of state and local taxes which farmers would pay under single-tax was calculated and compared with the percentage required by the general property tax. Unfortunately for the single-taxer's cause, these estimates made by several writers differed widely and the sources of information were seldom given.[1]

To these widely divergent estimates critics merely opposed the crude exaggeration that, under the single-tax, farmers would pay *all* taxes, or the unsupported assertion that improvements on farms are worth proportionately less than city sky-scrapers and business blocks and that farmers would profit less by proffered exemptions than would owners of improved urban properties. A possible exception was found in the case of stockmen in eastern Oregon whose wealth, consisting so largely of sheep and cattle, would be entirely exempt. Such wealthy graziers, it was contended, should not be favored by disproportionate exemptions.[2]

To test the truth of assertions on either side would be impossible. Lack of uniformity in assessments of several counties, failure to approximate cash value in any county and failure of some assessors to segregate improvements on real estate, baffle any attempt to forecast the effect of single-tax on the owners of urban, as compared with rural, real estate. At any rate farmers generally assumed that the purpose of the movement, if not of the specific measure, was to transfer the burden entirely to land, and that land ownership would involve increased fiscal obligations. The exemption measure and the philosophy back of it were condemned by resolutions in local and state

[1] Estimates of the farmer's share under single-tax ranged all the way from one-tenth to one-third of the total. See A. D. Cridge, in *Oregonian*, March 7, 1908, and in *Journal*, May 20, 1908: quotation from *Labor Press* copied in *Journal*, April 11, 1908; statement of Oregon Tax Reform Association, in *Journal*, April 3, 1908; Fred C. Denton, in *Journal*, April 11, 1908.

[2] *Journal*, editorial, March 1, 1908; T. J. Fording, in *Oregonian*, May 12, 1908; Geo. A. Thacher, in *Oregonian*, May 24, 1908; L. A. Hunt, in *Oregonian*, June 1, 1908; and T. C. Humphrey in *Journal*, May 18, 1908.

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granges.[1] The opposition also found formal expression in resolutions by the East Side Push Club and the Taxpayers' League of Portland. In all of these the feeling was expressed that the measure proposed was an experiment which might prove detrimental, if not disastrous, to the state. Closely allied to this was the opinion, held by those not unfriendly to the new system of direct legislation, that the important task of formulating a state's revenue policy demanded the more deliberate consideration of a legislative body. At any rate the first measure with single-tax tendencies submitted in Oregon was defeated by a vote of 60,871 to 32,066, or nearly two to one. In some localities, however, the returns were such as to suggest to advocates the expediency of making single-tax policy a local, as well as a state-wide, issue.[2]

II

To clear the ground for such action was the evident aim of the constitutional amendment submitted in 1910. This act contained a prohibition against the poll tax, provided that no measure affecting assessment and taxation should become a law until ratified by the people at a general election, repealed every constitutional limitation on the taxing power when exercised by the people, and empowered the voters of the several counties to regulate taxation and exemption within their respective jurisdictions subject only to such general laws as the people might approve.[3] Disregarding the clause affecting the poll tax, which had been abolished by legislative act in 1907, the purpose of this amendment was twofold: first to reduce the power of the legislature over taxation to a mere initiative, and secondly to clear the way for county option in taxation. Although the measure was framed by single-taxers, its connection with the

[1] *Journal*, March 15, 1908.

[2] The result in Multnomah County was so close that a transfer of 250 votes would have given the measure an actual majority. In Coos County the amendment was carried by a majority of 77. In typical agricultural communities like Benton and Wallowa counties, the vote was five to one against the exemption measure.

[3] Laws of Oregon 1911, p. 9; *Cf.* POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. xxvi, p. 288.

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novement was at first obscured by the fact that it emanated rom labor organizations and received the endorsement of the entral labor council of Portland and the state federation of abor.[1] It is true that a vigorous campaign in favor of the mendment was later undertaken by single-tax advocates with he aid of the Fels Fund Commission.[2] The customary indictnent of the general property tax was made, high and increasing 'alue of urban real estate referred to, and the evils of land specılation expressed as in the previous campaign; but, with the exeption of scattering references here and there, the precise onnection between the amendment and the future program of he single-taxer was not disclosed. An appeal for popular upport was based mainly on the justice of abolishing the iniqıitous poll tax and the necessity of having all tax measures ubmitted to the people for direct consent.

The county option feature, which was undoubtedly considered mportant, was not made prominent in the campaign. When his phase of the question was referred to at all, advocates ırged the inherent justice of allowing each county to choose or itself suitable sources and methods of taxation.[3]

In opposing the measure it was urged that compulsory refernce of all tax laws was not only useless but would make it mpossible for the legislature to frame a unified, consistent evenue policy for the state. The assembly could not control ax measures submitted by initiative, and the endorsement of ome bills and the rejection of others would destroy whatever ıarmony the legislature might introduce. Since the verdict of he people could not be taken before the next general election, he legislature could not, in the interval between consecutive lections, meet an emergency that might arise.[4]

Critics of the measure also emphasized the evils of local

[1] *Journal*, October 15, 1910.

[2] W. G. Eggleston, A. D. Cridge and W. S. U'Ren, People's Power and Public 'axation, p. 125.

[3] Peoples Power and Public Taxation, p. 27; see also summary statement of same rgument in *Journal*, October 15, 1910.

[4] Report of State Tax Commission, 1911, p. 23; *cf.* also, Gilbert, "Apportionment f State Taxes in Oregon," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. xxvi, p. 286.

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option in taxation, the probable confusion and conflict betwee laws of adjacent counties. The danger of double taxatio would also be enhanced in proportion as the diversity of law was increased. The evasion of taxes on certain classes c property would be facilitated by a mere change of residence c situs. Without separation of sources, too, the apportionmer of state taxes would present insuperable difficulties.[1]

Some few critics of the measure saw and clearly stated th purpose back of the constitutional changes sought by its advo cates. It would prepare the way for submission of measures i selected localities recognized as strongholds of single-tax doc trine. Once single-tax was introduced as a county measur other localities would be compelled to adopt a similar policy a a means of self-defense, and the system could accordingly b extended throughout the state. It was recognized as a rounc about way of forcing the single-tax on counties irrespective c local preference.[2] Although the defects of the amendmer were clearly discerned and its passage was opposed by leadin Portland papers, by the state bar association, the state tax com mission and other organizations, critics of the measure were nc active in exposing its tendencies. On the other hand, vigorou support of the amendment by single-tax adherents, its endorse ment by organized labor, coupled with an attractive ballot titl insured its passage by a narrow majority.[3] With constitution obstacles removed, the way was now open for reference of an tax measure the followers of Henry George cared to initiate.

III

By far the most important single-tax campaign in Orego was waged before the general election of 1912. At that tim

[1] *Journal*, October 15 and November 6, 1910. Argument against the amendme also well stated in Report of Tax Commission, 1911, pp. 22–23.

[2] Geo. W. Dixon, in *Oregonian*, November 1, 1910; *Oregonian*, editorial, Ju 27, 1910, in which the amendment was characterized as "dangerous to the securi of property rights."

[3] The vote for the state as a whole was 44,171 in favor, and 42,127 against. Multnomah county the measure was carried by 2000, while 17 out of 34 counti gave smaller majorities.

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he famous graduated single-tax and exemption measure was ɔut forward by the Graduated Single Tax League of Oregon. This measure, like previous ones, was cast in the form of a :onstitutional amendment. The single-tax measure of 1912 ıimed to raise all or a part of state revenue by a graduated tax ɔn franchises and rights of way of public service corporations ınd on land and natural resources valued at more than $10,000. The sums collected from this source in each county were ıssigned first to the county's share of state revenue and any ;urplus might be used by counties for the support of common ;chools, for the construction and maintenance of public highways and for general county expenditures in the order named. The graduated tax began with a moderate rate of $2.50 on :ach $1000 between $10,000 and $20,000 and rose by nine tages to a maximum of $30 per thousand on all excess over $100,000. By far the most important and distinctive feature of the act was incorporated in an inconspicuous clause which :xempted all personal property and improvements "in, on or ınder the land" unless the people of a county should subsequently by direct vote reimpose such taxes.[1] This section, in pite of an evident aim to disguise it, would, if enacted, have :aused a sweeping conformity of the revenue system state and ocal to single-tax principles. All levies on personal property vere to be repealed and improvements on land were to be :xempt, not only from the graduated tax, but from any other axes imposed by state and local governments. The step proɔosed was far more radical than that contemplated in 1908.[2]

The graduated feature of the tax was obviously suggested by he New Zealand land tax, the favorable effects of which had ɔeen exploited in previous campaigns. Although frequent eference was made during the campaign to the efficacy of the Jew Zealand land tax as a means of breaking up large holdings, he main purpose of the graduated tax was evidently political. 3y providing an exemption of $10,000 and by making rates

[1] Such action required the initiative of 15 per cent of the voters, while under the eneral act only five per cent was necessary.

[2] Text of measure will be found in the official Copy of Initiative and Referendum leasures for 1912, pp. 226–229.

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high on valuable holdings, single-taxers hoped to conciliate farmers and small home owners besides playing more powerfully on the popular prejudice against concentrated wealth. Although the provision for a graduated tax was overemphasized throughout the campaign, the voters soon realized that this least objectionable feature was thrust into the foreground to disguise and render more palatable a provision, which, to its advocates was unquestionably the core of the entire amendment and which was soon recognized by its opponents as the most radical in its tendency. This was the exemption of all property except land and franchises of public service corporations. Quite early in the campaign the measure was characterized as "pure single tax with a few deceptive frills."[2]

Besides the statewide measure, outlined above, acts with similar import were submitted in Multnomah, Clackamas and Coos counties, in all of which the vote in previous elections held forth some promise of victory. In Portland, as in any great city, the landless class constituted a large percentage of the electorate and the rapid growth of the metropolis had given point to the single-taxer's argument based on the doctrine of unearned increment. Clackamas county was the home of Mr U'Ren, chief advocate of single-tax policy, while in Coos county holdings of timber were highly concentrated and the evil of timber monopoly was loudly complained of.

Although there was some dissention among the ranks of the single-taxers themselves, and some disagreement with regard to the spirit of the measure submitted,[3] the amendment received support from influential leaders, and a liberal contribution from the Fels Fund made possible a vigorous campaign in its favor. Landowners were now thoroughly aroused and they perfected a

[1] See Argument of Equal Taxation League, Copy of Initiative and Referendum Measures for 1912, pp. 236–37; also admission of W. S. U'Ren in debate with Mr Veazie at Sellwood, reported in *Oregonian*, June 6, 1912.

[2] *Oregonian*, editorial, July 19, 1912.

[3] Some persisted in calling the amendment an out-and-out single-tax measure others insisted that nothing half so radical was contemplated. See A. D. Cridge, in *Journal*, August 1, 1912; *ibid.*, September 6, 1912; *Oregonian*, editorial, October 3, 1912, states clearly some points of disagreement.

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formal organization called the Equal Taxation League of Oregon, the influential members of which were thirty prominent landowners of Multnomah County. Mr. Chas. H. Shields, a Seattle lawyer, prominent in the fight against the single-tax in that northern city, was engaged to conduct the campaign in Oregon. Of the thirty-eight measures submitted to popular vote in 1912 none received so much attention as the single-tax issue. Communications and newspaper editorials touching the subject were frequent; debates between champions of both sides were held;[1] pamphlets and circulars were issued and the voter was deluged with a flood of literature on the subject of taxation. The cost of this campaign on either side was no inconsiderable item.

Naturally a campaign of this kind was productive of much bitterness. Charges and counter charges of crookedness and deception were made, personalities indulged in and epithets coined and freely used. Because the campaign was replete with personalities and charges of misrepresentation it must not be inferred that it had no educational value. Voters were familiarized with the defects of the general property tax, the nature and theoretical justice of a tax on unearned increment and the concrete advantages claimed for the specific measure before the people. On the other hand, people were acquainted with the ethical and economic defects of the single-tax, its relation to private property in land and the possible injury to a growing state that might result from its adoption.

The indictment of the general property tax laid special stress on its tendency to discourage industry and enterprise. A tax on improvements and personal property might be regarded as a fine on saving and foresight. This argument was pushed to an absurd length in maintaining that the present system encouraged drunkenness and other forms of dissipation. Workingmen realized that it was cheaper in the long run to "paint the town red" in a drunken carousal than to save money and

[1] Most important of these oral discussions was a series of five debates between Mr. U'Ren and Chas. H. Shields held at Hood River, Portland (2), Salem, and Oregon City.

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paint their houses. The latter operation, although it "gave tone to the community," would involve an increase in taxes.[1]

Although the argument based on the conception of unearned increment was more elaborately stated than in 1908, few new phases of the theory were presented. Man's natural right of access to the soil was vigorously asserted and justification of ownership was said to rest on use. Man's title to land was limited by the amount he could use for productive purposes, not the amount he was able to buy. When a landlord seeks to "fence natural opportunities away from labor and exact a tribute for their use, there social justification of ownership ceases. In answer to claims that single-tax would confiscate land, it was urged that "land was already confiscated from its rightful owners," landless men and women who wish to use it for homes or a source of food supply.[2] Examples were cited in support of the claim that increasing value of city lots is socially created wealth. In Portland there has been a marked tendency in recent years to lease important sites, the lessee agreeing to make improvements. These leases helped to make prominent ground rent as an unearned income. To make clear that the increased income and capital value did not depend on industry and foresight of individuals, examples were cited of Seattle and San Francisco owners who had been confined for long periods of time in lunatic asylums, but had, notwithstanding, waxed rich "through the exercise of brains and sagacity." The conclusion was reached that ground rents were mere tributes levied on industry and without recompense to society. If private property in land is a necessary institution, ground rents should merely pass through the hands of the owner into the public treasury.[3]

In defense of private property in land little advance was made by the opponents of single-tax over the argument as stated in 1908. The institution was characterized as the "chief gar-

[1] Heck Smith, in *Journal*, October 11, 1912.

[2] B. L. in *Journal*, July 2, 1912; Dr. J. Frey, in *Journal*, October 31, 1912; F. E. Coulter, in *Journal*, July 5, 1912.

[3] B. L. in *Journal*, June 21, 1912; F. E. Coulter, in *Journal*, July 5, 1912.

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ment of civilization," and the single-tax, which threatened to undermine it, was declared to be a "doctrine of decay." Land communism was "discarded by his Divine Majesty thousands of years ago," and persisted only among pagan people today. The precise connection between private property and civilization was not clearly explained, but defenders of the system were convinced that its overthrow threatened a return to barbarism, a reversion to "the primitive state from which we came." [1]

But the most telling argument against the single-tax was based on the notion of vested interest. Our government, the argument runs, permits the exchange of one species of property for another. Where exchanges are allowed and even encouraged, the justification of private property of all kinds must rest on the same principle.[2] Much of the land in our own public domain was acquired at little money cost but under contract that permanent title would be granted when certain conditions of residence and cultivation were complied with. This understanding was a contract in perpetuity, a covenant extending to generations yet unborn. To adopt a revenue policy which destroys all value in land would be to repudiate a contract freely entered into for all time.[3] The argument was strengthened by reference to workingmen who had purchased city lots on the installment plan, periodic payments being provided for out of current wages. These plots of land were from the owner's standpoint virtually labor products which in compliance with single-tax doctrine should be exempt.[4]

"The single-tax," said Mr. Shields in an interview, "is offered as a panacea for all the ills of society. Under its magic influence inequalities will disappear, crime, want and misery and even physical imperfections will vanish." The exorbitant claims of the single-taxer were scarcely overstated. Inequalities of wealth, to cite a few examples, would vanish when all taxes

[1] *Oregon Equal Taxer*, June 11, 1912; Chas. H. Shields, Single Tax Exposed, pp. 26 and 28.

[2] Single Tax Exposed, pp. 32–33; J. C. Edridge, in *Journal*, November 3, 1912.

[3] Single Tax Exposed, p. 20 ff.

[4] J. C. Edridge, in *Journal*, November 3, 1912.

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are levied on land. "Great incomes would melt away when the right to exploit others on natural opportunities is taken away. There are no other great incomes."[1] "The single-tax," the same writer concedes, "would not help the poor man, for the simple reason that there would soon be no really poor men in Oregon." Single-tax, too, would soon eradicate the social evil, because human beings would gradually get back their natural opportunities and thus become natural husbands and wives.[2] The conversion of land rent into public revenues to be spent on internal improvements, one advocate modestly claims, would create "a paradise right here in Oregon."[3]

Underneath this mass of unsupported assertions and obvious exaggerations are found some arguments entitled to serious consideration. Among these is the contention that the graduated tax would eliminate land monopoly by making large holdings unprofitable.[4] It will be remembered that the maximum rate proposed under the graduated tax was 30 mills on unimproved value exceeding $100,000 in a single county. To this must be added the regular levy which the single-taxer, notwithstanding his inclination to minimize the rate on small properties, estimated at 22½ mills for Multnomah County.[5] A rate of 5¼ per cent on unimproved value, no portion of which could be shifted, would undoubtedly have proved a powerful deterrent to land speculation except where a marked increase in selling price was expected.

On the other hand it must be conceded that the evils of concentrated holdings were greatly exaggerated by advocates of the graduated tax. Large holdings existed in city and country districts, but these were being rapidly subdivided as fast as the need for home-sites and tillable lands demanded. It was true that speculation and the tendency to discount future rise in value had caused land to be held at excessive figures, but in

[1] E. F. Coulter, in *Single Tax Broacher*, May, 1912.

[2] E. F. Coulter, in *Journal*, July 5, 1912.

[3] *Single Tax Broacher*, March, 1912.

[4] W. S. U'Ren, in debate with Chas. H. Shields, reported in *Journal*, October 25, 1912; *Single Tax Broacher*, May, 1912.

[5] W. S. U'Ren, in *Oregonian*, August 30, 1912.

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this particular large landowners were by no means the chief offenders. Opponents also raised the question whether the graduated tax would produce the expected results. Such subdivisions as followed might be attended by fictitious transfers for the sake of evading the tax. New Zealand's experience with the graduated land tax was referred to in support of this claim. True, the Oregon measure, with an evident aim of forestalling such action, had declared [1] attempts at evasion by false transfers would work forfeiture of property, but the clause was ambiguous and its precise construction yet to be determined. But the weakest point in the single-taxer's case was the claim that the measure would break up large holdings and at the same time produce liberal revenue. Clearly the subdivision of large tracts and transfer to several owners would bring values of separate holdings below the exemption limit and make the graduated tax inoperative. In calculating the revenue expected from the graduated tax, advocates assumed large holdings to remain intact. Often in the same argument they enlarged on the advantage of causing subdivision and the application of intensive methods.[2] When confronted with the charge of inconsistency, single-taxers replied that either large holdings would be broken up or increased revenue would be obtained and that either alternative was desirable.[3]

In discussing the practical advantages of single-tax, chief stress was laid on its potency to attract capital, encourage improvements and stimulate the demand for labor. Even more than in the campaign of 1908 the argument from example was pushed to an absurd length. The prosperity and rapid development of the Canadian Northwest was ascribed almost wholly to the tax on unimproved value, and the single-tax for Oregon was offered as the only satisfactory means of checking the pronounced emigration of American citizens to Alberta and British Columbia.[4] Similarly advocates of the graduated tax claimed

[1] Section k, Graduated Tax Measure.

[2] See *Oregonian*, editorial, October 18, 1912, where conflicting claims of single-taxers are subject to scrutiny.

[3] A. D. Cridge, in *Oregonian*, October 21, 1912.

[4] A. D. Cridge, in *Journal*, August 10, 1912.

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that the brisk demand for labor in Western Canada was accounted for by the excellence of their revenue system and resulting stimulus to industry.[1]

To these extravagant claims opponents replied that the Canadian cities used the tax on unimproved value only as a source of local revenue, and the land tax was supplemented by a variety of duties and imposts for provincial purposes. The tax was not, in the strict sense of the term, *single* at all.[2] Canadian prosperity, moreover, was not due to her system of taxation, for when provincial as well as local revenues are considered, it does not differ in scope from the general property tax. Other factors were paramount in promoting the rapid development of that section, chief among which were the abundance of rich soil, and the liberal land policy of the government and railways. The single-taxer's promise of lower cost of living for the working class was likewise illusory. The burden transferred to land would be shifted back to his shoulders. The argument on this point was of course fallacious. Single-taxers who understood better the laws of incidence refrained from criticism, it may be, for a purpose. Belief that the added tax on land could be shifted obviously removed one serious objection from the standpoint of the farming class.

By far the most telling phase of the argument against the graduated tax measure was based on the assumption that a radical single-tax was contemplated. Indeed the argument of the single-taxer himself lent some support to the view. The graduated tax was termed by its defenders as a "distinct and positive step toward placing all taxes on land value" and it was claimed that its adoption would demonstrate the justice and expediency of the single-tax principle in raising all revenues state and local.[3] The measure in its effect and tendency was arraigned

[1] When an idle carpenter in Oregon received a telegram conveying an offer of employment at Vancouver, the general property tax in Oregon was held responsible for the jobless man, and the single-tax in British Columbia credited with the manless job. See *Single Tax Broacher*, September, 1912.

[2] Chas. H. Shields, in *Oregonian*, August 4, 1912; D. Stevens, in *Oregonian*, November 3, 1912.

[3] A. D. Cridge, in *Single Tax Review* for August, and *Oregonian*, editorial comment, September 15, 1912; A. D. Cridge, in *Oregonian*, October 18, 1912.

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as distinctly hostile to the interests of the land-holding class regardless of amount held. Property owners as well as those who recognized the justice and expediency of private ownership were exhorted to resist this movement toward "land communism."[1]

Two specific defects of the graduated tax measure played an important part in the campaign against it. The first of these was the local option, or rather local rejection, feature of the bill. The exemption feature of the act applied to the entire state, but any county might, by initiative and referendum, restore the tax on personal property and improvements. In the return to the old system an infinite number of local variations was possible. Endless confusion and conflict of laws, double taxation, easy evasion, in a word, fiscal chaos, would result. In the second place, the measure as framed discriminated against holdings concentrated in one locality as compared with those more widely distributed. The amount of graduated tax was determined by the value of holdings in any particular county and not for the state as a whole. An owner with holdings massed in one county might pay a heavy tax while another with equally valuable properties scattered in several counties would escape the graduated tax altogether.[2]

As against the radical tendencies and specific defects of the act farmers could scarcely be appeased by the vague uncertain prospect of lower taxes. As in 1908 a desperate effort was made to convince the farmer that the graduated single-tax measure would reduce his burden. The task was of course more difficult, for the exemptions proposed by the new act were far more general. Appeal was of course made to numerous bodies of small farmers, the unimproved value of whose holdings seldom exceeded $10,000 and who were therefore not subject to the graduated tax at all. For this class a reduction

[1] Single Tax Exposed, p. 28; R. E. Harrison, in *Oregonian*, November 3, 1912.

[2] Initiative and Referendum Measures for 1912, p. 234; *Oregonian*, editorial July 24, 1912. To make clear the possible inequalities, critics chose an example of a man owning $10,000 worth of land in each of the 34 counties or $340,000 in the aggregate. Since $10,000 was exempt in each county he would pay no tax. On the other hand, a man with $340,000 of unimproved value in one county would pay $7000 of graduated tax.

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in the rate was promised on the ground that the loss of revenue involved in exempting personal property and improvements would be more than made good by the graduated tax on franchises and large holdings of land.[1] In proof of these claims, surveys and analyses of tax rolls were made and results for Clackamas County were published as a campaign document. In spite of these attractive claims backed up by an array of figures, the conservative farmer remained skeptical. The yield from the graduated tax on land was an uncertain quantity. The tax might be evaded by fictitious transfers or dispersion of holdings, or, as the single-taxer himself conceded, through actual subdivision of large tracts into small homes. No one could forecast the increased revenue from the taxation of franchises, for the act itself failed to prescribe a method for calculating their value.[2] Moreover the corporations were already assessed on franchise value as well as roadbed, rolling stock and other equipment. The state board of tax commissioners in calculating assessments of public service corporations capitalizes the net earnings at six per cent. The sum capitalized clearly includes surplus earnings from the ownership of franchise.[3] The new amendment, on the other hand, proposed to exempt everything but franchises and rights of way, and the assumption was that the latter would be assessed as unimproved land. In spite of "juggled figures," therefore, farmers generally believed that single-tax would mean an ultimate, if not an immediate, increase in taxes.[4] The opposition of the farming class found

[1] Graduated Single Tax and Exemption Amendment, by W. G. Eggleston, p. 3; *Single Tax Broacher*, September, 1912; A. M. Himes, in *Journal*, June 17, 1912; J. W. Cullen, in *Oregonian*, September 17, 1912. By exaggerating the amount of graduated tax which would be collected in Clackamas county, Mr. Eggleston claimed that a reduction in local levy from 20.6 to 8.87 mills would take place. Notice the precision with which the rate is calculated.

[2] Advocates later defined franchise value as "the amount on which a railway or other public service corporation is able to pay interest in the form of dividends on stock after paying interest on the money actually invested in all the property the corporation uses in its business." *Single Tax Broacher*, September, 1912.

[3] For method employed see First Biennial Report, 1911, p. 10 ff.

[4] *Oregonian*, editorial, July 20, 1912; Jonathan Johnson, in *Oregonian*, November 3, 1912.

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expression in resolutions adopted by the state grange which met at Roseburg, May 14–18. The principle of the single-tax was pronounced "fundamentally unjust and unreasonable," and its adoption, it was asserted, "would mean ruin to the farmers of Oregon."[1] The graduated tax was likewise actively opposed by the state tax commission. Early in the campaign it was the evident aim of the state board to remain neutral. As the campaign progressed, however, the opposition of single-taxers to a group of measures prepared by these officials and submitted at the same time[2] called for retaliation.[3]

The spirit of their campaign was well expressed by Mr. Galloway: "It is easy enough to propose legislation for shifting the burden of taxation on the shoulders of somebody else but the people of Oregon are not looking for such law. They desire a system that will apportion the tax burden among all classes in proportion to ability to pay."[4] Amid the clash of sectional and class interests variously affected by the specific measure, desire for wider distribution of tax burdens proved the deciding factor. The graduated single-tax was defeated by a vote of 82,015 to 31,534. At the same time the people repealed the county option amendment of 1910 and restored to the legislature its former power over taxation. Three county single-tax measures were at the same time defeated by varying majorities.[5]

Comparing returns of 1912 with those of 1908, it seems clear that the single-tax had lost rather than gained in support. The amendment of 1908 was defeated by a ratio of 15 to 8. In

[1] *Oregonian*, May 19, 1912; *Oregon Equal Taxer*, June 17, 1912. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 99 to 5. County grangers subsequently passed resolutions opposing the use of space in grange publications for any article favoring the single-tax. *Oregonian*, June 5, 1912.

[2] The program included a constitutional amendment authorizing taxation of incomes by the state, the exemption of household furniture, the exemption of notes, mortgages and corporation stocks, and a model inheritance-tax law.

[3] See *Oregonian*, September 26, 1915.

[4] Chas. V. Galloway in debate with H. D. Wagnon, October 8, 1912, reported in *Oregonian*, October 9, 1912.

[5] In Multnomah the county measure was beaten by a vote of 23,901 to 11,146; in Clackamas county 3787 to 1827 and in Coos 1909 to 1113.

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1912 the proportion was raised to 20.5 to 8. When comparison is made on an absolute rather than a relative basis the showing is still unfavorable to the single-tax cause. While the total vote on the measure of 1912 exceeded that of 1908 by 20,000, the affirmative vote had fallen off by 500. In fairness to the single-taxer's case it must be conceded that the measure of 1912 was far more radical than its predecessor, but, on the other hand, it had been rendered more attractive to small landowners by addition of a "graduated tax jug handle." Despite optimistic contentions of single-taxers, comparative votes probably reflect fairly well the change in sentiment between 1908 and 1912—years marked by a more or less continuous propaganda for single-tax in Oregon.

IV

At the general election of 1914 seven tax measures were submitted, two of which were recognized as having single-tax tendencies. A constitutional amendment framed by H. D. Wagnon of Portland provided for a graduated tax on the unimproved value of land over $25,000. This specific tax in addition to the regular levy began with a moderate rate of fifty cents on each $100 of valuation between $25,000 and $50,000, and rose to a rate of $3.00 on each $100 in excess of $100,000.[1] This graduated tax, it will be recognized, was borrowed with slight modification from the single-tax measure of 1912. Its obvious aim was to impose on unimproved value a burden heavy enough to encourage the subdivision of large holdings and their use for productive purposes. In conjunction with the regular state and local levies, the extra tax would have been high enough to destroy all profit on unimproved holdings in excess of $100,000 and make it possible to escape confiscation only by subdivision and sale. In the campaign which followed, this measure attracted little attention. The graduated tax feature, already made prominent in the campaign of 1912, had been rejected by a heavy majority. There was a disposition to regard the question involved as a settled issue. When hostile

[1] Initiative and Referendum Measures, 1914, pp. 60–61.

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reference was made to the measure it was only to deny that steps as drastic as those contemplated by the act were necessary to insure the settlement and cultivation of unimproved tracts. To compel subdivision of large estates under threat of confiscation was moreover a dangerous expedient. Confiscation once begun might be carried too far. The adoption of such measures would threaten the security of property rights and discourage the investment of outside capital in the state.[1] It was rejected by a vote of 124,943 to 59,186.

Far more effective in stimulating popular interest was the companion measure known as the $1500 exemption. It was likewise cast in the form of a constitutional amendment and provided that buildings, improvements on land, livestock, machinery, merchandise and personal property should be exempt to the extent of $1500. The measure was framed and endorsed by W. S. U'Ren, prominent single-tax leader and at the same time independent candidate for the governorship. It was evidently expected by single-tax advocates that promise of considerable exemption to small taxpayers would insure its passage. Once exemption of improvements had been started, the limit of exemption would be raised until all property except land had been freed from taxation. So far as immediate effects were concerned the measure would operate merely to reduce the burden on improvements and personalty and increase the rate on land value. Just how considerable would have been the change it was impossible to determine. Early in the campaign it was estimated that the measure would strike about $150,000,000 from the assessment rolls of the state, or approximately one-sixth of the total. To make good the loss of revenue an increase of one-fifth in the general tax rate would be necessary. It was difficult to ascertain in advance the precise effect on the tax rolls, however. The amendment permitted each taxpayer to claim $1500 exemption and a double exemption for husband and wife who were joint owners of the same property. In practice, too, the measure would probably have

[1] *Eugene Register*, August 27, 1914; Initiative and Referendum Measures, 1914, p. 64; F. W. Mulkey, in *Journal*, October 5, 1914.

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permitted a deduction of $1500 for every county in which tangible property was owned. As a consequence the number of exemptions per taxpayer would have been multiplied. The uncertainty on these points left room for argument, and widely divergent estimates were used to support opposing claims with regard to incidence. The percentage of property exempted in any particular locality would be determined by number and size of holdings, proportion of personalty to land values etc. In some small towns of 500 or less it was claimed by critics that the exemption would necessitate an increase of 300 per cent in the local tax rate.[1] On the other hand advocates claimed that owners of small but highly improved pieces of real estate would be benefited, since exemption of $1500 would more than offset the increased rate on unimproved value. To keep this idea prominent the measure was styled by its friends the "home exemption amendment."

The exemption was urged, too, as a partial corrective for the inequalities of the general property tax. The evasion of the tax on intangible personalty amounted to virtual exemption of millions belonging to the rich. The proposed exemption would merely compensate in part the heavier burden to which owners of tangible property are subject.[2]

The campaign in favor of the measure was by no means as vigorous as those of previous years. For this, lack of agreement between single-taxers themselves and shortage of funds were responsible.[3] Scattering communications supporting the measure appeared in the press, and Mr. U'Ren in pressing his claims to the governorship gave due prominence to the "home exemption amendment."

The campaign against the measure was aggressive, wide-spread and thorough. With the exception of the *Oregon Daily Journal* practically all the leading newspapers of the state were opposed. The campaign gave birth to a new organization called

[1] *Tax Liberator*, November, 1914.

[2] W. S. U'Ren, in *Oregonian*, September 5, 1914; Initiative and Referendum Measures, 1914, p. 38.

[3] Total expenditures in favor of the measure were only $402.75. Report of Secretary of State, 1913–14, p. 101.

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he Oregon Rational Tax Reform Association, with headquarters t Roseburg and an extensive membership among farmers and usiness classes in all parts of the state. The pages of the *Tax iberator*, organ of the association, were filled with arguments gainst the exemption measure. Although the avowed aim of he association was to promote the cause of rational tax reform, he campaign was mainly a destructive one. Prior to the elec- on the resources of the association were devoted to the task f defeating "U'Ren's pet measure." A specific defect of the ieasure much emphasized during the campaign was the proba- ility of multiple exemptions for taxpayers with holdings of ingible property in several counties. The assessor in one ounty had no practical means of allowing for exemptions ranted elsewhere. Each assessor would permit exemptions to ie limit of $1500 for a single man or $3000 for husband and ife. A man with holdings in 34 counties would obtain exemp- ons to the extent of $51,000 or $102,000 as the case might e. The measure would unavoidably discriminate in favor of ie taxpayer with widely-scattered holdings and against the poor ian with a single holding in one county.[1]

By far the most telling argument against the measure was ased on its relation to single-tax in its more radical form. It as described by its opponents as "single-tax in disguise," a modified form of land tax," the "old specter in different obes" etc. On this point there was a deal of unsupported as- ertion and little appeal to sound reason. Editorial writers and orrespondents rarely took pains to indicate the connection be- veen this moderate exemption measure and single-tax in its iore pronounced form, or to show how exemption, once granted, ould tend to extend itself until land remained the sole object f taxation. Instead, they reminded the voter that the amend- ient emanated from Mr. U'Ren, whose connection with the ngle-tax movement was well known, and was supported by ien whose names were already familiar to the public as advo- ates of land-value taxation. Experience proved, too, that xtended argument on this point was unnecessary. The ma-

[1] *Oregonian*, September 21, 1914.

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jority were already convinced that the single-tax philosophy wa unsound and were inclined to reject any application of th principle, however mild. The measure received a negative vot of more than two to one. Naturally, farming districts of th state gave the heavier majorities against it. Benton and Gillian typical agricultural counties, rejected the measure by a vote c four to one. In Multnomah, Clackamas and Coos the vote wa more evenly divided, but no county gave an affirmative majorit

Despite the fact that single-tax propaganda has not bee productive of tangible results or even increased support fo specific measures, it must not be inferred that no benefits hav sprung from a campaign of education. The indictment of th general property tax has exposed its weakness in theory and it defects in practice. Many critics of single-tax policy, who i early campaigns were inclined to uphold the principle c "uniform taxation" of all property, now frankly confess that cannot be done with any degree of fairness and justice. De fects of the existing system are now generally recognized an even the most conservative are beginning to see that the onl way to forestall considerable concessions to single-tax policy i the future is to promote the cause of rational tax reform Single-tax discussion has likewise made clear the nature of ur earned increment on city lots and the theoretical justice c taxing urban site value at a higher rate than property that i more distinctly the product of labor. At the same time critic of single-tax policy have emphasized the injustice of taxin away the entire value of land bought and paid for by hard earned savings of present owners, and exposed the folly c placing all taxes on land while disregarding incomes from othe sources. The practical outcome may be the adoption, at n distant date, of some policy resembling the German incremer tax, which concedes something to single-tax philosophy whil avoiding its fiscal and ethical defects. Some single-tax leader in the state have already made clear their willingness to endors the principle of the increment tax and recommend its use as supplementary source of state and local revenue.

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LAND TENURE REFORM AND DEMOCRACY

I

NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that there is still prevalent in the minds of most Americans the lofty sentiment that "all men were created equal," it requires only a modicum of casual observation to convince one that the famous Jeffersonian dictum is, unless liberally construed, substantially untrue. There is perhaps a greater degree of equality in men at the time of their birth than in subsequent years, but even from the beginning there are differences in opportunity and natural talents which lead to inequality in education, possessions, and social standing. On this point, however, it would be unfair to criticise Jefferson severely. One can appreciate his doctrine of equality without fully accepting it. For it is a truism that men's views are moulded in part by their economic environment—the conditions under which they make their living. These conditions, in Jefferson's time, were extremely favorable for the development of a spirit of equality. Land was the predominant form of wealth and it was abundant; all were free to become landowners; and while there was undoubtedly a certain inequality in material possessions, there was nevertheless an approximate equality in opportunity.

That the American spirit of democracy was originally the product of equality in opportunity and economic independence rather than the result of a blind belief in the inherent equality of men, can scarcely be questioned. And for a time at least, the continuance of this spirit was insured by the same conditions which had been responsible for its origin. The existence of a large supply of unoccupied land, coupled with the adoption of a liberal policy for its settlement, gave to agriculture a foremost place in the nation's business, and to farmers a stamp of independence and equality to be found in no other occupation.

As a class the American farmer was of a totally different type from the European peasant. His life was that of a pio-

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neer, spent in comparative isolation. He seldom saw hi neighbors, if he had any, but strangers were always welcome In his reckoning of character present worth counted for most antecedents for least. Moreover, with his Bible and his ax h was well-nigh self-sufficient. He paid no rent to an absente landlord, nor looked to charity when overtaken by misfortune He was essentially a home builder and a home owner, a farme rather than a proletarian, who enjoyed the full product of hi own labor. "Such men," wrote Jefferson, "are the true repre sentatives of the great American interest, and are alone to b relied on for expressing the proper American sentiments."

No less marked in significance was the effect which the lan supply had upon the welfare of the laboring classes. On th farm the labor problem was acute. Few there were who care to work in the hire of another when it was possible for one t become his own master on his own land. Likewise the frontie offered a life of independence to those who found the cond tions of employment in the factory and workshop unpromisin or intolerable. To have been born in the ranks of a wage earning class was no severe handicap. One could easily ris above the status of "low birth." Laborers had an alternativ of economic independence by virtue of which employers wer constrained to recognize efficiency as it appeared and to grar an early preferment to those worthy of further employmen It is little wonder, therefore, that the wages of American laborer have been high. Conscious of their ability to rise, howeve humble in origin, they have had ambition and incentive whic in turn have reacted favorably upon their productive powe and the scale of labor remuneration.

II

In the sense that its citizens were free to become their ow masters, the United States was, during the first century of i existence, truly a "free country." But with the rapid settl ment of the West under the Homestead Law—which marke the climax of the policy of favoring the actual settler—the co ditions giving rise to that freedom and equality were destine to run their course. By 1890, in fact, the best lands had bee taken up, and the supply of free land practically exhausted.

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In recent years a change in the form of land tenure has gradually been making its appearance. The percentage of farms operated by their owners is, for the United States as a whole, declining. Although this change became apparent long ago in some of the older states, where on account of a certain immobility on the part of farmers the status of tenancy was deemed preferable to the isolation and hardships of frontier life, it is only within the last twenty-five years that tenancy seems to have made great headway. In some sections of the country the decline in the percentage of farms operated by their owners has been nothing short of precipitous. According to the Thirteenth Census of the United States, 0.7 per cent of the farms in Oklahoma in 1890 were operated by tenants; by 1910 the percentage had risen to 54.8. In Kansas the percentage of farm tenancy increased from 16.3 in 1880 to 36.8 in 1910. A similar increase is recorded for Nebraska during the same period. These are comparatively new states, where one would expect to find a high percentage of ownership, but the increase in the number of owned farms in the less fertile portions of the western counties has not been sufficient to counterbalance the rapid increase in tenancy in the older sections. In states like Iowa and Illinois, well developed and long settled, the transition from ownership to tenancy has steadily advanced until at the present time there are several counties in which more than one-half the number of farms under cultivation are operated by tenants. Finally, in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas, less than one-half the number of cultivable farms are operated by their owners.

The reasons for this transition are fairly obvious. Land is no longer free. The young man who aspires to land ownership can no longer depend upon the generosity of the federal government. On the contrary, if he has only his hands to work with, he is obliged to spend a number of years in apprenticeship, either as a farm tenant or laborer, in order to acquire sufficient from his earnings to become his own master. In spite of natural handicaps many succeed eventually in acquiring farms, but a number of causes have combined to render that

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success problematical if not altogether unprofitable. Land has come to have a speculative value. Owing to the exhaustion of the supply of free land and the rapid rise in the prices of farm products during the last fifteen years, there has been a phenomenal increase in land values, and a growing confidence, borne out by past experience, that the ownership of land is equivalent to the certainty of an unearned increment. All classes indeed have contributed to the speculative spirit. The prosperous landowner, on realizing a surplus from his farming operations, has found it more profitable to invest his funds in additional land than to attempt to increase the productivity of the land he already possessed. Likewise, merchants, bankers, and private investors, equally aware of the possibilities attached to land ownership, have discovered in land acquisition a pleasant and profitable avocation. Much of the land so acquired has naturally been turned over to tenants (many of whom are wholly incompetent) for a cash rental insufficient in some cases to meet the annual tax levy.

The result of this general speculative activity has been to raise the value of land far above any investment valuation that could be made on the basis of present productive capacity. Land which yields a cash rent of $3 per acre may sell for considerably more than $100. When the cost of borrowing on farm-mortgage security is from 6 to 7 per cent, the natural return from the land is less than one-half the expenses that would be incurred by the prospective purchaser. Thus land speculation, even though the land be cultivated, has given rise to a ratio between farm earnings and expenses extremely unfavorable to ownership by the actual cultivator.

III

So long as this ratio continues, tenancy may be expected to go on increasing. The period of apprenticeship which the man of small means must serve preliminary to land ownership must continue steadily to grow longer. This is a situation not to be viewed with complacency. Face to face with the prospect of life-long tenancy, the young farmer of ambition and enterprise is likely to abandon the occupation of farming for the higher

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money wages and more attractive social life of the city. The gradual decline in the population of many rural communities bears witness to the strength of this tendency. The most vigorous blood has been irreparably lost. Those who have remained on the soil without the vision of economic independence have fallen victims to an enervating environment. There has already developed a type of American tenant not far removed in intelligence and mode of living from the level of European peasantry. Moreover, as a system, farm tenancy is wasteful. The tenant depletes the soil, neglects the maintenance of farm buildings, and manifests little interest in the application of scientific principles to agriculture. Having no permanent ties to the community in which he lives, he is unconcerned with the betterment of roads, the improvement of educational facilities or the development of a wholesome community life. These landmarks of tenancy are not easily destroyed.

Finally, experience has shown that a system of tenant farming gives rise to endless friction between the tenant and landowning classes. Sooner or later absentee landlordism becomes the rule. The relation between owner and tenant becomes what Carlyle would have called a "cash nexus," necessitating continual and unfriendly adjustment. These conditions militate strongly against the spirit of American institutions. Concurrently with the growth of absentee landlordism, rural population is divided into classes, landlords and landless, and there arises an inequality in opportunity directly opposed to a democracy of equality and independence.

In a democracy, then, the ideal form of land tenure is ownership. Opportunity to acquire and the right to possess hold for the young man a certain magic which makes for initiative, independence, and citizenship. Unlike the farm tenant, the cultivator who owns his own farm is interested in the welfare of his community and the maintenance of property rights. The contrast is tersely expressed in the well-known sentiment, "Any man would die for a home, but who would die for a boarding-house?" Even socialists, strong in their advocacy of collective ownership of all the instruments of production, find difficulty in arguing out of existence the social advantages to be derived

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from a system of limited holdings. Indeed, in some of the writings of modern socialists there is a tendency to withdraw from the old extreme position and to grant the desirability of small land proprietors. Only through some such concession in doctrine can the socialist appeal arouse any interest among the millions of small farm owners.

Private ownership of agricultural land, where the land is held as the property of the cultivator, does not give rise to great inequality. On the contrary, it fosters that spirit of equality and independence so essential to the welfare and content of the rural classes. In short, landowners who cultivate their own farms are the best type of agricultural workers. Like Jefferson's "cultivators of the earth," they "are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds."

IV

There are various ways of attacking the tenancy problem in a democracy. According to one time-honored plan the state, as the guardian of its citizens, would enter extensively into the business of acquiring land and, as the sole landowner, would reduce all farmers to the status of tenants. The advocates of this plan claim, among other things, that it would overcome the vexatious relations that are likely to arise between the farm tenant and the private landowner. Others who have not completely lost faith in the institution of private property would offer a variant and less radical proposal, in effect, that the state should lease the land so acquired in small holdings to cultivators on terms that would render ultimate ownership possible.

The latter method was adopted in a small way in Great Britain in 1908 with the passage of the Small Holdings and Allotments Act. In that country the value of land has come to be excessive on account of the social position which ownership affords, and tenancy has long been the characteristic form of land tenure. According to the terms of the Act, designed partly to mitigate the tenancy evil, the government is authorized to acquire, under certain conditions, that portion of any

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farm in England or Wales in excess of fifty acres and to sell or lease it to a farmer or laborer who desires land for the purpose of cultivation. If the owner and the government can not agree as to what constitutes a fair price for the land, the government may acquire control of it compulsorily.

The effect of this drastic measure has been to make the ownership of large estates less attractive by actually destroying a certain portion of their capital value. Several members of the peerage have been intimidated into converting their ancestral estates into cash lest the government should adopt even more stringent measures looking toward complete land nationalization. Incidentally, the outlook of the British tenant has been substantially improved. From year to year there has been a steady increase in the number of small holdings. As an effective program for land-tenure reform the scheme is full of suggestive features, but its adaptation to American conditions would, in the minds of most students, be too radical a venture to merit serious consideration.

A second possible means of reform might be found in the use of the tax weapon. If a special tax, say one per cent, were imposed on land not operated by the owner, it would check the growth of absentee landlordism. If, in addition, a progressive tax were imposed on all holdings above a certain minimum value, it would tend to discourage land speculation—one of the primary causes of farm tenancy. There seems to be a strong need for such taxes. For although absentee landlordism has not yet become a positive menace to the democracy of rural life, the movement toward concentration in ownership, growing out of the speculative character of land values, is indicative evidence that the problem will soon emerge. So long as the value of land continues to rise, the owners of large estates will be extremely loath to part with their holdings. And if perchance they find the acquisition of additional land to be a burdensome investment in their own generation, they can derive abundant consolation from the assurance that their children will fall heirs to a valuable legacy—sufficient soil to support a healthy family tree! Large farms so bequeathed are not likely to be cultivated by the beneficiaries.

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A progressive land tax together with a special tax on absentees would, if properly administered, have a remedial effect on the tenancy problem. By discouraging concentration in holdings and by reducing the speculative value of farm lands, it would tend to readjust the ratio between farm earnings and expenses so that the ownership of land would not be beyond the reach of the actual cultivator. But it is highly improbable that any such measures could be effectively carried out in this country. The use of the tax weapon for the purpose of social or economic reform has always been attended with difficulties well-nigh insuperable. A progressive land tax is especially difficult to administer. If it is imposed expressly for the purpose of breaking up large estates, it may easily be evaded. Moreover, it could be imposed in the United States only by the state governments which, in the past, have shown themselves utterly incompetent to cope with the problems involved in the administration of simple property taxes. Under these conditions it would be futile to hope for a general application of the tax remedy or, if applied, to expect the states to accomplish any practical or desirable results.

V

Finally, there are those who would attack the tenancy problem through a reform in the land-credit system. It is rightly contended by the advocates of this reform that the present banking system, although meeting the needs of the commercial classes for whom it was evolved, is prejudicial to those who would acquire land from its earnings: first, because the rate of interest on long-term loans is so high in comparison with the natural returns from land as to place a premium on tenancy; second, because the customary term of farm loans is too short, necessitating frequent renewal and the payment of excessive renewal commissions; and third, because the prevailing method of repaying a loan is ill adapted by nature to the business of buying a farm. In other words there is a demand for some new financial institution or system which will extend land credit to farmers on as favorable terms as have been accorded to the commercial and industrial classes by the national and state banking systems.

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This proposal has met with very favorable consideration, although there is still much difference of opinion among its advocates as to the exact manner in which the reform should be undertaken. Some of the less conservative reformers would rely entirely upon a scheme of government aid. They would have the federal or state governments engage directly in the business of making long-term loans to farmers at a low rate of interest. Funds for this purpose would be provided through the issuance of bonds having all the outward characteristics of government obligations. In no other way, they claim, can a young farmer secure a rate of interest sufficiently low to make the ownership of his farm a practical certainty. On the other hand those who are opposed to a government subsidy of any kind, particularly one for the benefit of farmers, insist that there is need only for legislation that will provide new machinery for the mobilization of farm credit at the hands of private initiative. That is, they would rely upon the efficacy of privately-owned institutions, operating for profit, to overcome the waste in the present system, thereby reducing the rate of interest.

These views have found expression here and there in legislative enactment. The American states have responded to the demand for land-credit reform with characteristic vigor. Nearly every state legislature which convened during the past legislative year considered land-credit measures of one form or another. In seven states constructive legislation on the subject has been enacted. A certain unanimity pervades these laws. All provide ways and means for making long-term loans, repayable by amortization, on the security of farm lands, and for the issuance of bonds on the collective security of farm mortgages. There is, however, an ominous dissimilarity in the kind of machinery to be employed. Some provide merely for the formation of private competitive land-credit banks which will give greater mobility to funds seeking farm-mortgage investment; others provide for the organization of a strong centralized bank or for a program of minimum state aid. The latter type of law is obviously designed to reduce materially the rate of interest on farm loans.

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There is undoubtedly a place for both kinds of legislation in the field of rural credit reform. Government aid should supplement rather than supplant private initiative. But this harmony of interest is not contemplated in current legislative measures. There is about them a distressing irregularity of purpose which must be attributed largely to the failure on the part of those seeking to solve the land-credit problem to recognize the existence of two problems. There is a fundamental difference between the credit needs of landowners and those of the landless. The former require long-term credit for the purpose of equipping the farm; the latter need long-term credit in order to complete the purchase price of land. The adoption of any scheme purporting to treat both classes alike will leave the tenancy problem unsolved, irrespective of the kind of remedy applied.

The problem of supplying landowners with adequate credit facilities should without question be left to private initiative. Experience has shown that private land-mortgage companies can, when reasonably well managed, succeed in supplying landowners with the capital they require on terms that are mutually advantageous. The Pearsons-Taft Land Credit Company of Chicago, the oldest concern of its kind in the United States, and the Woodruff Trust Company of Joliet have made enviable records in this field. The latter institution, although only four years old and confined in its business to a very restricted territory, now has outstanding bonds and guaranteed mortgages well over $600,000. It makes long-term loans, repayable by amortization, on agricultural lands at 6 per cent. This means that a borrower can extinguish a debt of $1000 in twenty years by making semi-annual payments of $43.26. On the combined security of the mortgages held in trust the company issues bonds to the public at 5 per cent and invests the proceeds in further agricultural loans. This process leaves a margin of profit sufficiently large to enable the company to pay liberal dividends to its stockholders. While the scheme has not greatly reduced the farmer's rate of interest, it has succeeded in reducing his cost of borrowing by relieving him of the necessity of paying renewal commissions.

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It would be well for the states to follow the example set by Massachusetts, Utah, and Wisconsin, and enact laws providing for the organization of these companies, so regulating their formation and activities as to afford reasonable security to the holders of land-mortgage bonds. Legislation of this character, if supplemented by a revision of the foreclosure and exemption laws, would solve the land-credit problem for landowners. It would not, as some have thought, have any far-reaching effect on the welfare of the tenant classes. It does not strike at the cause of the tenancy problem. The credit problem of tenants calls for more radical treatment if land-tenure reform is the goal.

VI

It was probably an appreciation of this fact which has caused several states to attempt to reduce the farmer's rate of interest below the rate that can be profitably offered by private land-credit companies. In Missouri, for example, a law (to become effective December 1st if in the meantime it is ratified by the voters of the state under the "initiative") has been passed boldly providing for an appropriation of $1,000,000 from the state treasury. One half of this amount will be loaned to farmers at 4.3 per cent. The other half will be invested in bonds of recognized standing and allowed to accumulate as a reserve fund. On the security of this fund, together with the deeds of trust on hand, bonds will be issued by a central state institution and additional capital provided for long-term loans. The rate of interest paid by the farmer will be the rate paid by the land bank on the bonds.

The Missouri law is a drastic attempt to solve all land-credit problems within the state. It treats the two problems as one and proposes to employ centralized state machinery as the only effective means of accomplishing the reform. This is an unfortunate situation. For should a state succeed in reducing materially the rate of interest to all farmers it does not follow that the low rate of itself would cause any diminution in the percentage of farm tenancy. The immediate effect of a reduction in the current rate of interest is to raise the value of land

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The mere prospect, indeed, of witnessing an arbitrary reduction in the interest rate is cause for general animation among landowners. With their speculative cupidity fully aroused they mortgage their land and acquire more, expecting eventually to convert their interest charges to lower rates and to realize a handsome profit from the advance in land values. This tendency appears whenever the promise of a low rate of interest is about to materialize. It is obvious, therefore, that legislation which promotes the spirit of land speculation is opposed to the interests of farm tenants. It would raise the value of land, further the movement toward concentration in ownership, and only aggravate the tenancy problem.

About the only way in which a material reduction in the rate of interest can be made to serve the needs of the tenancy classes is by carefully restricting the conditions under which the low rate is to be granted so as to limit the borrowing power of landowners and speculators. Something of this kind has been attempted in the Oklahoma law of 1915. Briefly, the law provides that the commissioners of the land office may issue bonds, bearing an interest rate of 5 per cent, on the security of certain state educational lands, and make loans to farmers at 6 per cent. Further issues of bonds bearing the same rate of interest may be made on the security of the mortgages held by the commissioners. The maximum loan that can be obtained by any one farmer is $2000 and then only on condition that he reside upon the land given as security for the loan. This feature of the law is excellent. The residence requirement and the rigid limitation on loans will virtually prohibit absentee landowners from benefiting by the low rate of interest.

Thus far the Oklahoma law is the only one really designed to promote ownership. If no difficulty is experienced in floating the bonds, an almost inexhaustible fund will be available for tenant farmers at a rate of interest well below the rate that is current in the state. Much permanent gain would result from the successful administration of the law. But, in the opinion of the writer, the problem of land-tenure reform is one of such magnitude as to be beyond the scope of state legislation.

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After all, state legislation on current problems is notoriously irregular and ineffective. Already the states have shown a disposition blindly to attack the land-credit problem. In view of the complex nature of this problem and its intimate relation to the tenancy problem, a strong national policy seems desirable.

The federal government is in a much stronger position than any one state to carry through an effective program. It could market its bonds to better advantage, grant a lower rate of interest to the landless man, and apply a uniform remedy to a common problem. Furthermore, the federal government should have precedence in this field of legislation by virtue of a function it has assumed in the past. For many years it was a liberal donor of the public lands. Its policy made for ownership and democracy. Now that the supply of free land has been exhausted, a program involving special aid to the landless man would be a logical continuation of that policy.

Those who are opposed to this kind of government intervention need carefully to revise their understanding of the land-tenure problem. Eventually democracy will have its way, and it would be better to attack the tenancy problem in its infancy than to adopt retributive measures later on. Approximate equality in opportunity rather than in possessions is the goal. Whether this means socialism or a compromise régime is immaterial. This much, however, is certain: to object to a well designed system of government aid on the ground that it is unnecessary is to discredit the desirability of democracy; to condemn it as "socialistic" is equivalent to paying one's compliments to socialism.

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A PROPOSAL FOR PAN-AMERICAN MONETARY UNITY

A CENTURY ago Napoleon looking down from the rock of St. Helena declared: "What Europe most needs is a common law, a common measure, and a common money."[1] Today, to most people a common law seems undesirable, a common measure both for Europe and the Americas is approaching attainment in the metric system, while a common money is widely looked upon as an ideal some day to be realized —but not far this side of the millennium. Fifty years ago the subject of international monetary unity was a live one in Europe and North America; and after the International Monetary Conference at Paris in 1867, which recommended uniformity on the basis of five francs of gold as the unit, it looked as if the international monetary unity achieved on a small scale in 1865 by the nations of the Latin Union, would be extended, though on a gold basis, to most of the leading states of Europe and North America.

In its essentials the plan recommended by the International Monetary Conference at Paris in 1867, and, independently, by the Committee on Weights, Measures and Coinage of the Paris Exposition of that year, was the international adoption of the gold standard on the basis of a unit represented by the gold content of five francs of French coin, all gold coins to be .900 fine, and the gold coins of each country entering the monetary union to bear the emblems of that country but to have legal circulation in all the other countries. England was to reduce the pure gold content of her sovereign by about .9 per cent, or approximately 2d on a pound, the United States to reduce the size of the gold dollar by about 3½ per cent, and France was to coin a 25-franc goldpiece.[2] By this adjustment five francs

[1] Quoted by United States delegate Samuel B. Ruggles in his report, to the Secretary of State, on the International Monetary Conference of Paris of 1867. Senate Executive Document, No. 14, 40th Congress, 2d Session, p. 97.

[2] House Ex. Doc., No. 266, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. pp. 5–6; and Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 14, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 18–19.

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would have been made equal to one United States dollar, and five dollars to one pound sterling. The result would have been the monetary unification to a very substantial extent of France, most of the French colonies, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and a number of the other British colonies, the United States, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Rumania. Later, to this group there would presumably have been added, on this side of the Atlantic, Argentine, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Cuba, Guatamala, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, all of whose currencies have been assimilated closely to the franc, pound or dollar as a unit.[1] Such a wide area of comparative monetary unity would have been a powerful leverage for bringing other countries into line. High official and scientific authorities in England, France, the United States and other countries favored the proposal;[2] and, had not the British Royal Commission on International Coinage of 1868 sidetracked the plan by an unfavorable report, in the face of strongly favorable evidence and the support of such men as W. Stanley Jevons,[3] Walter Bagehot,[4] and Ernest Seyd,[5] there is a considerable degree of probability that today the world would be enjoying at least as great uniformity in its monetary units as in its metric units of measure.[6]

But the opportunity was missed. The United States soon resumed specie payments on the gold dollar basis of pre-rebellion days; the bimetallic and silver states of Europe went over

[1] *Cf.* table, *infra*, p. 75.

[2] *Cf.* House Ex. Doc., No. 266, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 5 and 6; and Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 14, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 8–10, 82–83, and 106–110.

[3] *Cf.* Report from the Royal Commission on International Coinage. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1868, pp. 95–103; and *Journ. Statistical Soc.*, 31 (1868), pp. 426–464.

[4] Rep. Roy. Com. Int. Coinage, pp. 107–116.

[5] *Journ. Statistical Soc.*, 33 (1870), pp. 42–73.

[6] "I believe," said Jevons in his testimony before the Royal Commission (pp. 95–96), "that it is the adhesion of the English to the convention that is alone wanted to make it almost world-wide. . . . I think that, for instance, if we accede to the convention, there will scarcely be any country that is the least civilized that will remain outside of it, and it seems to me that this would probably be the most practical way of approaching a general solution of the decimal currency question."

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to the gold standard, mostly with distinctively national monetary units (aside from the Latin Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union), and the ideal of international monetary unity has come to be looked upon as one of the dreams of our fathers.

At the risk of being considered a dreamer, I want to revive this subject of international monetary unity—not, however, for the world, but for the new world. I do so, because I believe that the arguments advanced in its support half a century ago by such men as W. Stanley Jevons, Walter Bagehot, L. de Parieu, L. Mathieu, Baron de Hock, Samuel Ruggles and John Sherman, are even stronger today for the Americas than they were then for the United States and Europe; while the economic obstacles to the adoption of such a plan are much weaker. The present in fact is an exceptionally opportune time for Pan-American action.

Why then is Pan-American monetary unity desirable? What feasible plan for greater unity can be formulated? Why is the present an exceptionally opportune time for undertaking such a project? An attempt briefly to answer these questions will constitute the balance of this paper.

Before considering them, it should be said that the problem is a difficult and complicated one, and that the best and latest data available to the author on some of the topics are incomplete and not entirely up to date. Since the outbreak of the European War monetary events in Central and South America have moved very rapidly, but reports concerning them coming to the United States have been meager and often inaccurate. Furthermore, the size of the subject and the limited space available for its treatment will compel me often to appear to speak dogmatically when my judgment is purely tentative, and to speak in broad and absolute terms when strict accuracy would demand many qualifications. It should be said, therefore, that the plan here proposed is purely tentative and intended merely to provide a basis for future discussion. The principles which must be regarded in such discussion, however, cannot be seriously affected by fluctuations in the value of the monetary units to which the principles are to be applied.

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I

There are in addition to many minor reasons, at least five important, though somewhat overlapping, reasons for attempting to secure Pan-American monetary unity:

First. Under such a plan current prices throughout Pan-America would be quoted in terms of monetary units that people in all countries would readily understand. A business man accustomed to think in terms of one unit now finds it difficult to think in terms of another. For a Venezuelan exporter to quote for a given quantity of coffee a price of so many *bolivars* and *reales* means little to the foreign importer accustomed to think in terms of *pesos*, dollars, *milreis* or *bolivianos*. The foreign merchant knows that the equivalents of the *bolivar* and *reales* prices in his own money may be computed by reference to what appear to him to be complicated exchange quotations, but until they have been computed the quoted prices mean little to him. They speak a foreign language; he can translate it by an effort, but it is not a language in which he thinks. He can mathematically compute the equivalents, but he does not *feel* them when the prices are quoted. In discussing this subject before the British Royal Commission on International Coinage one of the leading export merchants of London said:

I had an invoice copied out yesterday which I sent last month . . . to an old correspondent of mine in New York. . . . This is the invoice of a variety of goods packed in four casks. The total amount of it is £253, and in the invoice there are 421 different prices making up the £253. My customer who ordered those goods has to form an idea of what every one of those 421 prices sterling will amount to in dollars and cents in New York before he can commit himself to the ordering of them. At the present time he has to go through a complicated calculation to transfer sterling money into dollars and cents, as well as all his calculations of the other fixed charges. . . .

There are at this moment in my trade a great number of goods that could be carried profitably to the United States and sold there, but which are not taken there on account of the difficulty of people having to go through the whole study of the prices.[1]

[1] Testimony of Alfred Field, Report, pp. 46 and 51.

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Many a trade opportunity, therefore, passes unrecognized because masked in prices expressed in unfamiliar monetary units. Under a unified monetary system anybody who read a newspaper from any part of Pan-America would know what the purchasing power of gold was in that part of the world; he would not only read but would understand the prices current, and would have "the first datum in all mercantile transactions ready to his hand."[1]

International merchants often seek to avoid such difficulties by publishing price lists in foreign monetary units. To such merchants the expense of calculating the prices in different currencies would be avoided. Small traders, moreover, would be freed from much of the difficulty and expense they now experience in keeping a clerical staff conversant with foreign price equivalents; and commercial travelers would be aided in their work of selling their goods in other countries.

Second. Foreign exchange operations would be simplified, and, inasmuch as they all could be easily expressed in terms of premium and discount, the business man would readily understand them, and be in a better position to protect himself against unreasonable exchange charges. Ernest Seyd, in a paper on international coinage read before the Statistical Society in London in 1870 expressed the idea well when he said:

> The English manufacturer . . . knows little of foreign exchanges [that isn't his business] and, with his single mindedness of purpose, he soon finds himself entangled in vexatious disputes, either with the drawer or the negotiator; and if, guided by experience, he finally guards himself against these small losses by adding something to the price of his goods, he is by so much hampered in his competition with a foreign producer. It is not too much to say that many manufacturers, after a few trials of this kind, give up foreign trade, because the "money part" is not clear to them.[2]

Third. Another advantage would be in the less frequent need of melting down the coins of one nation, casting the gold into bars, and then later having the bars remelted in order to have

[1] Testimony of Walter Bagehot, Report, p. 108.

[2] *Journal Statistical Society*, vol. 33 (1870), p. 44.

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the gold coined into the coins of another nation. This substantial item of expense would be largely eliminated under an international union in which the monetary unit of each of the American republics would be assimilated to those of all the others, and in which the standardized gold coins of each would be legally recognized in all.[1] The easy flow of gold from one American republic to another would in this way be facilitated, and the "gold-points" in foreign exchange operations would be brought closer together, thus stabilizing exchange to the advantage of all Pan-American trade.

Fourth. A fourth advantage would be the stimulus such an arrangement would give to the improvement of the currency systems of the American nations. "It is well," said Jevons, "to have a good currency at home, but to our foreign trade it is equally important that there should be a good currency abroad."[2] The general improvement of all the currencies under a system that would result from international monetary unity Jevons considered to be so great an advantage as to almost eclipse the others.[3]

Fifth. A fifth advantage, and by no means the least, is the fact that such a plan would strongly promote the ideal of Pan-American union. The existence of a unified monetary standard, with gold coins bearing the emblems of Pan-Americanism circulating throughout the two continents would be a perpetual symbol of the Pan-American ideal.

Other advantages deserving consideration in this connection are: (1) the encouragement such monetary unity would give to the investment of foreign capital in the less developed countries; (2) the assistance it would render in the interchange of scientific statistical information between the American republics;[4] (3) the convenience in regard to the computation,

[1] *Cf. infra*, pp. 13–15.

[2] *Journal Statistical Society*, vol. 31 (1868), p. 437.

[3] Brit. Royal Com. Int. Coinage, Rep., p. 98.

[4] It was in the International Statistical Congresses that the subject of international monetary unity was first seriously discussed. The subject was considered at the Congress of Brussels in 1853, of Paris in 1855, of London in 1860, of Berlin in 1863, and of Florence in 1867.

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and the apportionment between the railroads of the different countries, of the freight and passenger receipts on through traffic; and (4) the convenience of travelers whose gold money would be good throughout the twenty-one American republics, as is the gold money of each of the Latin Union states in all five of them.

II

Such are the chief advantages of monetary unity. The obstacles, however, are very real.

First. There is the strong but natural prejudice each country has for its own monetary unit; a prejudice exemplified in the fact that every country favors international monetary unity, *provided* that all other countries will adapt their monetary systems to its own unit of value. The United States would be very glad to see all the American republics adopt the dollar, while Mexico would doubtless be pleased to have them all adopt the *peso* of 75 centigrams of pure gold, and Peru the pound or the *sol*. Evidently international monetary unity requires numerous concessions; and the existence of strong national prejudices threatens a deadlock.

Second. The second great obstacle is the positive one of equitably adjusting existing debts to the new monetary unit in the cases of those countries which are called upon to alter their units, and the disturbances such alterations bring to established norms of prices and wages. These difficulties are not to be minimized; but fortunately the world has had much experience in making such adjustments and the lessons of this experience are available for the future.[1] Moreover, much encouragement may be drawn from the fact that the present deranged condition of the currencies in most of the American republics calls for monetary reform in those countries in any case; and that it will be little, if any, more disturbing to return to a gold basis on a unit slightly changed so as to be assimilated to the gold units of other countries than it would to resume specie payments on the old gold unit. As the British Royal Commission said:

[1] Act no. 1045 of the Philippine Islands, passed Jan. 28, 1904.

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It is obvious that when so many systems of national currency exist, widely differing from each other, a change must be made in the currency of many if not all of the countries which join in any common arrangement. . . . Such a change must necessarily be productive of inconvenience, varying according to the circumstances of different countries. Where the currency has become very much deranged it can hardly be said to be an inconvenience to establish a sound system; where frequent changes of currency have occurred, the inconvenience of a further change in order to establish a permanent or general system is less felt.[1]

III

What feasible plan can be formulated for securing monetary unity in the American republics with a minimum of disturbance?

The Five-Franc Basis. Were there any hope of securing an international monetary union embracing Europe as well as the Americas, the best plan would probably be the one recommended by the Paris International Conference of 1867, that is, the plan to make five francs of gold the unit, to reduce the pure gold content of the sovereign by about .9 per cent, and that of the United States dollar by about 3½ per cent, thereby making the dollar equivalent to five francs and the sovereign equivalent to five dollars.[2] Such a plan would not only give a substantial degree of monetary unity to Europe, but would afford a basis for extending this unity to the American republics; since a large number of them have their legal gold units exactly or closely assimilated to the dollar, the pound or the franc,[3] and might be reasonably expected to alter them slightly in case the gold contents of the dollar and the pound were reduced by international agreement.

Unfortunately, however, there does not appear to be the slightest prospect that the European nations have any desire to take

[1] Brit. Roy. Com. Int. Coinage, Rep., p. ix.

[2] By increasing the gold content of the mark approximately 1¼ per cent, four marks would be made equivalent to five francs.

[3] Assimilated to the pound are the legal units of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Salvador; assimilated to the franc are the legal units of Venezuela, Argentine, Haiti and Paraguay; assimilated to the dollar are those of Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Santo Domingo and Canada. *Cf.* table, *infra*, p. 75.

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action in the direction of securing monetary unity upon this or any other basis. They have not been interested in the subject for nearly half a century. With the animosities growing out of the present war, the tremendous post-bellum problems to be solved, and the billions of dollars of war debts expressed in terms of existing national monetary units to be paid, assuredly European countries will have no practical interest for a long time to come in such "idealistic schemes." If monetary unity is to be obtained in the western world in any reasonable time it must be obtained as a result of a Pan-American movement, not a world movement.

As a purely Pan-American proposition a gold five-franc piece would not be a satisfactory unit. It would conform exactly or in multiples of five only to the monetary units of Argentine, Haiti, Paraguay and Venezuela, and of these four nations only Venezuela is actually on a gold standard. Its adoption therefore would require the melting and recoining of practically all the two billion and more dollars of gold coin in the new world.

The Dollar Basis. A concise picture of the character of the monetary units of the twenty-one American republics and Canada appears in the table on the following page.[1]

A study of the table will show six noteworthy facts:

(1) Every country but one, Honduras,[2] is legally upon the gold standard.

[1] The data for this table were collected from a variety of sources, the chief being the United States Director of the Mint Reports, and Compilations on the Monetary Systems of the World; the Statesman's Year Book for 1915; The Pan-American Union, *passim*; the United States Statistical Abstract for 1914; *The London Economist*, *passim*; the "Special Agents" Publications of the U. S. Bureau of Commerce; and information sent me directly through the courtesy of the ministers of the various countries to the United States.

[2] Honduras in recent years has been active in a Central-American movement for monetary unity among the Central-American countries, on the basis of a gold unit equivalent to the United States gold dollar. On this subject there have been two Central-American international conferences at Tegucigalpi, Honduras, one in 1909, and one in 1910. *Cf. Bulletin of the International Union of the American Republics*, April, 1909, pp. 725–727, and *American Journal of International Law*, 1910, Supplement, p. 170.

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COUNTRY	POPULATION 000,000 [1]	LEGAL MONETARY UNIT			ACTUAL UNIT		PROPOSED UNIT		
		NAME	FINE GOLD	U. S. CURRENCY VALUE	CHARACTER	U. S. CURRENCY VALUE	FINE GOLD	U. S. CURRENCY VALUE	INCREASE OR DECREASE
			centigrams				centigrams		per cent
Argentine	9,0	Peso	145.16	$0.965	Paper	$0.440 [1]	$150.46	1.00	+3.7
Bolivia	2,3	Peso	146.45	0.973	Paper	0.314 [1]	150.46	1.00	+2.9
Brazil	24,3	Milreis	82.21	0 546	Paper	0.250 [1]	75.23	0.50	−8.5
Chili	3,5	Peso	54.92	0.365	Paper	0.179 [1]	60.18	0.40	+9.6
Colombia	5,5	Dollar	146.45	0.973	Paper	[2]	150.46	1.00	+2.9
Costa Rica	0.4	Colon	70.02	0.465	Gold	0.465 [1 2]	75.23	0.50	+7.5
Cuba	2,5	Peso	150.46	1.000	Gold	1.000 [2]	150.46	1.00	0.0
Ecuador	1,5	Sucre	73.22	0.486	Paper	0.463 [2]	75.23	0.50	+2.7
Guatamala	2,1	Peso	145.08	0.964	Paper		150.46	1.00	+3.7
Haiti	2,5	Gourde	145.16	0.965	Paper & U. S. Gold.	1.000 [2]	150.46	1.00	+3.6
Honduras	0,6	Peso	Silver	Varies	Silver	0.396 [1] (Nov. 29)	75.23 or 60.18	0.50 or 0.40	
Mexico	15,4	Peso	75.00	0.498	Paper		75.23	0.50	+0.3
Nicaragua	0,7	Cordoba	150.46	1.000	Gold	1.000 [2]	150.46	1.00	0.0
Panama	0,4	Balboa	150.46	1.000	Gold	1.000 [2]	150.46	1.00	0.0
Paraguay	0,8	Peso	145.16	0.965	Paper	[2]	150.46	1.00	+3.6
Peru	5,8	Libra	732.25	4.866	Paper	0.437 (sol) [1 2]	75.23 (sol)	0.50	+2.7
Salvador	1,2	Dollar	146.45	0.973	Fiduciary silver	0.350	150.46	1.00	+2.9
Santo Domingo	0,7	Dollar	150.46	1.000	Gold	1.000 [2]	150.46	1.00	0.0
Uruguay	1,2	Peso	155.57	1.034	Foreign gold	[2]	150.46	1.00	−3.5
United States	100,0	Dollar	150.46	1.000	Gold	1.000	150.46	1.00	0.0
Venezuela	2,7	Bolivar	29.03	0.193	Gold	0.193 [2]	30.09	0.20	+3.7
Canada	7,2	Dollar	150.46	1.000	Gold	1.000 [2]	150.46	1.00	0.0

[1] Latest figures available.

[2] U. S. gold in legal circulation.

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(2) Eleven of the twenty-one republics, so far as most of their business is concerned, are actually upon a depreciated paper money basis; one, though legally on a gold basis, is actually upon a fiduciary silver basis, and one is both legally and actually upon a silver basis. Twelve of them therefore are gold standard in name but not in fact. These twelve republics which are upon a depreciated money basis represent 73.9 millions, or 89 per cent, of the 83.1 millions population in all the republics outside of the United States.

(3) Eight republics and Canada are in fact as well as in name upon a gold standard.

(4) In five of these gold standard republics, viz., Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Santo Domingo, and the United States, also in Canada,[1] together representing 111.5 million people or 96 per cent of 115.8 millions actually on a gold standard, the United States gold dollar or a unit of exactly the same value is both legally and actually the monetary unit.

(5) There are three republics which are both legally and actually upon a gold standard whose monetary units are of a different gold value than the United States gold dollar. Together they represent a population of 4.3 millions, or 3.7 per cent of the people in countries actually upon a gold standard. These three republics are Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In Costa Rica foreign gold coins are legal tender, but United States gold coins are the only foreign coins that actually circulate in the country. United States gold coins, moreover, as also the gold coins of certain other countries, circulate in Uruguay. In Venezuela United States gold coins circulate on conditions of legal equality with Venezuelan gold coins. Other foreign gold coins are also permitted to circulate in Venezuela. This leaves no country of Pan-America which is actually as well as legally upon a gold standard in which the United States gold dollar or coins representing its exact equivalent or integral multiples do not circulate either as the unit of value or as legally recognized foreign coins.

[1] At this writing the exchanges show a very slight depreciation of the Canadian notes —less than one per cent. This depreciation, however, does not seem to be sufficient to justify the inclusion of Canada among the countries with *de facto* paper money standards.

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(6) A sixth point to note in the interpretation of the table is that the gold-standard countries at present using the gold dollar or its equivalent as their monetary unit, possess approximately four-fifths of the total gold coin in circulation and in the banks in the twenty-one American republics and Canada.[1]

The situation throughout the Americas as shown by the table is therefore favorable to Pan-American action in the direction of monetary unity.

If we may assume that there should be adopted as the basic Pan-American unit, a monetary unit represented by coins in actual circulation rather than some new and ideal unit like the gram or dekagram of pure gold—a conclusion reached by unanimous vote after debate at the Paris Monetary Conference of 1867[2]—the weight of the argument for Pan-America would seem to be strongly in favor of the United States gold dollar. It is today by far the most important gold unit on the American continents, circulating in larger quantities several times over than the gold coins of all other units combined; a unit of this size is legally current in more American countries than any other gold unit; and at present it is used by countries representing approximately 60 per cent of the total population of the twenty-one American republics and Canada. Moreover, the dollar is a convenient-sized unit, not so large as the sovereign nor so small as the franc, and is coined into pieces of the most approved millesimal fineness, i. e., .900. There is more foreign trade between the twenty other American republics and the

[1] Estimate based upon figures collected by the Director of the Mint, and published in his annual report for 1914, *passim*.

[2] The vote of the nations was unanimous in favor of the proposition: "It is more easy to realize monetary unification by mutual coördination of existing systems, taking into account the scientific advantages of certain types, and the numbers of the populations which have already adopted them." House Ex. Doc., No. 266, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.

Baron de Hock, delegate to the Conference from Austria, said with reference to the adoption of an ideal metric unit: "In Germany we find a striking example: there was a wish to introduce into the German states a coin not correspondent with any existing types. Although it was the most rational, and accorded *perfectly with the metric system* [being a gold crown containing 10 grams of gold], it could not find its way into calculations. The *gold crown* only passed from the mint to the melting pots of the goldsmiths." *Ibid*, p. 3.

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United States than between those twenty republics and any other country.

The kinds of changes in existing legal monetary units of the American republics that would appear to be necessary in order to assimilate them to the value of the United States dollar are shown in column iv of the table. Most of the changes would be slight and if scientifically managed should cause little disturbance. No changes would be required in the monetary units of Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Santo Domingo, the United States and Canada.

Those countries which are actually on a depreciated paper money basis, or on a silver standard, and are striving to come to a gold standard, would not suffer much inconvenience in slightly modifying their present legal units so as to assimilate them to a Pan-American unit. Their *de facto* paper and silver units must be raised in any event, and to raise them to a slightly different gold level than would otherwise be the case, in order to bring them into conformity with the Pan-American unit, should not be a procedure fraught with much difficulty. These remarks apply to Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatamala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Salvador. In five of these countries, Colombia, Ecuador,[1] Haiti,[2] Salvador[3] and Paraguay,[4] United States gold coins are already found in circulation.

The only disturbing alterations of national monetary units called for, therefore, would seem to be those of Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela. In Costa Rica the legal unit would need to

[1] United States gold coins, as also those of England and certain other countries, legally circulate in Ecuador, and are receivable at their equivalents in *sucres* for government dues.

[2] In Haiti none of the national gold coins authorized by the law of 1880 have ever been coined. United States gold coin is current, and must be used in payment of all export duties, the import surtax of 25 per cent and an additional 15 per cent, some salaries, and a considerable number of other items of the budget. The Monetary Systems of the Principal Countries of the World. Compiled in the office of the Director of the Mint. Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1912, p. 22.

[3] United States gold coins are receivable for public dues in Salvador.

[4] By Act of Dec. 30, 1876, United States gold coins are legal tender in Paraguay and receivable for government dues. They circulate only to a very slight extent.

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be raised about 7½ per cent to make it equal to 50 cents—a change whose apparent seriousness would be considerably mitigated by the fact that United States gold coins already circulate in the country, are unlimited legal tender at their equivalent value in *colones*, and are familiar to the people. In Uruguay a reduction of about 3½ per cent in the gold content of the legal *peso* would need to be made to make it equal to the dollar. Inasmuch, however, as there are no Uruguayan gold coins in circulation, and as the real money of account is foreign gold coins, including those of the United States, at their proper values in local money, this adjustment should not be difficult. In Venezuela an increase of about 3.7 per cent in the gold content of the *bolivar* would assimilate it to the dollar, making it equivalent to 20 cents. Here likewise the people are familiar with United States gold coin.

In two of the three countries in which an alteration in the *de facto* gold unit is suggested, i. e., in Costa Rica and Venezuela, the alteration suggested is for an increase in the gold content of the unit. For Costa Rica the increase would be 7.5 per cent, and for Venezuela 3.7 per cent, the latter being less than one per cent more than sufficient to compensate creditor and wage-earner for the average annual depreciation of gold as expressed in the rising cost of living during the four years preceding the European War, i. e., the last normal four-year period for which figures are available.[1]

The transition once having been effected, and the return to the gold standard accomplished, all the American republics and Canada would be on a gold basis, with their gold coins all .900 fine, and all divided decimally. The unit of each country would be either a simple fraction like ½, ⅕ or ⅖ of those of the

[1] For the four years 1910–1913 the average annual depreciation of gold, as shown by leading price index numbers, was: England, 3.9 per cent; France, 3.2 per cent; Germany, 2.4 per cent; Canada, 2.4 per cent; and the United States, 1.9 per cent. For the five countries the rough annual average was 2.8 per cent. Figures are not available for the South American and Central American countries. The index numbers used for the above five countries respectively were: Sauerbeck, Annuaire Statistique, German Customs Union, Coates (weighted), and Bradstreets. *Cf.* Bulletin No. 173 of the United States Bureau of Labor, on Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices in the United States and Foreign Countries, *passim*.

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other countries, or an easy multiple. All the unitary equivalents would be simply expressed and easily calculated. A United States gold eagle would be equivalent to 10 Argentine or Paraguay *pesos*, 20 Brazilian *milreis*, or Mexican *pesos*, or Costa-Rican *colones*, 25 Chilian *pesos*, or 50 Venezuelan *bolivars*, etc.

A permanent Pan-American monetary commission composed of a representative from each nation belonging to the monetary union might well be formed, whose duty should be to examine from time to time the gold coins minted by the different nations and to report any undue discrepancies from the legal weights and millesimal fineness. Nations whose gold coins conformed to the legal standards agreed upon, and so long as they did conform, might be authorized by vote of the Pan-American Monetary Commission to qualify their gold coins as Pan-American gold coins. This would be done by stamping upon the national coins some such words as "Pan-American Union," and the value of the coins in terms of the Pan-American monetary unit, which might be given some such name as an *oro* (the Spanish word for gold). Pan-American gold coins would be made receivable for government dues at their legal values in terms of national money in all nations belonging to the monetary union, and, in the course of time, might perhaps also be made legal tender throughout the Americas.

The advantages of international monetary unity, like those of uniformity in weights and measures, are so great that some time it is bound to come, although it may be accomplished slowly—a few countries at a time. The present is a particularly opportune time for its attainment in Pan-America. In bringing it about, the republics of the western world would set an example to Europe, and would, incidentally, in the course of time, send into every home in the American republics frequent messengers in the form of Pan-American gold coins that would be standard bearers of Pan-Americanism.

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THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY IN OREGON

THE abandonment of the movement for a direct presidential primary by Congress and the difficulties which are likely to delay the enactment of any such federal legislation make it probable that for some years to come direct popular participation in presidential nominations, as until recently in case of election of United States senators, must depend upon provisions enacted either by states or by political parties.

Oregon is a leader in this movement. The Oregon direct-primary law enacted by popular vote in 1904 made no provision in regard to president, vice-president, presidential electors, or delegates to the national party convention. It was the general opinion of the committee that drafted the law that it would be best to postpone the extension of the system until some experience had been obtained from the operation of the "state-wide" primary. At that time "the presidential election was so far away that it was believed there was plenty of time for the legislature to provide a way to choose delegates to the national conventions and candidates for presidential electors after the law had been tried."[1] "It was . . . agreed that if the legislature failed to provide the manner of electing national delegates, the state central committees of the parties that might be affected by the law, could, and probably would, call regular conventions."[2] A bill introduced in the legislature of 1907 providing that at the primary election there should be chosen delegates to state party conventions, by which platforms should be adopted and presidential electors nominated, failed of passage. The next year conventions were held, on the plan prevailing before the enactment of the direct-primary law; platforms were adopted, presidential electors nominated, and delegates to the national conventions were elected. This aroused some popular opposition on the ground that it was a return to the old convention

[1] *Oregonian*, July 3, 1907.

[2] W. S. U'Ren, quoted, *ibid.*, July 3, 1907.

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system considered to have been abolished by provision for the direct primary in 1904.

In 1910 the direct-primary law was extended by the initiative to include the expression of party preference for president and vice-president, the election of delegates to the national party conventions, and the nomination of presidential electors. In 1913 direct nomination was applied to the office of national committeeman, formerly chosen by the state central committee. No provision has yet been made for the formulation of party platforms. The law applies only to the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive parties. The direct method of choice of presidential electors and convention delegates had already been adopted by other states, but Oregon was the first state to provide for an expression of the party choice of president and vice-president at the primary election.

The enactment of the presidential primary law was due largely to the efforts of Jonathan Bourne, then United States senator from Oregon, W. S. U'Ren, leader of the Oregon radical movement, Ben Selling, a prominent progressive Republican, and other members of the People's Power League.[1]

I

The presidential primary election,[2] first held in April, hereafter to be held in May, comes at the same time and in general is governed by the same rules as the primary election for other offices to be filled at the succeeding general election in Novem-

[1] Says W. S. U'Ren: "Senator Bourne is the original inventor of the presidential primary, to the best of my knowledge, and certainly was the first to mention it to me. . . . Many minds contributed to the details of the law. . . . The argument [in the voter's pamphlet] in favor of the bill was almost wholly the Senator's work." *Oregonian*, Dec. 15, 1911. Bourne also paid the expenses of initiating the bill. In 1908 the *Oregon Journal* had asked, "Why not let the people of each state decide on their choice for president in primary elections?" This was in connection with the comment upon a statement made in the *Birmingham Age Herald* that a recent large petition filed by Democrats with the chairman of the Alabama Democratic state committee, asking that the name of Bryan be placed on the official primary ticket, was "significant as being possibly the origin of a new method of nominating the president." *Oregon Journal*, April 28, 1908.

[2] The law is far from clear in some of its provisions, but this outline follows the interpretation given in practice.

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ber. The original law requires nomination petitions in case of all candidates seeking place on the party primary ballots; but an amendment of 1915 permits the alternative of a mere request on the part of candidates for the offices of president and vice-president, and permits candidates for the other offices to substitute declaration of candidacy and payment of a filing fee in lieu of nomination petitions. The provision for the rotation of the names of candidates on the ballot does not apply to candidates for the offices of national committeeman or delegate to the national convention. At the primary election voters may "write in" the names of other persons than those printed on the ballots. Space in the party "campaign books" is available to presidential and vice-presidential candidates and would-be delegates, and, by an amendment of 1915, to candidates for the office of presidential elector.

Candidates for the offices of president and vice-president are nominated, and national committeemen are elected, by a plurality party vote in the state at large. The law of 1910 provided for the nomination of presidential electors and election of delegates to conventions by the respective parties in the state at large by the "single untransferable vote" (the term seems not to be in general use here in this connection). The voter might vote for only one candidate for elector and one candidate for delegate, although five electors and ten delegates were to be chosen. The law of 1915 retains the provision for the nomination of presidential electors by the voters of the state at large, but provides for the election of two delegates in each of the three congressional districts of the state, and the election of the others at large. Further, the recent amendment abolishes the "proportional representation" feature of the law entirely, and allows the voter to vote for as many candidates of his party as there are offices to be filled in the state and district respectively. Expenses of the delegates to the national party conventions, not exceeding two hundred dollars in any case, were allowed by the law of 1910, but the law of 1915 omits provision for such expenses.

The presidential primary was derided by its opponents as "another freak measure," as "intended to make complete an

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anti-convention hobby in this state."[1] It was defended as a logical extension of the direct-primary system already in operation.

Oregon has already developed the steps necessary for the application of the principle of direct nominations and now it remains only to extend and apply these principles to the nomination of president and vice-president and the election of the respective party delegates to the national conventions. . . . The other states will very quickly follow the example of Oregon or any other state that succeeds in the practical application of these principles in its election laws.[2]

"It is far more important to have the president of the United States nominated by direct vote than to have a constable nominated by direct vote."[3]

Education is swiftly doing its work. The little red school-house, the rural free delivery, the wide-spread publication of news on the day that it happens, and the other processes of enlightenment are making men think. They are reasoning that if they are competent to vote in the election for a president, they are also competent to vote in a primary for his nomination. They are finding out that they can better express their will in person than to have it done by proxies.[4]

This extension of the principle of direct government was doubtless, with the people, the most important consideration in the movement. But the abuse of the federal patronage in the control of state delegations to the national convention and, more especially, the failure of one group of the Republican party to secure representation in the convention were also important considerations, particularly with the leaders who inaugurated the movement.

Through the tremendous power of the chief executive and of the federal machine delegates elected by our state convention [of 1908] were instructed for Mr. Taft. . . . Impressed by this demonstration of the power of the president to thwart the will of the people, I

[1] *Oregonian*, May 3, 1910.

[2] Jonathan Bourne, *Oregon Journal*, Oct. 27, 1909.

[3] *Oregon Journal*, Dec. 10, 1911. [4] *Ibid.*

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realized that such power in the hands of any man is a serious menace to a truly representative government. Consequently, I tried to evolve a plan to destroy such power, and after much thought conceived the idea of enlarging our direct-primary law so that each voter may directly express his choice for president and vice-president.[1]

"Thus it is hoped the steam-roller method of nominating candidates will be destroyed and the voters given opportunity to say whom they desire as party nominees."[2]

Under the proportional-representation plan every faction equal to one-tenth of the party will be fairly represented by delegates of its own choice and election. Thus the voice of the progressives and stand-patters will be fairly heard in preparing a platform on which the party candidate must go before the people. The primary purpose and theory in the election of delegates and representatives to any convention or legislature is that the members are to represent constituents. This law will certainly secure that result in the election of delegates, and the authors believe it is altogether likely that the delegates so chosen will also fairly represent the different sections of the state.[3]

Although at the time of its adoption more adverse criticism was given to this feature of the law than to any other, it is probable that a very large number of the voters were not then aware that it contained any such provision.

When the measure was before the people for adoption, it was urged that, since the conduct of national conventions cannot be controlled by state laws, delegates elected under the primary law might not be seated by the conventions. But convention precedent already established seemed then to answer this objection. Before the meeting of the conventions in 1912, the Democratic national committee had expressly recognized the

[1] Jonathan Bourne, *Congressional Record*, vol. 46, p. 3549 (1911).

[2] Letter of Jonathan Bourne, Nov. 21, 1911.

[3] W. S. U'Ren, *Oregonian*, Nov. 21, 1911. This is the only case in which the principle of "proportional representation" has been put into practice in Oregon, although for some years there has been a very active movement in its behalf, and a constitutional amendment expressly authorizing provision of law for proportional representation in both primary and general elections was adopted in 1908. Minority representation rather than true proportional representation is of course the aim of the "single vote."

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right of the states to direct the election of their delegates. The Republican committee, however, had failed to do so. Had there been contests at the Republican convention in case of Oregon delegates on account of failure to secure party endorsement in the congressional district, it seems probable that the provision of the primary law for election in the state at large would have been nullified under the operation of the national committee's rule for district election, as in the similar California case.[1]

The provision for delegates' expenses was intended, it was said, to remove "the handicap which practically permits only men of wealth or leisure to attend national conventions."[2] But there was objection.

> The delegates to political conventions are not public officials, but are representatives of their respective political parties, and *the taxpayers of the state should not be called upon* to pay railroad fare, hotel bills, etc., for their junketing trips. If this measure is approved, there will be an additional burden of several thousand dollars heaped upon the shoulders of the taxpayers every four years.[3]

II

There was a movement among Republican politicians to "forestall" the presidential primary of 1912, by holding a convention on the old plan before the date of the primary election, but in view of the unfortunate results of the similar "assembly" experiment of 1910, the movement was abandoned as likely to arouse the opposition of the people.

The increase of the length of the campaign by the removal of the primary elections from the fall to the spring was one of the objections urged against the law.

> By adoption of the presidential primary bill Oregon has added nine or ten months to its general election campaign in presidential election years. . . . Oregon will spend nineteen to twenty months assisting in

[1] The new Republican rules recognize the states' right to control the method of election of their respective delegates.

[2] Jonathan Bourne, *Congressional Record*, vol. 46, p. 3549 (1911).

[3] Referendum Pamphlet, 1910, p. 178.

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electing a president and in choosing state officers. . . . If continued application has any virtue, we should ultimately become experts in choosing our heads of government.[1]

The beginning of the campaign for the primary election of 1912 may be indicated by Wilson's visit to the state in the early summer of 1911. Taft and Roosevelt both toured the state in the fall of the year. La Follette did not appear until a few days before the primary election was held. Neither Clark nor Harmon came to the state. These six were the only presidential candidates who received serious consideration in Oregon. Active organization of the supporters of the various candidates began in the summer and fall of 1912. At first a "Taft Committee" was criticized by extreme advocates of the direct primary as an attempt to nullify the primary law and as a return to the convention system of nomination. But it was soon recognized as a mere campaign committee, objections ceased, and similar organizations were formed for the other candidates. The Taft forces were the most extensively organized. The managers of each of these organizations kept in close touch with the central organizations of the various candidates. The official state party organizations, as such, took no part in the campaign for any candidate.

Petitions for all the above-named candidates for the office of president were circulated and their names were placed on the party ballots. No candidates for the office of vice-president appeared. The *Oregon Journal* commented on the situation as follows:

Nominating a candidate for vice-president in the primaries in April is to be a game of tag. Some unsuspecting and innocent Oregon citizen may awaken the morning after the votes are cast and learn that he is "it," with national fame thrust upon him and the solid Oregon delegation of ten votes pledged to stand by him, whether he blows hot or cold. There are no petitions in circulation for vice-president, and no candidates. Most of the men the people would like to have take the job will be busy dodging it should it come their way. No one can estimate how many votes it will require to gain a plurality under such

[1] *Oregonian*, Apr. 28, 1911.

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conditions. A few hundred may be enough. Some of the wits are suggesting that as a compromise each voter should vote for himself.[1]

This comment appeared in the *Oregonian:*

Republicans are so engrossed in the candidacy of either Taft, La Follette or Roosevelt, and Democrats are so enthusiastic in their advocacy of Clark, Wilson or Harmon for the presidency that neither party in Oregon has given any consideration to the matter of placing the name of a candidate on the primary nominating ballot for the party's endorsement for vice-president. . . . The principal reason not much thought has been given to the question of candidates for vice-president is the fact that the final selection of that candidate by the national convention of each party will depend largely on the outcome of the pending contest for the nomination as head of the ticket. Besides, the partisan supporters of each of the rival candidates in the two parties for president are fighting shy of introducing any unnecessary complications in a situation already involved, believing for them to undertake to champion the candidacy of any one man for vice-president might cost their particular candidate for the presidency votes and weaken his chance accordingly.[2]

But immediately before the primary election some of the "leading Republicans and Democrats" of Portland advised writing in the names of Borah and Chamberlain at the primary election. "The names of Borah and Chamberlain are specially mentioned because movements in their favor are being advanced in the two parties, and prominent men in each party are anxious to avoid a fiasco that would discredit the presidential-primary law in the indorsement of some unknown for vice-president."[3]

Ten delegates were to be chosen by each party to its national convention. Twenty Democrats and eighteen Republicans appeared in the race. But of course there was little inclination for a member of either party to try to secure nomination as one of the presidential electors to which his party was entitled.

After waiting in vain for candidates for presidential elector to declare

[1] *Oregon Journal*, Feb. 29, 1912.

[2] *Oregonian*, Mar. 15, 1912.

[3] *Oregon Journal*, Apr. 18, 1912.

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themselves, the Democratic state central committee has persuaded five representative Democrats to announce themselves for this office, which is devoid of salary and has no duties except to officially register the choice of the voters for president and vice-president. . . . The committee waited as long as it seemed safe to wait, hoping candidates would come forth. It is a considerable job to get the signatures required.[1]

This work was done by the committee. Only one Republican candidate for the office appeared. Objection was raised to any action by the central committee in bringing out other candidates on the ground that it was an infringement of the direct-primary law. The Republican voters were therefore left to "write in" the ballot names for four of the offices at the primary election. A few days before the election, however, a conference of leaders of the forces of the several Republican presidential candidates selected four other names for the offices, and at the same time allotted the electoral candidates to different sections of the state, in order to "insure the nomination of the party's full quota of presidential electors, without any unnecessary confusion or multiplicity of candidates."[2]

Only four of the Republican candidates for delegate to the national convention made official announcement of their personal preferences for president, and none of the Democratic candidates did so. Naturally none of the candidates for elector made any reference to preferences. However, as the candidates for delegate generally received their strongest support from their own localities, their preferences must have been personally known to many of the voters, and in some cases the press indicated the preference of the candidates for delegate.

Literature prepared in behalf of the presidential candidates by both the national and state party organizations was distributed. Space in the state campaign books was used for all but one of the presidential candidates. National speakers supported the Taft interests alone. The usual mass-meetings to arouse enthusiasm for the candidates were held. The straw ballot was in evidence, and some personal canvassing was done.

[1] *Oregon Journal*, Mar. 7, 1912. [2] *Oregonian*, Apr. 16, 1912.

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Most of the would-be delegates to the conventions advertised very little, either in the "campaign books" or otherwise, and the electoral candidates less or not at all. On the whole, the "campaign of education and organization" created little excitement. Expense statements from the managers of the several presidential candidates varied from $4339.32 to $163.78—the largest amount, that for Taft, being more than for all of the other candidates together. Candidates for delegate spent from $3 to $350 each, the average being $56.82. The expenses of candidates for presidential elector ranged from $10 to $102.50, the average being $31.37. The registration for primary election was unusually heavy, and over sixty-eight per cent of the Republican and Democratic registered vote was cast at the election.

The names of only three presidential candidates were printed on the ballot of each party, and these alone received substantial support at the election. But there were seven names "written in" the Republican ballot, and ten in the Democratic, these names receiving from one to nineteen votes each. Roosevelt and Wilson were nominated, each by a plurality only.[1] Borah and Chamberlain, recommended for the office of vice-president by workers for the presidential candidates, were nominated by the Republicans and Democrats respectively. Borah received 789 votes out of the 2599 cast by the Republicans for the office (compared with 71,927 cast for president), and Chamberlain 1462 votes out of the 1717 cast by the Democrats for the office (compared with 18,098 cast for president). One hundred and forty-six names were voted upon for the office by the Republicans, and fifty by the Democrats. Some, and perhaps many, names were "written in" merely as a joke. The vote for vice-president was thus a farce as had been predicted. Certainly this office should have been omitted from the primary law, and delegates thus left to their own discretion in the matter.

In addition to the eighteen candidates for delegate to the national convention regularly placed on the Republican ballot, and twenty on the Democratic, eight names were "written in"

[1]

Roosevelt	28,905	Wilson	9,588
La Follette	22,491	Clark	7,857
Taft	20,517	Harmon	606

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by the Republicans at the primary election, and five by the Democrats. The successful Republican candidates received from 2259 to 11,132 votes, and the Democrats from 686 to 3139. Of the Republican delegates chosen two had officially declared themselves favorable to Roosevelt, and he was also apparently the choice of a third delegate. Two of the delegates (one an ardent supporter of La Follette) had declared for "Roosevelt-La Follette policies," and another (personally preferring Hughes) had called himself a "Progressive Republican." Four were supporters of Taft. Of the Democrats all but one or two were apparently "progressive," but except in one or two cases their preferences for candidates were not well known. The highest number of votes among the Republican candidates for delegate was received by one who stood at the head of the alphabetical list—one of the two avowed Roosevelt supporters. The Democrat standing at the head received over twice as many votes as were received by any other Democratic candidate, although he had not indicated his preference for president.[1]

For Republican presidential electors there were fifty-one names voted for, all but one being "written in." The five who were nominated at the primary received from 134 to 42,423 votes, the others only from one to thirty-six votes. The highest number was received by the candidate whose name alone was regularly printed on the ballot. Among those nominated were only two of the five recommended by the managers of the presidential candidates. All ten of the Democrats who were endorsed by the Democratic state central committee and whose names were printed on the ballot were nominated, receiving from 1487 to 4492 votes.[2] Ten other names were "written in," but received only from one to five votes. There had been no discussion about the presidential preferences in connection with the nomination of electors, but later it appeared that of the Republican candidates three were supporters of Taft and two of Roosevelt. The individual preferences of the Democrats have not been ascertained.

[1] After the first places on the ballots, the alphabetical arrangement seems to have had no influence at all. In general the candidates received strong support in their several localities.

[2] Rotation of names on the ballot prevented any possible alphabetical advantage.

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It is certain that the strength of the various factions of the parties was not truly indicated in the nominations of 1912. Of course this may have been due, to some extent, to the over-concentration of votes given to some candidates, but probably it was due for the most part to the lack of adequate expression of the preferences of many of the candidates.

As above noted, the primary law makes no provision whatever for the formulation of party platforms. Hence, at the primary election there was no indication of party policy in the state other than that indirectly obtained from the endorsements received by the candidates for president and delegate. The national reputation of the presidential candidates, their public addresses in the state, the discussion in the press, the arguments in the official "state campaign book" etc., indicated their respective policies. But there was more difficulty in the case of the candidates for delegate. Of the eighteen Republican candidates for delegate, ten made no statement of policy whatever in the campaign-book or on the ballot, and the same is true of fifteen of the twenty Democratic candidates. Of the three candidates who used the campaign-book only one formulated anything like a platform. Of course the ballot statements (within twelve words) are necessarily indefinite. The preference of the would-be delegate for president was further evidence of the policy he would favor, but that preference was in many cases not clear. And little further evidence came from the press or elsewhere. On account of the provision for minority representation, the primary election resulted in the election of some delegates to the conventions who were opposed to their respective parties' preference for president and their policies. The election, therefore, did not solve the problem of Oregon's participation in the formulation of the national party platforms.

III

The representation of different factional (or merely *personal*) preferences for presidential candidates on the party delegations, instructed by law[1] to follow the party preference

[1] The law of 1910 provides: "Every such delegate . . . shall subscribe to an oath of office that he will . . . to the best of his judgment and ability, faithfully

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as indicated by the primary election, made the definition of the delegate's exact obligation to carry out the will of his party of special importance. But neither theory nor experience makes clear the duty of the delegates. In view of the fact that none of the presidential candidates received a *majority* of the party votes cast, the attorney-general was of the opinion that the delegates elected were bound to vote for those candidates for whom they were individually pledged (as has appeared, in some cases there were no such pledges) rather than for the choice indicated by the plurality vote of the party. But this view apparently met with no favor, and the delegates, whatever their personal preferences, generally expressed themselves as under obligation to support the popular party choice.

Upon the nature of that support, however, there was difference of opinion. On the one hand, it was contended that the obligation included not only the voting in the convention for the party choice, but also supporting him in the organization and proceedings of the convention generally. "It imposes upon the delegate . . . the clear duty of doing all he honorably and reasonably can do to support the interests of his candidate in the organization of the convention, in the preparation of the platform and in the play and conflict of forces and factions throughout the proceedings."[1] "He is sent there to procure, if he can, the nomination of the candidates for president and vice-president selected by the voters of his party. He is not

carry out the wishes of his political party as expressed by its voters at the time of his election." This provision is, apparently, repealed by an act of 1915. But the act of the same year which permits the substitution of declaration of candidacy and payment of a fee in lieu of nomination petitions requires a candidate using the new method to declare: "I will use my best efforts to bring about the nomination of those persons for president and vice-president of the United States, who receive the largest number of votes at the coming primary election in the state of Oregon."

In view of the possibility that at times men—perhaps the strongest men of the party—who may refuse to allow the use of their names at the primary election as candidates for the offices of president or vice-president may be persuaded to the contrary by "open and insistent convention demand," it has been suggested that "the presidential primary law would be improved by the addition of a provision permitting an expression by the voters as to whether the delegates should be instructed or uninstructed." *Oregonian*, Nov. 8, 1915.

[1] *Oregonian*, Nov. 11, 1911.

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to defeat their expressed will by alliances with their enemies or trades or bargains or combinations or parliamentary tricks and subterfuges designed to defeat his real mission."[1] One delegate said:

We are pledged to the people of Oregon to support Roosevelt for the presidency, and the term "support" does not alone consist of voting for him as the party's choice for president. It is our duty to act with other Roosevelt delegates in all matters coming before the convention, including the important details of organizing the convention itself. . . . We must support Roosevelt in every possible way and at all times in the convention.[2]

On the other hand, it was denied that the pledge to vote for the party nominee included any obligation to "line up" with the delegates so pledged on "all matters" that might come before the convention, and it was maintained that in all matters except voting for candidates for president and vice-president the delegates were free to use their own discretion.

These conflicting theories were applied to operations at the national party conventions in connection with questions of convention chairmanship, contested delegations, adoption of party platform, nomination of president and vice-president, and election of national committeeman. Circumstances limited discussion chiefly to operations at the Republican convention.

Delegate C. H. Carey at that convention made this statement in seconding the nomination of McGovern, the Roosevelt choice for temporary chairman:

Although my personal preference when I became a candidate for the position of delegate to this convention was for the reëlection of President Taft, I am bound by the oath I have taken and by the statute law of my state to support to the best of my ability Colonel Roosevelt as the candidate of this convention. This law, as I construe it, will

[1] *Oregonian*, Nov. 22, 1911.

[2] D. D. Hail, quoted, *Oregonian*, June 1, 1912. . . . "I take this occasion to urge you to the fullest support of the entire Roosevelt programme. It is hardly necessary for me to state that no one will be considered as carrying out his preferential primary instructions for me who, while himself voting for me, shall stand for operations in the convention which might defeat me." From Roosevelt's letter to the Oregon Republican delegation. *Oregon Journal*, June 20, 1912.

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not require me to violate principle or conscience; but in all matters of preliminary organization the presidential candidate for whom the people of my state have declared has indicated his preference and his desire; and it not being contrary to law or good conscience, I propose to follow his directions. It is on this account that I appear before you, and in behalf of myself and some of the other delegates from Oregon, who are in a similar position, I second the nomination of Hon. Francis T. McGovern.[1]

Six of the Oregon delegation, including one Taft delegate, voted for McGovern upon the foregoing or similar theories; the three other Taft delegates voted for Root, the Taft choice, on the ground that they were free to exercise their discretion; and the remaining delegate, a follower of La Follette, refused to vote on the alleged ground that McGovern's nomination was a piece of "trickery." "There is only one interpretation to be placed on the action of the three delegates who voted for Root," said the *Oregon Journal*. "They disobeyed instructions. The seating of the Taft delegates that the election of Root furthered, helped eliminate Roosevelt from the convention."[2] Before the Democratic convention assembled the *Journal* asked: "Can delegates elected under instructions for Wilson in a progressive state justify themselves in voting for a reactionary for chairman?"[3] Nine of the delegates voted for Bryan, but the other for Parker. With reference to his action the same paper declared: The primary law "instructs for a Democratic progressive, but one of the instructed voted for a reactionary temporary chairman."[4]

In regard to the attempt to "purge the roll" at the Republican convention by substituting Roosevelt delegates for alleged fraudulent Taft delegates on the temporary roll as made up by the credentials committee, the Oregon delegation was evenly divided, all the Taft delegates and one Progressive voting against the "purgation" upon the ground of precedent. For this contribution to "the second rout of the Roosevelt men"

[1] Official Report of the Proceedings of the Fifteenth Republican National Convention, p. 49.
[2] *Oregon Journal*, June 22, 1912.
[3] *Ibid.*, June 24, 1912.
[4] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1912.

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these delegates were roundly denounced as "playing Taft machine politics," and as "traitors to the people of this state." In some of the individual Roosevelt contests before the Republican convention there was a similar division of the Oregon delegation.

The delegate's obligation to vote for the primary preferences for president has been much discussed in the state. It was generally agreed by delegates as well as by others that delegates were bound to vote for the party choice as long as he had a "reasonable chance" of nomination by the convention. "I am going to vote for Roosevelt," said one delegate, "not merely on the first ballot, but as long as it appears he has a reasonable chance for the nomination."[1] "It is my duty," said another, "to vote and work for the nomination of Roosevelt until it is definitely determined that he cannot be nominated."[2] A third declared: "If Roosevelt fails of the nomination on the second or third ballot, and there seems to be no chance for him, I do not think I would be expected to support him longer."[3] "Of course," said W. S. U'Ren, "the delegates will have to use their own good sense. It was not intended to make them automatons. But it is intended they shall carry out the wishes of their party so far as it is practicable to follow those instructions when the voting begins."[4]

If the delegate should in vain perform his duty to the party choice as indicated by the highest vote cast by the party, it was not clear as to what candidate he should then transfer his support, and a variety of views accordingly appeared. "I think a reasonable construction would be that the vote should be switched to the state's second choice."[5] "I shall . . . vote for some 'progressive' Republican, as the vote in the . . . primary election showed conclusively that the majority of Republicans favor such a consideration."[6] "I will go with the man who

[1] C. W. Ackerson, quoted, *Oregon Journal*, May 29, 1912.

[2] D. Boyd, quoted, *Oregonian*, June 1, 1912.

[3] J. N. Smith, quoted, *ibid.*, June 1, 1912.

[4] Quoted, *Oregon Journal*, Feb. 18, 1912.

[5] W. S. U'Ren, quoted, *ibid.*

[6] D. Boyd, quoted, *Oregonian*, June 1, 1912.

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has the biggest vote in the convention."[1] "My selection will depend entirely on the situation as I find it in the convention and who would be the best man for the party to nominate."[2] Another view favored the delegate's *personal* choice (announced in some cases during the campaign) as his second choice at the convention. Apparently there has been no advocacy in Oregon of provision by law for the expression of second or additional preferences for president and vice-president by the party voters. It must be admitted that instructions may be taken too seriously. As one of the delegates said: "If instructions to delegates are to be carried to the limit, there will be danger of no nomination at all being made."[3]

At the Democratic convention all the Oregon delegates voted for Wilson, the Democratic primary choice, on the first ten ballots. Then, the New York delegation having "switched" to Clark, and Clark having a majority of the votes, two of the Oregon delegation went over to Clark. The view of these delegates is thus stated:

> Oregon has a preferential primary, and we each took an oath that we would exercise the best of our judgment and ability in endeavoring to carry out our instructions as expressed at the polls. We have voted here today. Mr. Clark has received the majority. Mr. Wilson has not even one-third, and I as a member of the Oregon delegation, with due regard for my oath, depending on our judgment and exercising it as we have a right to do, believe that we now have the right, and that the time has come when we should exercise our judgment, and we have the right to exercise it by casting a vote for Champ Clark.[4]

But when the tide turned to Wilson, the "renegade delegates," as critics dubbed them, first one and then the other, "partially redeemed themselves" by returning to the "Wilson fold," where all the delegates thereafter remained. The Oregon delegation had voted, nine to one, for Bryan's anti-Morgan-Ryan-Belmont resolution.

[1] J. N. Smith, quoted, *ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1912.

[2] W. R. King, quoted, *ibid.*, May 31, 1912. *Cf.* F. V. Holman, quoted, *ibid.*

[3] W. R. King, quoted, *Oregon Journal*, July 14, 1912.

[4] F. V. Holman, Official Report of the Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention, 1912, p. 222.

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The Roosevelt "bolt" complicated matters in the Republican convention. In anticipation of the "bolt" most of the Oregon delegates decided to stay in the regular convention and continue the support of Roosevelt there. One of them announced: "I do not feel I have been elected to a rump convention. I will support Roosevelt so long as he has a chance for the nomination, and if he bolts the convention I will still continue to vote for him there in the regular convention."[1] "At the convention," said one of the Taft delegates,

> before the first ballot on the presidential nomination was taken, Colonel Roosevelt decided not to have his name presented, and he requested delegates favoring him to abstain from voting or at any rate to answer present, but not voting. Eight of our ten Oregon delegates decided that under our instructions we should vote for him anyway, and we did so. The other two delegates [ardent Roosevelt supporters] did not vote, and in this respect followed literally the request of Mr. Roosevelt. I am not sure that his withdrawal would have been sufficient ground for us to have voted for other candidates, but none of the delegation was willing to take this responsibility, although some of the number would have been glad to do so.[2]

Said one of the latter at the convention: "I refuse to vote where the cards are stacked."[3] Most of the criticism of the action of these two delegates was directed not so much at their refusing to vote for Roosevelt after their "release," as at their leaving the convention (to attend the "rump convention"), and failing to vote for Borah, the primary choice for vice-president.[4]

The eight other delegates who remained in the convention voted for Borah, but Sherman was nominated as vice-president on the first ballot. Chamberlain, the Democratic primary choice, was not an active candidate for the office, and is said to

[1] F. S. Bynon, quoted, *Oregonian*, June 1, 1912.

[2] C. H. Carey, quoted, *ibid.*, July 4, 1912.

[3] C. W. Ackerson, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Fifteenth Republican National Convention, p. 400.

[4] "The expression of vice-presidential choice did not extend much beyond a jest, as precious few voters took the trouble to write in the name of their choice. But the law instructs the delegates to stand by the man who received the votes in the same language that it instructs the delegates to support the party's choice for president." *Oregon Journal*, Apr. 27, 1912.

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have advised the Oregon delegates not to vote for him; but his name was nevertheless proposed by one of the Oregon delegates. He received the votes of all those delegates on the first ballot, and the votes of all but one on the second. The first ballot showed that he had little chance of nomination, and the second that he had none. Then Marshall was made the unanimous choice of the convention upon motion of the delegate who had proposed the name of Chamberlain.

In respect to the formulation of the national party platform delegates were in much the same uncertain position as they were in respect to the choice of president. The policies indicated by the party choice for presidential candidate and those indicated by the election of some of the delegates in each party were not in harmony. What should the delegates do in regard to the platform? It was one of the avowed purposes of the provision for the election of delegates to give all factions of the party a fair chance to influence the formulation of the national platform. This view would make the delegates independent of the wishes of the presidential candidate nominated at their party primary. But, on the other hand, there was opinion to the effect that delegates were bound to vote for the platform advocated by him. In the Republican convention supporters of Roosevelt refused to vote on the "unprogressive" party platform submitted, and none but Taft delegates voted for it. The Democratic platform was unanimously adopted.

Opportunity for conflict appeared again in the choice of national committeemen. At first it seems to have been considered that the Republican committeeman for the state should be one in sympathy with the nominee of the convention, but later this plan was opposed by the Roosevelt delegates. However, a committeeman favorable to Taft was elected, and the delegates who voted for him were accused of bad faith to Roosevelt. There was apparently no such difficulty in regard to the choice of the Democratic committeeman. The "last remnant of the spoils system in politics," as it was called, was removed, at the instance of members of the Progressive party, by the act of the legislature of 1913, which provided for the choice of the national committeemen by the voters of the respective parties at the presidential primary election.

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The operations of the Oregon delegates at the conventions were closely followed at home, and deviation from instructions, or a particular theory of instructions, called forth harsh criticism from individuals, groups, clubs, and the press. Telegrams scolded and threatened delegates while they were at the conventions, and many of them, upon their return, were long kept busy explaining their convention conduct. And returned delegates aired the squabbles they had had with each other during their absence.

IV

As has appeared, all these troubles were caused by a conflict between the personal (or factional) choice of the delegates and the party choice. Dire consequences had been predicted of the law which made such conflicts probable. "It means divided and warring delegations at both the great national conventions. It means the intrusion of meddlers, interlopers and mischief-makers. It means the reign of dissension, dissolution and despair in both parties."[1] And the feeling that the provision for proportional representation and the provision for party preference were "inconsistent and incompatible"—that all of the delegates of each party should represent the majority of the party—increased with the experience of the conventions of 1912. This was expressed by Republicans and Democrats alike.

> The trouble with the Oregon delegates at Chicago was not so much that the delegates were not in good faith desirous of obeying their instructions as that they were elected through a foolish and short-sighted system under the presidential preference primary law. . . . It was carefully arranged . . . that there could never be a "solid" delegation for any one.[2]

> A fine hodge-podge resulted, and a Kilkenny delegation was sent to Chicago. How could the people expect harmony, unity and enthusiasm when conflict and confusion were deliberately invited by the election of ten delegates who belonged in different political groups and were bound to have opinions, desires and purposes of their own?[3]

[1] *Oregonian*, Aug. 5, 1911.
[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1912.
[3] *Ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1912.

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The results are the same, whether in the Republican party or the Democratic party. . . . Wouldn't it be better to change the law so the delegates would fit the instructions, or quit instructing? If the instructions are to be for a progressive, what's the use of so fixing the election process that reactionaries will be entrusted with the instructions?[1]

The possibility of a similar conflict in case of the presidential electors had been early suggested. "A minority of a party in the state may nominate candidates for electors hostile to its presidential candidate. If the vote of the presidential electors of Oregon shall not sometime be divided, even though the popular vote may have been strongly in favor of a given candidate, it will not be the fault of this law."[2] For a while it seemed that a "scheme" for inducing candidates nominated as Republican presidential electors in certain states, including Oregon, to vote for the Progressive candidates in spite of the nominations made by the Republican convention[3] might partially succeed in Oregon. Before the nomination of Taft two of the electoral nominees, friendly to Taft, had stated they would support the convention choice, but the third adherent of Taft had declared that he would not vote for Roosevelt even if nominated by the convention. After the convention action it was certain that these three would vote for the "regular" convention nominee, and it later appeared that one of the followers of Roosevelt would do the same. But the other would-be elector wholly repudiated the Republican convention, affiliated with the new Progressive party, and was nominated as one of its electors. He then demanded that he should be labeled as a Progressive on the ballot. Since his name could not, under the law, appear twice, the Republican list of candidates for elector would thus be one short, and a Republican victory in the state might be

[1] *Oregon Journal*, June 26, 1912.

[2] S. W. McCall, "Representative as against Direct Government," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 108, p. 458 (1911).

[3] It was natural that no state regulation should be made in reference to the duties of presidential electors, and none was made in the law of 1910. But the law of 1915 requires candidates for the office to "pledge themselves, if elected, to vote for their party's nominees for president and vice-president of the United States in the electoral college."

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reduced by one-fifth. This was denounced as "one of the rankest political frauds in American history."[1]

It is presumptuous, audacious and indefensible to the last degree for a candidate for presidential elector to repudiate the nominee of his party and to declare that he will use his office to support a candidate who is not the nominee of his party, but who openly proclaims himself to be forming a third party so as to be the nominee of another than the Republican party.[2]

Said the candidate, however:

I was nominated by the people as an elector on the Republican ticket, and I accepted. My name was written in the primary ballot by the people and I made no declaration of principle. The people went on record as favoring Roosevelt. I cannot see why I should not abide by the wishes of the voters.[3]

And it was maintained that a primary election has a legal standing, but that a party convention has not. Later the candidate promised that in case of his election he would vote for Taft should the majority of the Republican nominees be elected, and for Roosevelt should a majority of the Progressive nominees be successful. Finally the secretary of state refused to certify his name as an elector nominated by either party on account of his nomination to a third office, and the candidate withdrew from the contest.

Thus it appears that under the provision for the primary nomination of presidential electors there may be an inclination to repudiate the long-accepted doctrine of the proper function of electors; that the *direct* nomination of the electors and their consequent *direct* responsibility to the party voters of the state may detract from their character as the agents of the party-as-represented-in-national-convention and tend to clothe them with the character of the agents of the voters-of-the-party-in-the-state; and that the proportional representation of the various factions of a party among the electors may lead even farther, and clothe the electors with the character of agents of the

[1] *Oregon Journal*, Sept. 18, 1912.

[2] *Oregonian*, July 18, 1912. [3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1912.

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factions-in-the-party. From these considerations, as well as from the facts noted above in connection with the nomination of electors, it seems that there is no good reason whatever for their nomination by the party voters, and that the matter might well be left to the state central committees.

Although most of the criticism of the provision for minority representation has been caused simply by the belief that minority representation is much out of place in this connection, the principle of such representation under any circumstances has been obnoxious to advocates of "majority rule."

It was objected that generally the *proportional* representation arrived at by the law would not, under the conditions, be *geographical* representation.

> A large number of politicians of both parties in the counties outside of Portland . . . fear the limitation of the voter to one vote, when ten delegates are to be chosen from the state at large, will deprive the state outside of Multnomah county of representation. They feel this result would be unfortunate, as the custom in the past has been to distribute the honor of attending the national conventions to all parts of the state. Out-state politicians recognize that for the most part the men of widest political renown live in Multnomah county, and here one-third of the voting strength of the state is concentrated. They fear that this condition will crowd them out.[1]

And it is true that Multnomah county received more than its share in the primary election of 1912. But geographical considerations had little weight with advocates of proportional representation. "If the majority of the people by their votes choose all or nearly all of the delegates from the county, why should there be complaint? The delegates will represent the sentiments of the voters under the instructions of the primary law, and they can do this just the same, whatever counties they are from."[2]

The objection, so often urged against the system of proportional representation, that the people generally cannot understand its operation, has some basis in the complaint here continually repeated to the effect that the single vote "disfran-

[1] *Oregon Journal*, Nov. 19, 1911. [2] W. S. U'Ren, quoted, *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1911.

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chised" the voter to the extent of nine-tenths of his privilege in case of delegates, and four-fifths in case of presidential electors. The "disfranchisement" is thus explained: "There are ten delegates to be elected . . . and this primary law says we shall only vote for one. So I am disfranchised as to nine. It says I can vote for only one candidate for elector, when five are to be chosen, and I am disfranchised as to four."[1]

On the whole this experiment with minority representation proved unsatisfactory. It is unfortunate that the merits of the principle should have been obscured by its illogical application and that it thus served to discredit, to some extent, the merits of the presidential-primary law. For the sake of consistency it was necessary that the "combination of majority rule with proportional representation" should be dissolved; and that either party preference for president and vice-president should be retained, and the voters of the party allowed to vote for *all* of the candidates for delegate and elector, or that the preferential vote should be abolished and the minority representation retained. Of these alternatives the former was the more in accord with the "Oregon System," and was retained by the act of 1915 which eliminated the feature of minority representation from presidential primary elections.[2] But the district representation in the election of delegates to the party conventions, introduced by this act, invites complications similar to those which were caused by the minority representation which it abolished.[3]

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[1] T. H. Crawford, quoted, *Oregon Journal*, Nov. 19, 1911. See also, especially, C. B. Moores, *Oregonian*, Feb. 16, 1915.

[2] A proposition made during the campaign of 1912 to test the constitutionality of the single-vote provision of the law was abandoned because it was criticised as an attack on the direct primary and an attempt toward return to the old convention system, and because there is a very general opposition here to any interference with "the people's laws," except through the direct action of the people. And the failure of a bill in the legislature of 1913 which substituted for the single vote a vote for the full number of delegates and electors was due to this same prejudice against "tinkering" with direct legislation. The elimination of such minority representation was one purpose of an initiative bill rejected by the people in 1914.

[3] *Cf.* F. W. Dickey, "Presidential Preference Primary," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 9, pp. 468, 482–3 (1915).

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EFFECTS OF WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

TWO principal problems are involved in the woman's suffrage question of the present day. First, what are the indirect social and ethical results produced by the influence of woman in politics and by the increased opportunities for feminine development and expression through the expansion of woman's sphere of activity? Second, what are the direct effects upon the political situation caused by the enfranchisement of an entirely new class of voters and by the increase in actual numbers of the voting body? The first of these problems has been discussed and re-discussed, but the second problem, involving as it does many radical changes in the working of our political institutions, has secured comparatively little attention or study. Helen Sumner's admirable book on *Equal Suffrage*, based on her investigations in Colorado, while striking at most of the real problems, in the main merely marked the way for more intensive studies. The readjustments of power in political and social groupings, the effects upon boss-rule, elections, and all the various other problems are still unsettled. They are the matters with which we are concerned in the following paper. The vote of the Chicago election has been analyzed with the view of bringing out just those political changes which follow in the immediate wake of woman's suffrage.

Chicago's mayoralty election of April 6, 1915, afforded the unique experiment of testing woman's suffrage for the first time under what might be termed metropolitan conditions. The experiment was extremely interesting in that it gave opportunity to study the system in operation in a small compact area where varying social types prevailed, where issues were local and likely to attract extensive and active interest, where concentration of population would make organization feasible and possible, and where numbers were sufficiently large to warrant generalizations and statistical methods. The election, more-

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over, was an important one, embracing two distinct parts: first, the selection of a number of officers—mayor, city treasurer, city clerk, one municipal judge and one alderman from each of the thirty-five city wards;[1] second, the expression of opinion on eight referendum questions concerning matters of proposed public policy. Partisan nomination primaries had preceded the election by approximately two weeks, and in these both Republicans and Democrats had two factions contesting for the nominations. In both primaries and election, separate count was taken of the vote of each sex, permitting thereby comparisons and contrasts in the opinions registered by the men on the one hand and the women on the other.

I

The most evident and important fact drawn from the returns is that the votes of the women were distributed among the different candidates in proportions almost identical with those of the votes of the men. With but few exceptions the women voted as the men did. In two cases by a slight margin the women's vote reversed the decision recorded by the men. The first of these was in the seventeenth ward, where a majority of 61 for Thompson in the male vote was overcome by the women's plurality of 171 for Sweitzer. The second case resulted in the defeat of the notorious "Barney" Grogan by Murray. Grogan's plurality on the male count was 160. This was overbalanced by a majority of 472 for Murray in the final count of the women's vote, giving the latter the aldermanic seat for the eighteenth ward.[2] Neither of these, however, could be considered decisive contradictions of opinion, the pluralities in either case amounting to less than two per cent of the total vote. As a matter of fact, if the votes cast for each candidate be reckoned and compared as percentages, one sex with the other, an almost perfect correlation is found.

[1] Three additional vacancies were filled, making a total of 38 aldermen actually elected.

[2] The final count revealed some changes in the figures as first published for the fifteenth and thirty-fifth wards' aldermanic vote. According to these later figures, the women's choice was opposed to that of the men, but only by a very small number of votes, so that the actual results as first published were in no way changed.

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PERCENTAGES OF MEN'S AND WOMEN'S VOTE CAST FOR DIFFERENT CANDIDATES IN THE MUNICIPAL ELECTION OF APRIL 6, 1915

DISTRICT	CANDIDATE	MEN'S VOTE	WOMEN'S VOTE	VARIATION [1]
		Per cent	Per cent	
City	Thompson—Rep.	57.7	59.3	1.6
City	Sweitzer—Dem.	38.	36.8	1.2
City	Stedman—Soc.	3.7	3.2	.5
Ward 2	Thompson—Rep.	70.	72.	2.
" 5	Thompson—Rep.	37.	40.	3.
" 9	Thompson—Rep.	69.	70.	1.
" 21	Sweitzer—Dem.	48.	48.	0.
" 33	Sweitzer—Dem.	28.	27.	1.
" 25—Pct. 41	Sweitzer—Dem.	23.	17.	6.
" 26 " 43	Thompson—Rep.	76.	79.	3.
" 33	Buck—Alderman.	37.	43.	6.
" 33	Hazen—Alderman	34.	32.	2.

The fact that the correspondence or correlation indicated in the table appears in the votes of the smaller units of the election precincts and the wards as well as in the vote of the city as a whole uncompromisingly suggests a lack of independent political conviction upon the part of the women. The extreme regularity in the variation of the percentages in all probability indicates some causal connection. Is it, as has been argued, that women merely reiterate the political convictions of the men and thus simply swell the number of ballots without affecting the results? Is it that the present case is sporadic, arising out of circumstances and conditions peculiar to this particular election, or is it that new forces have been introduced into our political machinery affecting the action of the voters? For an answer to these questions we must look to the facts of the case.

Consider first the nature of the recent campaign. The issues at stake were purely political and partisan. Neither of the mayoralty candidates represented a well-defined municipal program or advocated any important local policies; neither had personalities which captivated the public mind. Progressives and Republicans fused to carry a ticket against an opposing

[1] The figures in this column represent the difference between the percentage of the men's vote cast for a given candidate and the percentage of the women's vote cast for the same candidate.

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Democratic slate. The entire campaign was waged as a partisan contest. In such event, normally, a household would vote as a unit, for political opinion or party affiliation is largely a matter of association and interests. In all probability daughters follow the lead of their fathers in about the same proportion as do sons. Wives generally have the same convictions as their husbands, because of similar associations and viewpoint. It would not be surprising to find southern women strongly Democratic or Pennsylvania women preponderantly Republican. In the city, then, where political groupings of a like sort exist, only on a smaller scale, the same political faith would be likely to predominate in the same degree among the women of any given district as among the men.

On the other hand, in the primaries where within each party there is latitude for difference of opinion respecting the qualifications and records of the opposing candidates for nomination,

PERCENTAGES OF MEN'S AND WOMEN'S VOTES CAST FOR DIFFERENT CANDIDATES IN THE PRIMARIES OF FEBRUARY 23, 1915

DISTRICTS [1]	CANDIDATE	MEN	WOMEN	VARIATION [2]
		Per cent	Per cent	
City	Olsen	46	56	10
"	Thompson	54	44	10
25th Ward	Thompson	42	30	12
"	Olsen	58	70	12
7th Ward	Olsen	56	67	11
"	Thompson	44	33	11
13th Ward	Thompson	63	49	14
"	Olsen	37	51	14
6th Ward Rep.[3]	McCormic	46	62	16
" "	Freund	43	31	12
" "	Others	11	7	4
30th Ward Dem.[3]	Latchford	28	27	1
" "	Lynch	36	24	12
" "	Mulford	24	18	6
" "	Others	12	31	9

[1] The first eight items are of votes cast in the selected districts for the competing candidates for the Republican nomination for mayor.

[2] The figures in this column represent the difference between the percentage of the men's vote cast for a given candidate and the percentage of the women's vote cast for the same candidate.

[3] Primaries for nomination of alderman.

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considerable disagreement is to be observed between the convictions of the men and those of the women. Judge Olsen in the Republican primary received the clear endorsement of the women but was defeated by the heavy male plurality for Thompson. Here was a very decided expression of independent choice on the part of the women, as appears from accompanying figures. The comparison of these facts with the election returns would seem to point to but one conclusion, namely, that where clear partisan issues are involved, the women vote as the men do; but where such issues are eliminated, or are considered as of secondary importance, their choice is freely expressed quite independently of the views of the men.

Furthermore the single fact that, in general, correspondence rather than disagreement prevailed does not necessarily establish the proposition that the women blindly follow the men. Discussion in the home as to the merits of the candidates and the issues may have contributed largely toward a close correlation between the vote of the sexes. The women may have been as instrumental in influencing the vote of the men as were the men in guiding and controlling the vote of the women. Consequently, comparisons of the distribution of the votes of one sex with the distribution of those of the other does not afford a real index of the independence of woman's vote. The criterion to be observed is whether on the whole there has been more independent voting after woman's introduction into politics than before. Opinion seems to be agreed upon an affirmative answer. The *Chicago Tribune* writes as follows in regard to some of the districts:

> The fourth ward is County Treasurer Stuckart's territory. It should have given Sweitzer 5000. It responded with 2246.
>
> The twenty-first ward was carried by Thompson by 497, normally a Democratic ward when Harrison was running.
>
> The twenty-second . . . gave Sweitzer only 404 where not less than 2000 might have been expected.
>
> The eighteenth never gave less than 5000 plurality in the good old days. Only 859 was its record for Schweitzer yesterday.

In eight wards party ties were broken to elect aldermen of

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different political faith than that registered by the majority of votes in the mayoralty ballot. Wards 10, 11, 12 and 21, with Republican majorities for mayor, elected Democratic aldermen. Wards 15 and 27 elected Socialist aldermen, though they went otherwise strongly Republican, and wards 17 and 18 chose Republican aldermen while supporting a Democratic candidate for mayor. On the whole, opinion seems to be agreed that in so far as aldermen were concerned, the recent election may be characterized as one of the best expressions of intelligent, independent thought that Chicago has ever witnessed. Some part of this may have found its origin in woman's new influence, together with a concomitant increase in interest and discussion of political questions and issues. The effect then of the introduction of an entirely new class of voters has not been to instill any radical change of viewpoint, nor appreciably to alter the political complexion of the electorate, but to create a wider field of interest, more extensive discussion, and a more enlightened opinion in political matters that eventually must tend toward careful consideration and intelligent choice of candidates, an informed, independent electorate, and a more effective popular control of government.

II

We have found that throughout the city, in the wards, and to some extent in the precincts, the proportionate distribution of the votes among the different candidates was the same for both sexes. It must not be inferred on that account that woman's suffrage has brought about no alteration in the political status of the city or of the various population and social groups therein. Like proportions may exist between parts of two or more quantities, totally unlike in aggregate size. To exhaust the possibilities of change involved in the introduction of equal suffrage, we must consider not only the grouping of votes within the units—wards, precincts etc.—but the relative and aggregate size of those units. In other words, there are problems and questions arising in connection with the mere fact of the number of women voting, the proportion of this number to the total eligible voters, the distribution of the female vote

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throughout the wards of the city, the social groups from which these numbers are recruited, etc. These are matters that often carry far more import in determining the successful working of democratic government than do the more apparent facts which we have considered above. What type or group or viewpoint in the community does the majority of the electorate reflect? That is, after all, the key to an understanding of good or bad government. It is to this question therefore that we now turn for consideration.

It is almost self-evident that the proportion of women voting to the potential voters of a given district is dependent upon the character of the population of that district. According to the Illinois law all women citizens, 21 years of age and over, are entitled to vote in municipal elections. The qualification of citizenship, however, results in excluding a large element of unnaturalized foreign-born women. These latter, approximating 150,000 to 200,000, are mainly concentrated in a few of the wards; so, while it is possible to determine the number of females 21 years and over for the various sections of the city, the actual number of eligible voters in a given district can not be obtained from the existing data with any degree of accuracy. Readjustments in political weight or power as between the different parties or social groups may nevertheless be traced by comparing the actual ratios of increase in the number of voters in the different election districts. If there has been no change, the ratio of increase should be the same for each and every district in the city. If, on the contrary, the proportionate increase varies from district to district, there is inevitably a resultant shifting of control. In the following table are given the percentage ratios of the women's to the men's vote for the 35 wards of the city; or in other words, the ratios of increase in the number of voters are given on the basis of the former franchise, namely, manhood suffrage. Figures are also given showing the percentage of the women's to the total vote, and in the fourth column is indicated the political complexion of the district in the vote for mayor. The facts to be observed in this connection may be considered under three heads: (*a*) the

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general political effect, (*b*) the social significance, and (*c*) the effect on local city government.

TABLE SHOWING RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF WOMEN TO MALE VOTERS IN VARIOUS WARDS OF THE CITY

DISTRICT	PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN'S TO MEN'S VOTE	PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN'S TO TOTAL VOTE	PLURALITY IN ELECTION
City	57.7	36.4	Rep.
Ward 7	71.	41.	Rep.
" 25	70.	41.	Rep.
" 6	68.	41.	Rep.
" 31	68.	40.	Rep.
" 13	68.	41.	Dem.
" 3	67.	40.	Rep.
" 32	67.	41.	Rep.
" 35	63.	40.	Rep.
" 4 [1]	55.	36.	Dem.
" 5	54.	31.	Dem.
" 16	46.	32.	Dem.
" 18	45.	31.	Dem.
" 19	43.	30.	Dem.
" 21	44.	30.	Rep.
" 22	41.	25.	Dem.
" 17	38.	28.	Dem.
" 1	32.	24.	Dem.

A. *The general political effect.* In the first place, it is to be noted that high percentages of women voters correspond generally with Republican wards and low percentages with Democratic wards. To illustrate the importance of this, let us assume a hypothetical case. Take two wards, A and B, each with 13,000 men voters—A, Republican, and B, Democratic. Suppose the result of the combined male vote for the two districts is an exact tie between the two candidates X and Y. But ward A has a women's vote which is 9100, or 70 per cent of the men's, while ward B has a women's vote of 6500, or only 50 per cent of the men's. If the women's vote be distributed between the candidates according to the same ratios in which the male vote is divided (which according to our observations above would seem to be likely) the result of the combined vote gives a very definite plurality as follows:

[1] All other wards (18) ranging from 50 to 60 per cent in column 2.

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Ward A

CANDIDATE	MEN'S VOTE		WOMEN'S VOTE		TOTAL
X	8,000	62 per cent	5,642	62 per cent	13,642
Y	5,000	38	3,458	38	8,452
	13,000	100	9,100	100	

Ward B

X	5,000	38 per cent	2,470	38 per cent	7,470
Y	8,000	62	4,030	62	12,030
	13,000	100	6,500	100	

Total Vote—X—Wards A and B	21,142
Total Vote—Y—Wards A and B	20,488
Plurality for X	624

X would therefore carry the two wards by 624 votes. X's situation is exactly similar to that of the Republican party in the city of Chicago. While in the present election the results were not materially affected because of the exceedingly large pluralities given the Republican candidates, various possibilities are suggested in which these peculiar circumstances may have important bearing. Normally, the city has been Democratic. Woman's suffrage has tended to augment greatly the Republican ranks while giving comparatively a much smaller increase in numbers to the Democratic party. In connection with assembly-district, county, and state elections, these facts take on a new shade of importance. For example, where the conflict between the city and country looms up large as in New York, with the city strongly Democratic and the up-state districts Republican, any condition which tends to affect the relative strength of the two parties involves the whole question of urban or rural domination in the state legislature and in the choice of governor. In Illinois, however, women are not entitled to vote for constitutional officers; but there are still a large number of statutory officers, together with all the local governmental officials, where woman's suffrage may bring about a complete change in the center of control.

So far as local government is concerned, the paramount consideration is not whether this control shall be Democratic, Republican, Socialist or Progressive, but in what element or

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social group the determining political power rests. We shall therefore consider in some detail how woman's suffrage has readjusted the political strength among the social groupings in the community.

B. *The social significance.* Of the ten wards in which the number of women voting was 50 per cent or less of the number of men, nine represented constituencies of poorer-class foreigners, and the other, a vicious segregated group. Ward I with its enclosed vice district showed a women's vote 32 per cent of that of the men. Wards 21 and 22, with the large Italian colony, voted respectively 44 per cent and 41 per cent as many women as men. The five "river wards," 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, comprising various mixed elements, mainly foreigners or of foreign parentage, unskilled and un-Americanized, showed percentages in order, 46, 38, 45, 43 and 50. In ward 10, the Bohemian women's vote was approximately half that of the men. On the other hand, the high-percentage wards are associated with the skilled working groups, the small home-owners, the medium-salaried office and professional workers, and in general the so-called "middle class" elements. Ward 7, the neighborhood surrounding the University of Chicago, showed 71 per cent as many women as men voting. Its immediate neighbor—Ward 6, the Hyde Park district—showed a percentage of 68. On the north side, Ward 25, the fashionable apartment section and the Rogers Park home district, while showing the largest actual number of voters, 13,440, gave a percentage only of 70. Wards 23, 24 and 26, comprising a distinctly middle-class element, showed percentages of 58, 51 and 58, respectively. In the outlying west-side wards, 31, 32, 33 and 35, with a typical medium-propertied, home-owning population, the women turned out in large numbers, the percentages being 68, 67, 56 and 63.

But ward lines do not in many instances follow social groupings, so that the above figures may express an average between two extremes of so-called "good" and "bad" elements. For example, take the twenty-first ward. Here there are two natural social divisions—the east-side ultra-fashionable set and the west-side Italian colony. In the group of 15 precincts

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comprising the latter district, the women's vote averaged 36 per cent of the men's, or 30 per cent of the total vote, while the averages for the east-side precincts were 62 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively. In individual precincts the latter group showed a women's vote as high as 84 per cent of the men's, while in the west-side group the highest percentage was only 44 per cent and the lowest was 11 per cent. Like differences are found in other wards. The precincts bordering on the stock yards in ward 30 average 39 per cent as many women as men voters, while further south and west, in the better residence section, the average of seven precincts is 66 per cent, with individual precincts ranging as high as 78 per cent.

According to the above figures, the readjustment of political power among the social groupings, so far as they may roughly be distinguished by outward economic conditions, seems plainly to have been toward a concentration of control in the intelligent middle-class element and a cutting-down of the power of the illiterate, poorer and uneducated groups. A rough division of the wards into three sections according to the economic status of the population will show the relative proportion of the voters in the different social classes.

DISTRIBUTION OF VOTERS IN CHICAGO IN ELECTION OF APRIL 6, 1915

DISTRICTS	PERCENTAGE OF MALE ELECTORS	PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE ELECTORS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ELECTORATE
A 12 Wards—3, 7, 6, 13, 23, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 . . .	46 per cent	52 per cent	48 per cent
B 11 Wards—2, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30.	31 "	30 "	30 "
C 12 Wards—1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 21, 24 . . .	23 "	18 "	22 "
	100	100	100

As a matter of practical politics these figures carry little significance, for the alignment of voters in parties and in election districts, rather than the distribution according to social classes, determines the real allocation of political power. It is evident that the upper social groups have the preponderance of numbers, but whether they are so organized, so united in viewpoint and so distributed as to make their numbers count effectively is

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a question that bears more pertinently in the matter of every-day politics. We shall give this some consideration under the following head.

C. *The effects on local city government.* In order to appreciate the untrustworthy rôle actual numbers may play it must be remembered that our present system of representation consists of two broad types—district representation and representation or election at large. Chicago is governed municipally by a common council of 70 aldermen—two from each of 35 wards—and a chief executive or mayor. As part of Cook County, it is governed by a board of county commissioners, ten of whom are chosen by the city through election at large. Various minor officials are also elected in both city and county on a general ticket. In municipal matters the dominant authority is the council, its powers being broad and extensive and its functions numerous. In view of these powers and functions considerable weight attaches to the control of a majority in this body, or, to come more directly to our problem, to the control women actually exercise over its membership.

According to the figures quoted above, 50 per cent of the women's strength as a voting body is concentrated in one-third of the 35 city wards. This means that under any circumstances one-half of the women voters have a voice in electing only one-third of the city council. Not only that, but the 50 per cent which have a voice in the election of the other two-thirds of council members comprises the poorest, least intelligent and least Americanized portion of the population. Of course, differences existed in the voting strength of the wards prior to the adoption of woman's suffrage, but with the inauguration of the latter plan these disparities were increased, as may readily be observed from the following figures:

AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTES CAST IN DIFFERENT ALDERMANIC ELECTION DISTRICTS: MAYORALTY ELECTION OF APRIL 6, 1915

	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
Average—6 Wards (4, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22) .	6176	2872	9048
Average—6 Wards (23, 25, 26, 32, 33, 35).	16694	10648	27342

From this table it appears that in one group of six wards

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the average number of male votes cast in the mayoralty election was 16,694, and in another group of six wards the average was 6176, or in the ratio of 2.7 votes in the average ward of the first group to 1 vote in the average ward of the second group. The average numbers of female votes cast in the same groups were 10,648 and 2872, respectively, or in the ratio of 3.7 votes in the average ward of the first group to 1 vote in the average ward of the second group. With the combined vote, male and female, the ratio was 3.0 votes in the first group to 1 vote in the second group, showing a considerable increase over the ratio of 2.7 to 1 which would have prevailed under single manhood suffrage.

When the women who may reasonably be counted upon to express an intelligent, independent choice of candidates for public office are denied the voting power commensurate with their numbers, as is most evidently the case in the ward system of representation, women's influence as a whole toward better government is seriously curtailed and limited. To some extent this condition might be alleviated by a redistricting of the city. Proportional representation, in theory at least, would likewise overcome this objection and would afford each political group a weight in the selection of public officers strictly in accordance with its numerical voting strength. However, without questioning the validity of the theory of ward or district representation, the fact remains that under such a system much of the dynamic force in the woman's movement for better government is dissipated, and the matter of minority control is raised to a problem of serious proportions.

Concerning those officers elected for the city at large, conditions of a different sort prevail. In the twelve wards containing approximately 33 per cent of the population and 50 per cent of the voters, these representing the best elements in the community, 68 per cent of the votes cast were for the Republican candidate Thompson, giving him in round numbers 209,000, or two-thirds enough to establish an absolute plurality for the city over Sweitzer, the Democratic candidate. The following figures on the distribution of party votes will give an index to the center of actual political control. The three groups are the same as those referred to in the table on page 115.

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DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC VOTES ACCORDING TO DISTRICTS IN THE MAYORALTY ELECTION OF APRIL 6, 1915

	GROUP A	GROUP B	GROUP C	CITY
Republican votes cast	204,637	117,569	68,717	390,923
Democratic votes cast	106,641	73,521	71,747	251,909
Combined Republican and Democratic vote	311,278	191,090	140,464	642,832
Percentage of total Republican vote	52	30	18	100
Percentage of total Democratic vote	42	30	28	100
Percentage of combined Republican and Democratic votes	48	30	22	100

DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC VOTES AS PERCENTAGES OF THE COMBINED VOTE IN EACH DISTRICT

	GROUP A	GROUP B	GROUP C
Republican	66 per cent	62 per cent	49 per cent
Democratic	34 "	38 "	51 "
Combined	100 "	100 "	100 "

The preponderance of sentiment toward Republicanism in the twelve wards of Group A, combined with the fact that these wards contain approximately fifty per cent of the active voters of the city, places in those districts, or in the social group therein, virtually the power of control over all officers chosen for the city at large. This, of course, rests upon the assumption that the voters of these districts act more or less in concert, or as a conscious, single, political group, striving toward common ends and accomplishments. An examination of former election returns would seem to justify this assumption. Republicanism, almost invariably in local elections, has derived its main strength from the Group A wards, or the so-called "upper middle-class" elements, while aligned against it have been the foreign elements of the river or Group C wards, preponderantly Democratic. With the entrance of women into politics an evident strengthening of the former or Republican group has taken place, while the alignment of forces along the above social lines has become even more pronounced. Fifty per cent of the total women's vote comes from the Group A wards. Of this fifty per cent, seventy-two per cent or approximately three-quarters are Republican and one-quarter Democratic. With the normal scattering of votes throughout the rest of the city,

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the Republican women of Group A are able to command an absolute majority of the total women's vote. As long, therefore, as these "upper middle-class" women are united into a socially and politically cohesive group, as in a large measure they are at present, they possess a preponderant voice, on the feminine side, in the selection of officers for the city at large. Considering the combined vote, both male and female, the effect of this distribution, where elections at large are concerned, is to strengthen the upper middle-class political power relatively to that of the lower economic classes and foreign elements. The center of political control thus tends to be shifted upward in the scale of social classes. This tendency holds both in theory and in practice so far as the present election is concerned. We shall not attempt to predict that the condition will persist or will hold for other localities. It is merely a statement of fact in regard to the Chicago situation.

III

There still remains one fact in this connection worthy of special attention, that is, the measure of woman's response to the newly-created ballot privilege. In the mayoralty election the women's vote was 36 per cent of the total cast. The *Century* for March, 1914, gives the following figures for California cities:

	MEN	WOMEN
San Francisco	65.5 per cent	34.5 per cent
Los Angeles	56.9 "	43.1 "
Berkeley	53.4 "	46.6 "

In the recall of Gill in Seattle in 1913, the women's vote averaged 32 per cent of the total. The figures giving Chicago's percentage show that the women there constituted a greater proportion of the electorate than in San Francisco and Seattle but a considerably smaller proportion than in either Los Angeles or Berkeley. Comparisons of this sort are very inadequate unless the actual number of eligible voters is known. In Chicago, (not including Morgan Park) the school census of 1914 showed 765,171 adult males, twenty-one years and over, and 717,942 adult females. Of these approximately 180,000 males were unnaturalized, leaving 585,171 eligible as

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voters. Assuming that a like proportion of the females were unnaturalized aliens, the eligible women voters would be 717,942 minus 168,000, or 549,942. On the basis of these figures, 73 per cent of the men and only 44 per cent of the women who were eligible voted in the election. It would seem quite certain, therefore, that less than half of the potential women voters availed themselves of their right to participate in the election. What changes future developments in the line of organization and canvassing may bring are matters mainly of conjecture. At present there is hardly a doubt that the women responding to the suffrage call are a minority of those in the community.

In view of the much controverted position held in regard to woman's stand on social questions, we may briefly consider this aspect of the Chicago election. In this election, social questions and welfare or service programs were conspicuously absent. Both of the candidates were utterly lacking in any conception of the broader preventive or developmental functions of government in regard to health, recreation, and social amelioration generally. In the Republican primaries, however, Judge Olsen, representing to some degree the more advanced and progressive thinker on these questions, was strongly favored by the women as against Thompson, who distinctly stood for the commercial and business development of the city.

In the little ballot which provided the only means for a direct expression of opinion on specific questions, the returns indicate relatively less interest by the women than by the men. Of those voting in the election, 67 per cent of the men on the average marked each question on the ballot; of the women, only 51 per cent filled in the little ballot. In regard to the actual opinions registered, no marked difference of attitude or viewpoint is to be found between the sexes. Almost exactly similar proportions prevail in both male and female vote "for" and "against" each of the twelve propositions. But as the questions involved were mainly financial ones, over-emphasis should not be placed on these findings. The construction of new fire houses and police stations, purchase of equipment and additions for the garbage-reduction plant, completion of the Contagious Disease Hospital, new dormitories and a new build-

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ing for the House of Correction and John Worthy School, improvement of bathing beaches, sites for which had been laid out or already purchased, and the annexation of several small outlying villages could hardly be said to involve special problems of social policy. The little ballot was only roughly indicative of woman's interest in local civic matters. As such, it revealed her in an unfavorable light as contrasted with the attention given to the same affairs by the men. Whether this is due to some inherent difference between the sexes or to the comparatively brief period of political education which has been afforded the women through active participation in practical politics cannot of course be determined from the returns of a single election.

In so far as generalizations are permissible from observations of such limited extent, we may sum up our conclusions under the following heads:

1. That women on the whole register the same political convictions as the men, but are not necessarily on that account lacking in independent views and opinions.

2. That woman suffrage promotes greater interest in and discussion of political issues, thus resulting in a more intelligent expression of judgment by the electorate than issued under limited manhood suffrage.

3. That woman's interest in politics and the degree of her activity varies, as a general fact, directly with her social and economic standing in the community.

4. That woman's entrance into politics has tended to readjust the relative power of different social groups, leading in the main to a strengthening of the control of the upper middle class where general elections are concerned, but giving the poorer element a relatively greater degree of control where election by districts is practiced and the districts containing the upper middle-class voters do not have representation in proportion to their numbers.

5. That the voting woman displays a less active interest in matters of public policy than does the man who votes.

6. That only a minority of the eligible women avail themselves of their right to vote.

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COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY[1]

NEUTRALITY is an official matter, a policy that governments alone can assume. If an individual has any power of thought or any feeling of sympathy, he cannot be neutral. What he claims as "neutrality" is really indifference or ignorance or something worse. When he declares that such is his attitude, consciously or unconsciously he is stating an untruth, thereby trying either to deceive himself or to mislead others.

In bringing the judicious mind to bear on the problems which led up to the present war, on those it has engendered and those it will produce, what is needed is not vague assertions of "neutrality," not the wild credulousness of partisanship and not the singular irrationality of emotionalism. Instead, the essential qualities called for are plain common sense, united with an ordinary spirit of fairness and tolerance to those with whom one may differ.

Apart from divergence of views about the respective belligerents, and about what ought to be done to or for them, the war has brought to the people of the United States as never before an idea of the tremendous contrast between war and peace as conditions of human existence. How to avoid the one and maintain the other engross thought as nothing else can do. Those who seek to give expression to their convictions on the matter may be divided into three classes. To the first belong the non-resistants who have conscientious scruples against a resort to arms. In the second category are numbered the advocates of "preparedness," who believe in an accumulation of means of defense against a possible foe, just as the prudent householder insures his house against a fire that may never come. Third in order are those who seek to remove the causes of war, or at least to reduce its possible causes to a minimum.

While it is conceivable that a "pacifist," so-called, might belong to any one of these three classes, his proper place is with the last; for he is not one who would either submit or oppose, but one who would prevent. Just as in the realm of medical research the great aim is to forestall a physical evil, instead of striving to cure it after it has appeared, so in dealing with the diseases of nations and peoples the great object of the "pacifist," rightly understood, is to provide against

[1] See note 2, p. 124.

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the coming of the malady of war. This is not a case of "discretion" surrendering to superior odds; nor is it one of "precaution" amassing armaments liable to make the potential, if unknown, antagonist pile up still larger ones, and to make little states imitate the action of their big neighbors in the vain hope of contending successfully against such "defensive" measures when, perchance, they become "offensive." The seekers after "preparedness," indeed, too often fail to understand that the vision of the insider is not the viewpoint of the outsider. What seems a means of defense to the one may well appear an act of offense to the other. The line between the measures is apt to be as close as laughter is to tears. Neither "discretion" nor "precaution" of the sort mentioned avails in reason against the prophylaxis of a common sense, the sole effect of which would be to keep a danger from arising.

The spectacle, moreover, of entire peoples fighting for selfish objects that each attributes to the other, or for noble purposes that each denies to the other, has about it an abnormality which, were it not so tragic, might be ridiculous. Under such conditions neither in logic nor in ethics is it possible precisely to determine which is right and which is wrong. If to this state of absurdity be added the circumstance that the soldiers doing the actual fighting are personally unacquainted with their antagonists, and hence can have no personal grudge to settle, and the further fact that the individuals chiefly responsible for provoking the struggle, and for whetting the hatred that makes it continue, are civilians who use tongue and pen but never sword or gun, the irrationality of the whole procedure is all too clear. Common sense condemns it, and demands that means be sought to prevent the recurrence of exhibitions so degrading to the intelligence of the human race.

Looking at the question from still another angle, if war as an agency for the supposed adjustment of international disputes is ever to be abolished, the patent, practical truth demonstrated by the present war is that the attainment of so desirable an end cannot be reached until the causes of it are understood and removed at their inception. Here the risk of easy judgments comes to the fore. Difficult as the historian finds it even approximately to show what provoked the relatively petty wars of the past, the fact does not deter many a wiseacre today from proving incontestably—to his own satisfaction—just who and what were responsible for a struggle that involves the world and all mankind. "Everyman his own historian, and forsooth his own international lawyer," is apparently the situation that has arisen; and the merit of his conclusions, be it said, stands in a sort of inverse proportion to the

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magnitude of the conflict itself. The simpler the cause adduced, the readier the panacea proposed, seems to be the corollary that follows. To the larger aspects of the matter, to the depth and spread of its multifarious ramifications, few give proper heed; but when they speak, theirs is the voice of common sense.

That the vast issues underlying the present war had been apprehended and the perils certain to arise, unless these issues were adjusted by peaceful means, had been pointed out, is a fact amply proven by the number of books and articles, speeches and journalistic utterances which preceded the cataclysm. But they cried aloud in vain. Men would not hear them. Europe at large had been at peace for a century. In that time what is called "civilization" presumably had advanced too far to admit of the possibility that war on the scale of a world conflict could ever arise again. A large army or a large navy was simply a police force to keep the peoples of Europe civil to one another, or was useful in gaining power over other folk elsewhere. Those who talked of the possibility of war, therefore, were so many modern Cassandras, or less politely, "jingoes," and those who dwelt upon the possibility of removing the causes of war were "chimera-chasers" who should be treated with indifference, if not with derision or contempt. In the spirit of the fatuous belief that a huge ocean-liner was unsinkable, so a world war, simply, was unthinkable.

Some of the writers and speakers on the theme undoubtedly were persons of just the types in question. Others, not delighting in sensationalism or in mere ideology, were mindful of the lessons of history, mindful of the truth that, despite the advance in "civilization," human nature has not been greatly altered, mindful also of the evidence that "civilization" itself often has been promoted by war. They pleaded that, in the interest of peace, the facts be squarely faced and that measures be honestly taken to prevent their logical consequences from coming into operation. Eminent among these advocates was the famous English publicist Sir Harry Johnston,[1] whose little treatise, *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*,[2] deserves a foremost place in the literature of a subject that as yet has but a small bibliography.

[1] Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, G. C. M. G., K. C. B., D. Sc., probably the greatest living English authority on Africa, has held many offices in the British colonial service, and is the author of numerous works on geography, history, politics, economics, biology and sociology. Few are so well equipped by knowledge and training as he to discuss the topic under consideration.

[2] Common Sense in Foreign Policy. By Sir Harry Johnston. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1913; x, 119 p.

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When the work appeared, early in 1913, it aroused no particular interest. Newspapers and magazines noticed it as a sort of "pacifist" document that seemed a bit out of the ordinary. But as the world moved on in its happy-go-lucky way, serenely conscious of a century of buying and selling, of living and dying, in a sedately normal fashion, with only an occasional localized war to create the relish of a diversion, even the practical suggestions of a little book that would not take long to read were passed over and forgotten.

Since the "unthinkable" has happened, and has assumed a form that eighteen months ago would have been deemed equally "unthinkable," the content of *Common Sense in Foreign Policy* has taken on a meaning which even its author might not have believed possible. Instead of being an example of warning and advice, with just a glint of prophecy, it has become in several respects a prophecy likely to be fulfilled. Perhaps the writer had the prescient vision of the seer; perhaps he spoke more truly than he imagined.

Though one may not agree with many of the viewpoints and recommendations laid down in the work, the honesty and sincerity pervading them are unmistakable. Whether the author of them feels now as he wrote then is altogether dubious. It is difficult, if not impossible, to be judicious-minded when one's country is at war, at a time when passion and emotion sweep reason to the winds. However this may be, the book certainly has a value out of all proportion to its size, and it merits careful examination.

Sir Harry Johnston is an "imperialist" in the best meaning of that word. He pleads for the "promotion of peace and goodwill among white nations . . . and, when the ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence amongst the Caucasian peoples has been nicely adjusted," for an observance of the duty "to see that the educational task of the Caucasian is carried out in a right, a Christian, a practical and sympathetic fashion towards the other races and sub-species of humanity," who thus may be enabled in the course of time to attain "positions of equality with the Caucasian nations in the Confederation of the World" (page vi). Were he not convinced of the obligations and privileges of the white man in this respect, convinced that the results to be accomplished were "in the long run a blessing to undeveloped countries and the beginning of a new and happier history among the coloured peoples," he would not, in his map-making and theorizing, "have made so free with the waste places of the earth" (page vii). To this end, "what we white peoples ought to strive for, with speech and pen," he declares, "is unity of purpose; an

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alliance throughout all the world in this final struggle for mastery. . . . We ought to adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes of conflict" (page vii). These last four words afford the keynote to the entire work, the essential feature of a common-sense relationship among nations, the prophylaxis that would be the greatest boon to humanity.

In elaborating the ways and means by which this result might be accomplished, the author never loses sight of the fact that he is a British imperialist, and withal a free-trader, who believes heart and soul in the omnipotently civilizing mission of his country. His dominant motif indeed consists in pointing out how the British Empire may assist or retard what he forecasts or recommends, and how that realm would be affected by a redistribution of territories in the world at large. Nowhere does he suggest that Great Britain relinquish one jot or one tittle of what she holds in virtue of possession, except for a full compensation elsewhere. The other European powers, instead, are to do that. Nor is he especially careful about confining the "waste places of the earth" to regions outside of Europe, or inhabited wholly by "coloured peoples." What international mankind needs for its greatest good is, in his opinion, a territorial readjustment at the expense, or to the advantage, of countries other than Great Britain, but in no case diminishing the dominion, the prestige and the security of the greatest of colonial powers itself. The suggestion, however, which at first blush seems a bit naïve—to put it mildly—is not accompanied by any hint at the desirability of actually enlarging British territory, except at minor points. Given the British *status quo*, everything else ought to be susceptible of accomplishment, if the other nations will only agree to a world-wide system of partition and exchange, carried on amicably under the ægis of British approval.

This attitude of constant insistence upon the preservation of the British Empire intact, this belief in the mission of Great Britain as the paramount civilizer, as the august supervisor of international adjustments, in all fairness to the author it should be said, is not indicative of a bumptious national self-complacency or of an inordinate notion, on his part, of British impeccability or superiority. It is also true, nevertheless, that the author might have criticised to advantage something more in his own country than the methods of making appointments to the foreign service, might even have found there much the same fault that he discovers in other lands, particularly in France and the United States. Indeed the candor with which, for example, he alludes to certain defects in France, Russia and other nations now allies of Great Britain, and the generosity with which he treats Germany, now so

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anathematized as an enemy, are characteristics that lend piquancy to his text and mark his desire at the time to be just, tolerant and scientific-minded.

The work consists of eight chapters, of which the last, dealing with certain improvements needed in the administration of the British foreign service, is of comparatively small importance. On the other hand, the preceding seven chapters devoted to the foreign policy of Great Britain in general, and to a specific examination of its relations with France, Germany and Austria-Hungary, Russia, Portugal, and the United States, and to the disposal of the Far East and Near East, offer tempting inducements to discussion, all the more so in view of a series of graphic and instructive maps inserted in opportune places. Though admittedly never seen before of mortal geographer, these maps constitute a set of pictorial essays on a possible futurity which have a speculative fascination of their own, quite apart from the admirable service they render in illustrating the text.

In the initial chapter on the foreign policy of the British Empire attention is directed to the healthy growth of popular interest, and of publicity, in concerns lying beyond the bounds of Great Britain. No small share in contributing to this result has come from the insistence of the self-governing dominions that the "Old Lady of Downing Street" shall not "make an ass of herself" by going to war for idle reasons. "The nation of the United Kingdom," furthermore, "refuses any longer to be bound by treaties, concluded secretly, as to which its elected legislature has not been consulted and which it has not ratified" (page 8). The sentence is certainly significant enough in view of what has happened since. Yet despite this arousing of interest in foreign affairs, there has been little attempt so far to coördinate national desires and ambitions, to realize what is wanted, in the imperial sense, how it is to be obtained, and how it may be possible to preserve from molestation or encroachment the great fields of adventure already "marked off on the map" as British territory, or as eventual spheres of influence. Assuming that the qualities which have made the British Empire what it is continue to exist, wisdom in foreign policy demands, not only that the British "keep abreast of the times in intelligence, education and physical well-being" (page 10), but that they take into due consideration the interests of other nations. In that case, besides removing from rivals an impulse to attack, they might well become "the focus of a Confederation of the World."

Apart from these general considerations, it seems manifest that the existing advantage in sea-power, both naval and mercantile, must be

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upheld, if the British Empire is to continue in unimpaired strength. This can be maintained only by "keeping ahead of any probable combination of other powers which would result in an aggregation of wealth and labour force" sufficient to inflict defeat. "Improbable combinations" of the sort, furthermore, are not likely to be formed, so long as the principle of free trade or a moderate tariff is observed.

"The greatest of British interests is peace," and the main motive of British policy is to guide the process of imperial development "along paths of progress without recourse to war, least of all war with any combination of European rivals powerful enough to make the issue of the struggle uncertain and victory disastrously costly" (page 14). In this connection Britain has to remember that its "resources in fighting men of first class value are limited. Money cannot necessarily buy either courage or military training." The British navy counts for something like two-thirds of the "factors of defence and attack," but it cannot accomplish everything. Before the British nation and its self-governing dominions go to war, therefore, they must be sure that the issue is a justifiable one.

Of the multitude of conceivable grievances, on the basis of which war might be declared, only eleven, in the author's judgment, are "worth fighting for or against." These he enumerates as follows:

1. Any attempt which is not endorsed by the Dutch people to include Holland within the limits of the German Empire.

2. Any attempt, under any conditions whatever, on the part of Germany, to control the mouth of the Scheldt; or any fortification of the mouth of the Scheldt by Holland, acting under the influence of Germany, which would lock up Antwerp and interfere with its free access to the North Sea.

3. The territorial integrity, complete independence, and neutrality of Belgium and of the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg.

4. Any unprovoked attack on France, or any further annexation of territory by Germany in eastern or northern France.

5. Any further diminution of Danish territory, or an attack on the independence of Denmark which is equally opposed by Norway and Sweden.

6. Any interference by another power with Egypt or Sinai, with the British sphere in Arabia, or with the independence and neutrality of all the rest of Arabia between the bay of Al-Kuweit and the Gulf of Akabah.

7. The establishment of any other European Power than Great Britain in control of Southern Persia east of Bandar Dilam.

8. Any similar attempt to interpose a foreign influence in Siam west of the Menam River and the Gulf of Siam.

9. Any interference with the independence of China Proper which might upset the conditions of trade and enterprise to the marked detriment of

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the British Empire—that is to say, any interference with perfectly free-trade conditions in China which would give any foreign Power a commercial advantage in that Empire over other nations; similarly, the interference of any other European Power in the affairs of Tibet (it is provided, of course, that Tibet remains like the rest of the Chinese Empire, a free-trade area).

10. Any attempt of the United States to exercise peculiar political or commercial privileges in South America, east of the Panama Canal zone, and in general any attempt on the part of an outside Power to interfere with the independence of the South American republics; or a disposition on the part of any South American State to confer peculiar privileges in commerce on the subjects of any foreign Power to the detriment of the free-trade principle.

11. And, of course, any attack on the territories included within the acknowledged scope of the British Empire [pages 15–16].

In this catalogue of *casūs belli* two items call for especial attention. One is the significant fact that, of the nations that might war with Great Britain, only two are directly mentioned, viz., Germany and the United States, her two chief commercial rivals. Indeed all of the first five items, nearly half the entire number, have Germany in view. That only the sixth, seventh and ninth allude to Russia, that the eighth refers to France, and the ninth also to Japan, furnish eloquent evidence of how the British international attitude has changed since 1899, when the Anglo-German naval race began.

The other item of particular interest is the connection of these motives for war with the present struggle. In the first five on the list local self-defense looms large and imperative. Clearly do they emphasize the fact that Great Britain can afford to permit no change whatever in the *status quo* of areas adjacent to her on the continent, south and southeastward. Here also the chief center of concern is Belgium; but neither at this point nor elsewhere (pages 32, 39, 46, 61) is the inviolability of that country demanded for any reason other than what is suggested by the need of a positive local security, of a bulwark of defense, for its island neighbor. That was the reason why, under the direction of British diplomacy, it was created an independent state and then neutralized, originally as a safeguard against France, later constructively to become one against Germany. Such an attitude of self-protection is entirely justifiable and honorable from the standpoint of any self-respecting nation, so long at least as the countries of the world remain organized on a militaristic basis, whether on sea or on land. To claim, therefore, as has since been done, that Great

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Britain entered the war, solely or even mainly, if indeed at all, to protect "poor little Belgium," or to "uphold the sanctity of treaties," is an assertion of righteousness which may find easy refutation in similar cases on many a page of her own imperial history.

Despite her numerous faults (pages 19–27), France ought to receive the support of Great Britain in the "maintenance of her position as the only ruling power in North Africa between the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the frontiers of Tripoli" (page 27), and that for reasons alike of sentimental import, of fitness to govern, and of British colonial interest. The French Congo, on the other hand, must be regarded as "a region of Africa destined to belong to the German Empire" (page 30), partly because it is now "almost entirely detached from actual contact with the French Sudan," and partly because it might be exchanged to advantage for Metz and French Lorraine. Germany, it seems, has tried to gain possession of the region "and a few other things besides, without giving anything in return"; and had France yielded too much in this direction during the crisis of 1911, "she could have placed no further barrier in the way of further German encroachment, until at last Britain would have suffered from her yielding."

Germany, however, has something to say on her own behalf. She complains that France, not merely opposes "the full satisfaction of German land-hunger in West-central Africa, but she puts many spokes between German wheels in the Near East." She "refuses to Germany a third place in the direction of Turkish finance."

> In addition (it is well known though not admitted) every effort during the past ten years has been put forth on the part of French diplomacy to obstruct German ambitions in the Near East. Repeatedly France has sought to bring about a Russian interposition in the Balkans: either to prevent the growth of friendship between Servia and Austria; or an understanding between Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria; or any autonomy in Turkish administration which might pave the way for the disappearance of Ottoman power from Europe and the allotment of the Turkish dominions west of the Hellespont to a Balkan confederation, too likely to be eventually allied with Austria and Germany. France has blocked the Baghdad Railway (politically though not financially) wherever and whenever she was able.
>
> All this seems very churlish to the German [pages 30–31].

The motive for the attitude of France may proceed in a measure from the circumstance that "each nation must frame its policy on selfish lines, if it is to exist and prosper"; but the author is more dis-

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posed to believe that the whole trouble arose from Germany "being a little too drastic, a little too greedy, in 1871, when she took the region west of the little Seille River including Metz, where the speech has been French almost from the time of Charlemagne." Here Sir Harry Johnston admits that Metz was "once an Imperial City" and hence German; but he sets the admission quite aside by declaring that "France likewise was once a German kingdom"—an asseveration not likely to find favor among the present school of "*omnis Gallia*" French historians! They would be apt, however, to support stoutly his contention that the seizure of Metz by France in 1551 was justifiable "because it followed the range of French speech." In this regard it might be interesting to know whether such was contemporary French opinion on the matter, particularly as expressed by Henry II himself, and whether it might be made a general principle applicable today to areas speaking languages altogether different from those of their European possessors. But of course what is proper for Europeans and their descendants as empire-builders cannot be held good of "coloured peoples." On the other hand, to say that the "small portion of French Lorraine," including the "threatening fortress of Metz," represents a "strategical projection of Germany into France, which is a perpetual menace to French security" (page 31), is altogether plausible—at least from a French viewpoint—whatever may be said of its defensive value to German security.

Were this area to be given back to France, and the neighboring Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to be cut loose entirely from the German Customs Union, and rendered both neutral and independent, the action would have several desirable consequences. It would compel "an abandonment of all German ambition to overrun and incorporate Belgium within the future limits of the German Empire," make France "comparatively safe from an overwhelming surprise attack on the part of Germany," enable her to "turn her thoughts and ambitions southwards across the Mediterranean to the full development of French Africa," give Germany the French Congo, and lead to a recognition also on the part of France that "Germany has strong claims to a predominant partnership in the administration of the Turkish Empire" (page 32).

Regarding the British attitude in the matter, so essential would be the gain to Great Britain "in the assurance that Belgium was safe from a German attack and outside the scope of Pan-Germanist ambitions," that she "might do much to facilitate arrangements" between Germany and France in reference to the Nearer East.

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A German occupation of Belgium would be followed by a German acquisition of Picardy and a deliberate attempt to push Britain on one side. Successful in this, the Germans could conquer us at leisure or, at any rate, ruin the position of our country as an Imperial Power. Any further German interference with Luxemburg would be so obviously actuated by the desire to injure France and facilitate the entry into Belgium, that it likewise would have to be resisted as an attack almost on our own frontier. Naturally, likewise, it would be a national necessity to assist France with all our strength, if she were attacked by Germany without a cause.

But the fate of Alsace and German Lorraine is no business of ours, and we could not make it too clear to France that we would never pledge our support to any war of aggression against Germany for the recovery of those provinces. . . .

We must not follow at her heels, if she incited Russia to attack Germany or Austria for the furthering of French projects. . . .

France has considerable claims . . . to a protectorate over Syria, between Damascus and Hamah, without prejudice to the Jewish state which will some day be founded in the Holy Land. But there is no other direction in which French business, commerce, or past sacrifices entitle France to a further share in the derelict Turkish Empire [pages 32–33.]

"When the final settlement of the Eastern Question averts Armageddon [!] and brings Europe a step nearer to confederation," France might well afford to display two "proofs of her friendly understanding with the British Empire." These would have to do with stopping the shipment, through French territories, or by virtue of French treaty rights in Africa and Arabia, of arms and ammunition to be used against British subjects. Doubtless the British themselves have not by any means been free from blame in this "treachery between white nations," but it is time that the states of Europe "made common cause against barbarism and ceased to secure sneaking profits out of each other's difficulties" [page 35].

One point we must not overlook in our calculated friendships, and that is the renewed vigour of France. . . . She . . . never may be . . . in a position to attack Germany . . . but she is certainly able to resist German aggression to a degree which may well cause that Power to hesitate to provoke a war. The Italian alliance with Germany and Austria will not outlive the final settlement of Eastern affairs. It has again been renewed, owing to the tactical mistake of France, seeming . . . to back up a Russian interference, under Servian guise, in the Balkan Peninsula. But when France withdraws from the useless and unprofitable Russian Alliance, Italy and Spain will gravitate toward her instead; and a Latin Confederation, which may not impossibly secure the adhesion of Britain, Por-

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tugal and Greece, will be a quite sufficient makeweight against that *Central European Alliance of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Balkan kingdoms, and Turkey, which will probably be the great political achievement of the twentieth century*[1] [pages 35–36].

With this extraordinary flight of prophecy the author rises to the culminating point of his entire work—the relations of Great Britain and Germany. The discussion of them he prefaces by remarking that, contrary to the situation in the case of France, the circumstances, ethnic and historical, which might seem naturally to make Great Britain and Germany friends (pages 37–39), do not outweigh the considerations, economic and political, which tend to make them mutually distrustful, if not hostile. Some of these considerations have already been indicated; and on their account "the understanding has arisen with France, and will be supported by the vast majority of voters in the United Kingdom, so long as it is not warped into unprovoked aggression on Germany to subserve Russian ambitions or the purely financial interests of France" (page 40).

Now, since the main objects of civilization are "the conquest of the Earth by science and the struggle to bring about universal happiness for man," it is a matter for deep regret "that there should be any conflict of interests between Britain and Germany, any expensive duel in armatures." Why then should their respective foreign policies clash? The answer to the query is found in the "German longing for political and colonial expansion." Given this state of mind, arising naturally enough from German development during the last forty years (pages 40–43), the problem for Great Britain to ponder over is how she may assist, or at any rate not oppose, this outward growth, "in return for a cessation of menaced attacks on the independence of the Netherlands and of France, and consequently of the British Islands" (page 40).

"You may well be content," is the German cry addressed to Great Britain, "for you have occupied or ear-marked such an enormous proportion of the earth's surface that you do not need to talk of extension for three centuries to come." *We* may have provided sufficient elbow-room for the next twenty years, but that is not sufficient. Instinctively we must fight for the future, or our memories will be reproached by our children and our children's children.

This may be called "sentimental nonsense," because it is uttered by Germans, and not by Englishmen. But we are the last of the powers who should laugh at such a yearning. Moreover, the Germans, after all, are

[1] Italics are the reviewer's.

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only expressing the Divine afflatus, the determination of the best type of white man to dominate the world. Germany is hatefully cramped within her present boundaries. . . . She is forbidden to approach nearer . . . towards the Channel or the Atlantic by the power of Great Britain. Such a prohibition is not insuperable, but to break it down might well ruin Germany financially, so that she would be too exhausted to make use of her victory when it was obtained [page 49].

The elements of an Anglo-German "reconciliation" lie, first, in certain readjustments of areas in southern Africa (page 43) which, incidentally, would enable Great Britain to have her long-projected Cape-to-Cairo railway and its possible branches run exclusively through British, French and Belgian territory, and command the heart of the continent (pages 46, 47). Elsewhere in Africa, also, in regions now belonging to France, Spain, Portugal and Belgium (page 45), Germany might be permitted to secure cessions by peaceful means; but so far as the Portuguese dominions are concerned, "Britain is quite unable," because of previous engagements on the subject, "to bargain for an Anglo-German understanding" (page 45), even if desirable in itself. Were Germany, however, to absorb all of the Belgian Congo, the action would be of "far less vital importance" to Great Britain than any direct attack by that power on Belgium proper (page 46).

The second element of Anglo-German reconciliation would assure to Germany "a sea outlet adequate to her desires." This would consist in a manifestation of the "goodwill of Austria *by the acquisition of Trieste*" (pages 49, 50). To be induced to make such a cession, of course, Austria "must receive compensation elsewhere, the more so as Italy would probably have to be won over to good-humour and compliance by obtaining at the same time the district of Triente." That compensation, in turn, "can only lie in an eastward direction, in the Austrian Empire becoming more and more a great confederation of Southern Slavonic States in close alliance with Germany and Hungary" (page 50).

The transcendent changes that might follow in the wake of such a readjustment of conditions in the Near East are enough to hold one spell-bound in contemplating the extraordinary possibilities entailed. They concern, not eastern Europe so much, as the areas once or still belonging to the Ottoman Empire, regions doubtless the most famous in the entire annals of history, the scenes of a mighty panorama unfolding itself from the rise and fall of the Chaldean, the Egyptian, the Hittite, the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Persian, the Macedonian,

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the Roman and the Byzantine empires down to our own days. The vision had best be told in the author's words.

[The] satisfaction of Austrian ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula might lead to the satisfaction of German ambitions with regard to an outlet on the Mediterranean. This in its turn would enormously relieve the German pressure on Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France, and pave the way for a complete understanding in future between Germany and France, and relieve the anxieties of Great Britain as to Germany's intention of becoming an Atlantic power. Austrian predominance as a kind of suzerain over the Balkan States to the north of Greece would indirectly benefit German trade. . . . The Turkish Sultanate would possibly not come to an end, but would henceforth, within certain limits, be directed and dominated by German councils. Germany in fact would become the power with the principal "say" as to the good government and economic development of Asia Minor. Syria might be constituted as a separate State under French protection, and Judæa be offered to the Jews under an international guarantee—to become in fact an Eastern Belgium. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed British protection, and Arabia (except the southern portion, which already lies within the British sphere of influence) be regarded as a federation of independent Arab States. For the rest, Turkey in Asia—less Armenia, which might be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, become to Germany what Egypt is to England—a kingdom to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps transfused and transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan Caucasian [*sic*]. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies of both Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them contented, busy, prosperous and happy, for at least a century ahead.

Who is going to object to such a settlement? Surely not Britain? The main opponent will be Russia [pages 50–51].

If, after receiving a number of compensatory allotments of territory from Austria, the Balkan countries should incline in their political friendships too much toward Russia, and this power should press her advantage, "then indeed there would be danger of a terrible struggle between Austria and Germany allied, on the one hand, and the Russian Empire on the other." In such a conflict "there is no doubt . . . as to the direction in which British sympathies should lie: with Austria-Germany" (page 55).

France, so long as she is unsatisfied on the subject of Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Belgium, might attempt, not only to join Russia in attacking Germany and Austria, but would seek to drag Great Britain after her into such a struggle, with the prospect of dismembering the German dominions in Europe and Asia. Any such intervention on our part would be a fatally

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foolish act. It could not result in an eventual subjugation of Germany, Austria, or the allied Italy. The power that would gain most from any Anglo-French crippling of Germany, would be Russia. And most decidedly from the point of view of our ideals in liberty and civilisation, of our position in Asia, and our commerce with the eastern Mediterranean, any further westward accession of power to Russia would carry with it disastrous consequences. . . . And to see her established at Constantinople; still more, to leave Germany and Austria to be crushed between the French hammer and the Russian anvil, would be as bad a blow to the balance of power in Europe as was the unchecked supremacy of Napoleon.

In short: the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula to the north of the kingdom of Greece—a kingdom which as far as possible should be neutral like Belgium and Denmark—are no direct concern of the British Empire [pages 55–56].

This last assertion conceals one of the most extraordinary political readjustments of recent times. How fundamentally an international situation may become transformed in little more than a quarter of a century is a fact that it proclaims with a silence that is all too eloquent. Disraeli certainly would have marvelled and Bismarck would have stood amazed, could they have witnessed so complete a reversal of what each thought an ideal policy for his own time and people. Imagine Disraeli, the doughty comforter of the "Sick Man," now told by one of his countrymen that "the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula . . . are no direct concern of the British Empire"; and picture Bismarck, the grim champion of "reinsurance" with Russia, brought face to face with the grimmer logic of events today and yet declaring, as he did in 1879, that Germany has no concern in the Balkans which would justify it in risking "the sound bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer"![1]

Some "unreflecting readers of narrow outlook," resumes the author, may be shocked that he, "while fully alive to what perils there are in the German problem and in Prussian ambitions," should follow "numerous Polish, Austrian and even French publicists," so far as to "advocate the seeming strengthening of Germany by making her the leading state in a great Central European Confederation" (page 57). The reasons may be readily adduced.

If the Austro-Servian difficulty can be adjusted without positive injury to Austrian interests in the Balkan Peninsula, the resultant confederation of Central Europe will be a powerful counter-agent to future wars. As a

[1] *Cf.* POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. xxx, p. 46. Article by Professor Munroe Smith.

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league for mutual defence, it will be too well endowed with men and money to be lightly attacked and vanquished; as a confederation of free peoples of varied types, dispositions, languages, and modes of religious belief, it will be provided with a sufficient area of potential wealth and cultivable soil to be cured of wild ambitions and of aggressive policies against other leagues and empires. . . . And to Western Europe generally, this Central European Confederation would prove a welcome bulwark against the fast-increasing millions of Russians [pages 59–61].

The one danger which could menace our Empire would be the Russian occupation of Constantinople and Asia Minor, and the facilities such developments would give for a Russian descent on Syria and Egypt—Egypt, the wasp-waist of the British Empire. Since Turkey has absolutely no hope of durability or permanent strength, the only real bulwark against a Russianising of the Near East is the introduction of our brother Germans into Asia Minor and Mesopotamia (and perhaps French influence into Syria) to restore the remains of the Byzantine Empire to Western civilisation. . . . [The Russians] must, in all conscience, with an Empire already amounting to nearly 9,000,000 square miles, leave Central and Southeastern Europe alone, and allow other European nations the honor and the profit of restoring the dominions of Alexander and Justinian to the civilisation of Greece and Rome [pages 73–74].

On the supposition that the Germans may choose to recast their Empire, by reducing the number of states and by dividing "the overwhelmingly large proportion of Prussian territory into subsidiary kingdoms and duchies under Hohenzollern princes," this circumstance, added to the part Germany would take in the new "Central European Confederation," might have very happy consequences. In the author's opinion, "there would be no longer the restless discontent and the half-insane desire for war which characterizes the vocal and the voting classes in Prussia today, well typified as they are by the writings of General von Bernhardi" (pages 60–61).

Regarding this last assertion, out of justice, not to the German viewpoint merely, but to that of all who believe that the time for dispensing with naval and military force, as determining ultimately the relationship of nations, will not have arrived with the close of the present war, two important questions might be raised. In the first place, were the utterances of the officer mentioned, and of others of his kind, really so influential in Germany itself as Sir Harry Johnston implies, and were they not better known, perhaps, in Great Britain than in the land of their origin? Secondly, if they were actually influential to that or even to a greater extent, were they quite so pernicious or undesirable as he appears to think? In order to answer these ques-

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tions, countries other than Germany and Great Britain should be drawn into the discussion.

According to an abundance of reliable German testimony on the subject, "Bernhardian bellicosity," assuming it to have been so dreadful a thing, was little, if any, more influential on the great mass of the population than were the jingoistic vaporings of Murray and the *Daily Mail* on the British people, of Boucher and *Le Petit Journal* on the French, or of Homer Lea and *The Evening Telegram* on the American, as ascertained from similar sources among the three peoples concerned. Sensationalism of the "sabre-rattling" or "lion-roaring," or even the "spread-eagle" variety, is not a product altogether "made in Germany." In Germany's case, moreover, there was some reason at least why Bernhardi and his colleagues might have a hearing. To the eastward lay the constant menace of Russia—the retiring habits of which were not so well known then as they are now—a huge mass of land and people terrible because of their very immensity and vagueness. Germany was becoming rapidly an industrial and commercial country, liable to sacrifice its agricultural interests to manufacturing, and hence to make itself dangerously dependent upon outside sources for its food supplies. Any relaxation of vigilance, of habits of discipline, obedience, orderliness and systematic coöperation, suggested, if not bred, by military training, the insidious spread of a spirit of commercialism setting personal gain over devotion to the Fatherland and its institutions, might afford an opportunity for Russia, aided by France because of motives of "*revanche*," or because of her rôle of creditor, to realize the dream of the Muscovite—the seizure of the road to Constantinople that lay through Berlin and Vienna—and thus incidentally to injure or destroy whatever the German might hold dear—call it "Kultur" or anything else.

In this connection is it unreasonable to ask whether several of the suppositions mentioned in the case of Germany might not have some bearing, *mutatis mutandis*, upon the respective international situations of Great Britain, France and the United States? From the individual standpoints of the first two countries, as illustrated during the present conflict, the answer is obvious. The geographical location of the United States, on the other hand, the sole power of great importance on the American continents, and a variety of additional circumstances, into an examination of which it is not necessary here to enter, might seem to indicate the probability of a perennial enjoyment of immunity from attack by envious or resentful, or simply meddling, fellow nations. But whether the American people ought to regard their situa-

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tion as one of true, or one of false, security is something for "past and current" history, but not hysteria, "hyphenophobe" or otherwise, to teach them.

Returning to the text—so far as Russia in particular comes into a common-sense adjustment in foreign policy, a satisfactory compensation for loss of territory, or relinquishment of territorial ambitions, in Europe could be obtained by assuring to her naval and mercantile marine freedom of access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and to that of other nations similar access in a reverse direction (page 71), and also by certain acquisitions and rearrangements in Asia. To gratify her legitimate desire for a "warm-water port," a strip of land in western Persia, stretching from the Caucasian frontier on the north down to the Persian Gulf, might be secured, through which a railway could be built. This would entail a relinquishment on the part of Great Britain and Russia of the spheres of influence they now hold in Persia as a result of the unfortunate delimitation, or better partition, of 1907. Furthermore, through ridding that country of foreign influence, the readjustment in question would hasten the "eventual regeneration and civilisation of Persia" (page 66).

To the eastward, China could have the "*beau rôle* of the unselfish State" to play, one similar—in a highly peculiar sense—to that of Austria in Europe (page 58). If Russian losses to the westward are to be repaired in such a way as to keep Christian nations, and their insular colleague not of that faith, peaceably disposed to one another and to China herself, she has simply to turn over to Russia certain territories in the north which the latter ought to have, or eventually will get (page 97)—unless China learns betimes to object in approved European and Japanese fashion. She would "probably be wise," however, "in allowing those regions to come under Russian protection, since the indigenous peoples are much more nearly related to the races and tribes of Russian Asia and have frequently rebelled against Chinese rule" (page 95). Doubtless, also, "a good deal of South-west Manchuria will be added eventually to the Japanese Empire with some satisfaction to China"—consisting in a restoration of part of her own territory! (page 67).

But if Russia were to annex any part of "China Proper," were she to extend her political influence to Tibet, or her conquests of Persia in an easterly or southerly direction, threatening India, and "push through Finland to the north coast of Norway and establish herself on the shores of the Atlantic," she "might come so seriously into conflict with British interests, that warfare would ensue, or, at any rate, a very unfriendly

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attitude be forced upon" Great Britain, (pages 67, 68). Finland, in fact, is a country on behalf of which "British sympathies may some day be invoked." Because of their affiliation with Sweden, the western and northern portions of the province ought eventually to become independent and then "a self-governing member of the Scandinavian Confederation." "But the ultimate settlement . . . of the Finnish question is one which . . . draws Sweden towards an understanding with Germany, for, if Germany and Austria were forced into war with Russia, the temptation to the Swedes would then be very strong to get the question of Finland settled" (page 69, 70).

"Britain and America" is a topic, finally, that does not loom especially large on the horizon of *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, occupying, as it does, only about one-twentieth of the bulk of the book, with a few references scattered through other pages. What is vouchsafed, however, has to do chiefly with the tenth on the list of the "only things worth fighting for," so far as the United States is immediately concerned.[1] "The greatest blunder which British foreign policy has committed in regard to America since the Napoleonic wars," remarks the author, "was the abandonment of our legitimate interests on the eastern coast of Central America" (page 88). Whatever concessions Great Britain made, in the middle of the last century, to certain republics in that area were granted "with the idea, not only of conciliating the United States, but of encouraging that growing Power to consider herself bound by the famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty never to acquire territory or exclusive influence in any part of Central America" (page 89).

On this point it should be remembered that the treaty in question was observed by the United States only "as long as it was convenient." The conduct of that country, indeed, ten years after Great Britain had consented to replace the Clayton-Bulwer stipulations by the Hay-Pauncefote arrangement, affords ample proof that, as a general proposition, treaties "only bind the polity of the United States as long as they are convenient." Anticipating, as it were, a somewhat celebrated allusion on the part of the German Chancellor to the stuff of which treaties may be made, the author observes that, in the case of the great American republic, they "are not, really, worth the labor their negotiation entails or the paper they are written on. It is well," therefore, "that this position should be realized" by other nations, "as it may save a great deal of fuss and disappointment in the future" (page 89).

[1] See above, p. 129.

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This frank statement, however, must not be construed to mean that the United States is

at all inimical towards Great Britain. This union of fifty [?] English-speaking, self-governing communities . . . tends towards an informal alliance with Great Britain, an alliance springing from a deep-seated community of interests and the strongest of all bonds—a common language. But such an alliance will never be written down, nor will it ever be possible to force the United States to do anything it does not wish to do, even to the keeping of its pledged word. But so long as we remain a free-trade country, it is altogether to the interests of the United States that we shall hold a very high and authoritative place in the councils of Europe. And if the United Kingdom were ever in serious danger from a hostile European coalition, it is a prophecy almost certain of fulfillment that a fleet would sail from the United States to her rescue [pages 89–90].

Right here two quotations from other parts of the book might have a certain appropriateness. One is: "German soldiers were employed by us in our American war of 1775-83. Their introduction was the commencement of the wonderful Germanisation of the United States which is a telling force in world-politics today" (page 38). The other is: "The Germans . . . who go to North America . . . cease to be German subjects either in themselves or by their descendants. They become in course of time foreigners—and foreigners extraordinarily patriotic towards the Flag of their adopted country" (page 49). Sir Harry Johnston, of course, is wrong about the historical origin of the "Germanisation" of the United States; and he is probably wrong, also, in his earlier assumption about the readiness with which an American fleet would sail to Great Britain's aid under the circumstances cited. The patriotism of American citizens of German and of other descent, reinforced by a suitable amount of common sense, in all likelihood, would keep the American ship of state safe and sound in American waters where it belongs.

Sir Harry Johnston, indeed, is himself not altogether sure that the relations between Great Britain and the United States will continue amicable, even aside from the matter of help in extricating the former from European complications.

The one requirement necessary for our peace of mind in regard to . . . [the larger islands of the West Indies, Mexico and Central America] is that the United States shall not extend a Protectionist, preferential policy across its present borders, if it should feel obliged to assume political control over any part of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, [Salva-

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dor, Panama,] or Costa Rica. If the States maintain a fair field and no favour for all law-abiding persons who come thither for trade and industry, then, not only Great Britain, but the world at large will be grateful to the United States for intervening (if need be) to save [the several areas in question from their] chaotic political conditions. . . .

South America, on the other hand, lies possibly for all time beyond the direct tutelage of the Anglo-Saxon, or at any rate of the Anglo-Saxon as typified by the Government of the United States [pages 90–91].

A further attempt on the part of the United States to arrogate to itself a privileged position in the commerce of Central and, still more, South America, similar to the fiscal policy it has imposed on Cuba, would be resisted so emphatically by a European and Japanese alliance [quite apart from German interests in the matter] that the United States would be defeated [page 41].

Such in general are the themes discussed in this remarkable work. Throughout the emphasis is laid upon three essential things. These are, first, the observance of a tolerant attitude on the part of "white nations" toward the justifiable ambitions of one another; second, the determination of possible readjustments among them of territory; and, third, a maintenance of the free-trade or moderate tariff principle within the areas where it now prevails. Regard for them would constitute the surest guaranty for the preservation of international peace. A trifle repetitious and desultory though the text of the little book may be, once in a while even falling into error, it remains, nevertheless, a frank, fair, honest and ingenuous presentation, from a British standpoint, of the opinions of a man who knows much whereof he speaks. It deserves careful reading by all desirous to learn how the present war might have been avoided, and how a disregard of many a fruitful suggestion it contains is responsible for Armageddon.

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD.

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REVIEWS

The Reconciliation of Government with Liberty. By JOHN W. BURGESS. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.—xix, 394 pp.

In his work on *Political Science and Constitutional Law* written some twenty-five years ago, Professor Burgess maintained that liberty, equally with government, should be "constitutionalized"—that is, the constitution should be not merely an instrument of government but also a constitution of liberty. The state, he argued, and not the government, is the true source of liberty; and the sovereign, through the constitution, should create a realm of individual liberty and provide the necessary organs and procedure by which this domain may be protected against the possible encroachments of the government.

In the present volume he tells us that it has been the search of ages to find a political system, and the travail of ages to construct one, in which government and liberty may be reconciled and in which each may strengthen the other. To review the efforts that have been made by the states of Asia, Africa, Europe and America from the earliest times to the present to solve this problem of reconciliation is the rather large task to which Professor Burgess addresses himself. The test which he adopts for determining in each case whether the solution of the problem has been found is whether the sovereign power is organized "back of and independent of the government," whether the sovereign power thus organized has defined and established a realm of individual liberty, and, finally, whether it has provided proper organs and a procedure for protecting this "realm of immunity" from invasion by the government. In every case where this has not been done, liberty has been sacrificed to government and the solution of the problem of reconciliation has failed of realization.

Applying this test to the states of the past and the present, Professor Burgess finds that in few of them has a satisfactory solution been reached. In some of them the sovereign power has not been organized independently of the government; in others the sovereign power though organized separately from the government has failed to create by constitutional enactment a sphere of individual liberty; in still others, which fulfil both of these conditions, no organs or mode of procedure have been created for safeguarding the liberty thus defined against the encroachments of the government. Many of the European constitu-

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tions, he points out, have provided for a separate organization of the constituent and legislative powers; some of them contain bills of rights; most of them provide for legislative bodies elected by universal manhood suffrage and for government through ministries responsible to the legislature; but they are all defective in that they have "discovered" no constitutional way of protecting liberty against the possible tyranny of the legislature, "this most ruthless organ of government."

The chief reason why the European legislatures have not "realized their absolute powers" is to be found, we are told, in a rational philosophy of the state in the Teutonic countries and in the restraining influence exerted by the Roman and Oriental churches in the Latin and Slavic states (page 287). Professor Burgess's view that it is the influence of the Roman Catholic Church that has preserved the liberties of the French nation from the tyranny of the legislature will no doubt seem extraordinary to most Frenchmen. One is tempted to ask why, if it is the influence of the Roman Catholic Church that has served to restrain the French legislature from "realizing its absolute powers," this influence was powerless to prevent the legislature from outlawing and persecuting that same church, as French clericals maintain it did by the laws of 1905 and 1907. The fact is, there is probably no legislature in Europe over which the church exercises so little influence today as that of France.

Only in the United States of North America has the true solution of the problem been approximated. Here all the essential conditions laid down in the test adopted by Professor Burgess are present. Nevertheless, in recent years, he says, there have been signs of reaction, and we are further away from the true solution of the problem than we were twenty years ago. The acquisition of foreign territory from Spain and the doctrine of the Supreme Court that the constitutional guarantees in respect to civil liberty do not extend *ex proprio vigore* to the territories thus acquired, but apply only when formally extended by act of Congress, mark a backward step. Furthermore, the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, the "crudest, most reckless bit of constitutional legislation known to our history" (page 369), removing the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to levy taxes on incomes, and "putting all property and all human effort at the mercy of the government" by authorizing it "to take whatever it will and in any way it will," appears to Professor Burgess to be an act fraught with grave danger to the liberties of the people and, therefore, a step backward in our progress toward the full and complete solution of the problem of reconciliation. Finally, he sees in the adoption of the initiative, the referendum, the

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recall, and other new institutional forms of democracy, a breaking down of constitutional barriers the effect of which is leading us away from the path of true progress.

In emphasizing the necessity of "constitutionalizing" civil liberty as a means of protecting it against the infringements of the legislature and the executive, Professor Burgess has undoubtedly laid down a principle of political science which is generally sound; yet one can hardly avoid the feeling that he attaches an undue importance to formal constitutional prescriptions and to the separation of constituent and legislative powers. It is manifestly quite impossible to obtain from the study of mere constitutional texts any adequate idea of the civil liberty actually enjoyed in any country. It is idle to argue, for example, that because the constitution of France contains no bill of rights there are no guarantees of civil liberty in that country. One cannot help feeling, Professor Burgess says, that the French statesmen are not disposed to give the liberty of the individual a place in their constitutional law. But, as every one knows, most of the French constitutions since 1789 have in fact contained elaborate declarations of rights, and the reason why the present constitution contains no such declaration is because it was not considered necessary to repeat it. Most of the French publicists today hold that the "principles of '89" are in fact a part of the public law of France and that the legislature cannot infringe upon them without violating the constitution. (*Cf.*, for example, Duguit, *Droit Constitutionnel*, volume ii, pages 6, 13; and Coumoul, *Le Pouvoir Judiciaire*, page 229).

On the other hand, the constitution of Prussia contains various declarations in favor of liberty of speech, press, assembly etc.; but, as is well known, this liberty is actually far less in Prussia than in France. Great Britain has no written constitution, the organization of state and government are confounded, the legislature is omnipotent; yet to argue that civil liberty is less protected in England than in Spain and Portugal where the sovereign power is organized "back of and independent" of the government, is to regard only forms and to ignore the real facts. It seems to the reviewer, therefore, that the rigid application of the tests which Professor Burgess adopts for determining the problem must often lead to the most unsatisfactory results in practice. It is very much like the old-fashioned classification of governments as monarchies, aristocracies and democracies, which puts governments as widely different in fact as England and Persia in the same class, and governments like France and the United States, which have little in common, in another class. Moreover, it may be seriously doubted whether the

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grounds upon which Professor Burgess attacks the sixteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States are well-founded. In fact, the amendment added nothing to the power of Congress in respect to the taxation of incomes. That power was already practically unlimited. The amendment merely changes the mode of procedure by dispensing with the necessity of apportionment. Furthermore, Congress has always had an unlimited power in respect to the taxation of imposts, duties and excises, subject only to the rule of uniformity—a rule which imposes no limits as to the amount which may be levied. In respect to these forms of taxation, Congress is entirely free to "take what it will and in any way it will," provided only that the rate is uniform; yet Professor Burgess sees no danger in the existence of such a power and he does not propose to limit it by constitutional amendment. Finally, if space permitted, it seems to the reviewer that it would not be difficult to show that the recent adoption of the various democratic "nostrums," such as the initiative, referendum and recall, is not incompatible with the doctrine of liberty, although many of us will agree with the author that some of them are of questionable expediency for other reasons.

JAMES W. GARNER.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776 to the End of the Year 1914. By JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY. Boston, Ginn and Company, 1915.—viii, 308 pp.

This comparative study of state constitutions is the fourth published version of material originally printed by Professor Dealey seventeen years ago, and since then on three successive occasions revised and expanded. There is no better way of accomplishing pioneer research than to print and invite criticism, then to print again; and the greatest service a critic can render to the tentative product is—with full realization of the author's difficulties—to speak his mind very frankly. In the opinion of the present reviewer Professor Dealey needs to correct certain radical defects in his manner of treatment before he can regard his work as completed.

The volume is in three parts, dealing with the past, the present and the future of state constitutions. The first criticism that suggests itself, points of detail aside, concerns the arrangement of the first or historical portion. The successive instruments and their principal amendments are taken up mainly in a chronological order, modified to some extent by geographical considerations and by a distinction between old states and new. Much thought seems to have been expended upon this order,

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which is logical and effective so long as attention is focused upon the mere fact, or upon the mere method, of change. When, however, the reader finds interpolated—sometimes after a group of states, often in connection with a single state—a statement of the principal provisions which were at this time adopted, his attention is strained and fatigued by the constant shift from one topic to another. Thus on page 102 we read that Connecticut, since 1886, has introduced plurality elections, increased the size of its senate, and placed a time-limit on the sessions of its assembly. On the next page, Vermont, in 1913, strengthens the governor's veto power, introduces November elections and January sessions, and places restrictions upon special and local legislation. This is the method of the medieval chronicle, not of the digested history. If these dreary catalogues must be preserved intact, they should at least be relegated to footnotes. A better solution, however, would seem to be to take these unrelated details out of their historical setting and redistribute them by order of topics.

If chronology is to be subordinated to the topical order, however, some rather incisive analysis of the subject matter is required. And this brings us to our second criticism. It is not easy to discover upon what principle the author has selected, out of a multitude of topics, those which are worthy of specific mention in his first part. He goes into details such as those just quoted, yet he omits—to give only one illustration—such a highly significant fact as the activity of Mississippi in 1832 and of New York in 1846, in inaugurating the mid-century movement for the popular election of higher administrative and judicial officers. In his second part, dealing with existing constitutional provisions, he pursues a topical order; and in his third part, devoted to trend and future development, he does the same. But he pursues one order of topics in part two and quite another order in part three. When one looks up "short ballot" in the very imperfect index, and discovers that it is correlated, in the first reference, with Australian, Massachusetts and non-partisan ballots, one secures further evidence of how much remains to be done in the sifting and ordering of material.

A third general defect of this volume is its style, and in particular its over-insistence upon detail. The reviewer may speak with the better grace on this point from having sinned in a similar way himself. He appreciates the conscientious effort which results in a passage such as this, referring to the higher judges (page 175):

[1] Three states still retain a "good behavior" tenure, but all others fix a

[1] Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island.

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definite term. A long tenure is favored by four other states:[1] the remaining states vary from two years (Vermont) to twelve, twenty-two favoring the six-year term; eight and twelve are the periods next favored.

It is a rhetorical triumph to force a mass of scattered items into sentences which (with the aid of footnotes) actually parse; but, seriously, is the triumph worth while? On page 51 we find: "It would be tedious and unnecessary to enumerate in any detail the substance of these new and revised constitutions. . . . The mass of detail would prove confusing and the advantages gained from it if set forth are not obvious." It would have been better if the author had applied this principle more widely, leaving out much that is unsystematically minute, and expressing in tabular form whatever readily lends itself to this treatment. An entire page (184) of numerical details in regard to the state legislatures would be vastly more effective if put into the form of a table rather than of a running narrative.

A few minor slips have been noted. The statement that New Jersey's original constitution was never amended (page 28) ignores the Declaratory Act of 1807, which was certainly an amendment in substance. On page 88 the author seems to say that Colorado had woman suffrage as early as 1876. The discussion of the New York provision regarding senatorial apportionment (page 200) overlooks the real point of this ingeniously worded rule, safeguarding the smaller counties in their existing number of senators. The footnote on page 194, crediting to Oklahoma a provision which originated in New York, betrays the fact that in at least a portion of his work the author has relied upon Professor Stimson rather than upon the original documents. In the main, however, the text does not lend itself to detailed criticism. Statements such as these on pages 135 and 136 that "in eighteen constitutions the oath ends with the sentence 'So help me God' (Vermont and Connecticut use the second person)," and "the constitutions of Virginia and Oklahoma are the only ones to mention the Young Men's Christian Association," look as though they were substantially correct. In any case they may be allowed to pass unchallenged.

These defects in Professor Dealey's volume are the better worth noting, because, in despite of them, he has produced a valuable work, which will have, or should have, a wide circulation. Statutory law—and as Professor Dodd has pointed out in a recent number of the QUARTERLY, no well-defined line between statutes and American state

[1] Pennsylvania, twenty-one years; Maryland and Virginia, fifteen; New York, fourteen years.

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constitutions can any longer be drawn—has long been a neglected field in our universities. It does not lend itself readily to the generalizations which the political scientist affects; while the lawyer has been apt to regard it as an unfortunate excrescence upon our common-law system. It is part of the growing actuality of our modern education that we are beginning to take this matter seriously. Professor Dealey has designed a pioneer work upon a comprehensive plan. In chapters i and ii, for instance, which deal with the relations of state constitutions to the union and the admission of new states; in chapter ix, which contains a convenient classification of existing instruments into four groups and touches upon their external form; in his full bibliographies, finally, he has brought together, in small compass, material which will be of the greatest assistance to the future worker. If he himself has not yet completed the work, or done as much in it as it is to be hoped he still will do, that is because he has courageously departed from the beaten track. Others will be helped by him in this respect more than he has been helped by others.

ALFRED Z. REED.

NEW YORK CITY.

The British Empire. By SIR CHARLES LUCAS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—ix, 250 pp.

On nearly the last page of *The British Empire* Sir Charles Lucas describes the method and spirit in which he would like to see the history of the Empire taught in the schools and colleges of Great Britain and the oversea dominions. He would like to see this history taught without minimising any of the wrongdoings of the past or the present, without attempting to deny that sordid motives have had play as well as higher aims; but always

> with due insistence that it is contrary alike to reason and to the facts of history to represent the acquisition by England of an overseas empire as an artificial process, the product of a line of self-seeking men, solely intent on personal advantage, and not, as it actually has been, a natural and national growth, necessary to England for the defence of England, congenial to Englishmen as the kind of work for which their character and their training have adapted them, and incumbent on England as the part which has been assigned to this particular land and people in the evolution of the world.

This is the spirit which obviously actuated Sir Charles Lucas in writing this short history of the oversea possessions of England, of the Domin-

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ions and the countries which are now of the British Empire. It is the spirit which characterizes every chapter—almost every page—of the book, and the result is the most authoritative and fairest history of the British Empire that has yet been attempted within the compass of a single volume.

Sir Charles dates the beginning of the Empire from the reign of Queen Elizabeth; he traces its growth and development century by century to the beginning of the present war—to the time when the British Empire, as seen through German eyes, is a creation of force and fraud, an image with feet of clay, a collection of down-trodden races and communities eager to rebel, in short an evil in the world which ought to be wiped out. No sane Englishman nor sane man in any of the neutral countries accepts the German view of the British Empire. While conceding that there are black spots in the history of England's acquisition of her vast possessions, and periods when the motives of England were open to question, Sir Charles Lucas shows with much clearness and force how contrary to fact are Germany's conceptions of the British Empire and of England's rôle as a colonizing and civilizing power.

The book was apparently written primarily for Englishmen, for it is dedicated to the members of the Working Men's College, London. But at this crisis in the world's history, when England's motives and success with her oversea dominion, with her crown colonies and with India, are so violently assailed by Germany and German partisans, it is a book that will be widely read in the United States. For this reason it is to be regretted that when the author was emphasizing the democratic character of the government of Canada, and the large powers gradually conceded since 1840 by England to all the self-governing colonies that are now of the oversea dominions, he did not go into a little more detail. Nowhere does he make clear that none of the oversea dominions—in fact that none of the colonies—pays tribute of any kind to Great Britain. Nor is there anywhere in the book a summary of the enormous powers enjoyed by the dominions—power to make their own tariffs, regardless of England's commercial interests; power to make their own navigation and immigration laws; power to name their own plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of commercial treaties; and power (or usage equal to power) to veto an undesirable nomination to the high office of governor-general.

It is doubtful if the extent of the powers enjoyed by the oversea dominions is popularly understood even in England. Discussions arising out of the war, and especially out of Germany's ambition to be

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an empire with large colonial possessions, have made it obvious that the wide powers conceded by England to her self-governing dominions in the last three-quarters of a century are not generally known in this country; and in this respect Sir Charles Lucas has failed to take advantage of an opportunity that was offered him. The omission can, however, easily be made good in the next edition; and when this edition is passing through the press the author will probably see his way to revise a statement in the chapter on the meaning and use of empire (page 222) that the existence of Canada is not threatened nor likely to be threatened by the war. Such is not the conviction of Sir R. L. Borden, the premier of Canada; of Sir George E. Foster, minister of trade and commerce in the Borden cabinet; of Mr. T. Chase Casgrain, postmaster-general; of Sir Wilfred Laurier, the leader of the Liberal opposition in the Dominion Parliament, or of Mr. N. Rowell, the leader of the Liberal opposition in the Ontario Legislature. These are the Canadian statesmen who have spoken most frequently in the last eighteen months on the effect on Canada of a possible victory for Germany; and these leaders have not hesitated to declare that Germany's "place in the sun" means the possession of the Dominion of Canada.

Sir Charles Lucas's book would probably not have been written but for the war and the German attack on the colonial system of Great Britain; and it may be added that so far as English books are concerned the war has prompted no better book than this study of the growth of the British Empire and of the colonial spirit as it has actuated England since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. It is a book that will long survive the war.

EDWARD PORRITT.

HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT.

L'Arbitrage international chez les Hellenes. Par A. RÆDER. (Publications de l'Institut Nobel Norvegien. Tome I.) Kristiania, H. Aschehoug and Company (W. Nygaard), 1912.—324 pp.

The author of this work in his introduction remarks that the more international arbitration is employed the more reason there is to hope that modern societies will find in it the means of practically solving the difficulties that arise between nations. At the present moment this hope seems to have been discredited. It is just now the fashion to speak of arbitration as an inadequate, ineffective process. In reality, however, the popular disrepute into which international arbitration has temporarily fallen is due not to dissatisfaction with the results but to the refusal or neglect to resort to it. Nations, like individuals, have

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the choice between trial by judges and "trial by battle"; and on the part of nations the freedom of choice is less restrained because no form of organization has as yet been found by which the physical force in a populous and highly developed country can be held in check as effectually as can that of the individual in a populous and organized community. But the fact that nations in a particular instance go to war may indicate not that the dispute was incapable or even difficult of judicial or other amicable solution, but simply that one or both of the contestants preferred to take the chance of obtaining by force what justice could not concede. The difficulty was not in the nature of the question but in the disposition of the disputants.

Precisely the same phenomena are seen in the history of arbitration among the Greeks. They understood the theory of arbitration with perfect clearness, and they carried it practically to a high stage of development; but the fact that they used it successfully, and with more or less method, did not prevent them from casting it aside when popular passions moved them to do so. Mr. Ræder has industriously collected and systematically arranged all the cases of Hellenic arbitration which modern investigations have disclosed. The results are instructive. He gives eighty-one examples of arbitrations and agreements to arbitrate. Nor did the autonomous Greek states invariably refuse to extend the process to their relations with other countries.

It is only in recent years that the facts in regard to arbitration among the Greeks have come to light sufficiently to enable the student to treat the subject in a philosophical manner. This end has been attained by the study of inscriptions, which are the chief source of information on the subject. By this means the details of numerous arbitral decisions have been disclosed with such fulness as to show the procedure employed and the formalities observed. In bringing together and summarizing the results attained in this field of research, Mr. Ræder has performed a useful and helpful service.

J. B. MOORE.

War and Waste. By DAVID STARR JORDAN. Garden City, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923.—xi, 296 pp.

The volume of President Jordan entitled *War and Waste* consists of a series of essays, addresses and newspaper articles in furtherance of the perpetual peace propaganda, which appeared shortly before the outbreak of the European war. The fundamental idea in it is the reversed biological selection due to war. This idea is expressed and illustrated with gripping force, truth and pathos.

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On the political and economic sides, the book is less convincing. The principal political idea seems to be that, if only armor plate and munition lobbies and journals could be rendered innocuous, all of the various nations could be trusted to keep the peace forever because (as the author believes) none of them has any interest in war or any desire for war. If this faith is well founded, one wonders why police are necessary to keep the peace between individual citizens, or a national government and army to keep the peace between cities and states within the nation. This idea that peace can be kept by agreement, without the backing of force, which seems to be held by most of the perpetual peace propagandists, is either the real "great illusion," or else it implies that nations are incomparably wiser, juster, less selfish, and more faithful to their agreements than are individual citizens or the lesser political units. Whether this is so, let history answer—especially the history of the last three years.

On the economic side, impressive figures are offered of debts and waste due to war, though these are admittedly rough estimates. Moreover, not content with arguing that increased military expenditures have been an important factor in the increasing cost of living, the author goes further and maintains that the decreasing value of gold since 1897 is not really due to the increased production of gold, as economists have usually held, but to increased taxation for military purposes. Thus he asserts that "the percentage [of taxation] collected on every dollar of working capital or income has its reflex effect on reducing the value of that dollar in the clearing house of the world"; and, further, "as the purchasing power of a dollar will be less in ten years, the rate of interest tends to rise." This suggestion has certainly the merit of novelty. Another constantly recurring idea is that all things at bottom are controlled by the House of Rothschild, otherwise the "Unseen Empire of Finance." Thus we are told that

> A gigantic national debt involves an invisible empire which shall direct and control credit. . . . Nathan Rothschild at Waterloo and at London forced the downfall of the house of Bonaparte to insure the rise of the house of Rothschild. . . . From the battle of Waterloo until his death Nathan Rothschild was the actual ruler of Europe. . . . The drastic exactions of Germany [in 1871] were fixed by the Invisible Empire. . . . The nations of Europe have no independent existence, they are one and all provinces of the Unseen Empire of Finance.

Somehow in reading such simple and sweeping generalizations, one is reminded of speeches and editorials about Wall Street. Again, in

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harmony with this emphasis on the rôle of finance, the author always returns to the proposition that war is chiefly a matter of money, or more specifically, of gold. This is to mistake the symbol for the thing itself. The really decisive factors in war are men and materials, not money. If need be, the printing-press can supply the money, as happened in England during the Napoleonic wars and in the United States during the Civil War.

On the other hand, when it comes to the rôle of the economic factor in causing or preventing war, there is hesitation and confusion, if not downright contradiction. Thus it is maintained, in line with the contentions of Jean de Bloch and Norman Angell, that

> the steady extension of unification in international life is a guarantee that international war among civilized nations has already come to an end. . . . No war can bring financial, social, or political gain to any nation. . . . Wars of spoliation, imperial wars, must go the way of international wars, as too costly for the people of a modern industrial state. . . . War is dying. It dies because it cannot pay its way. . . . We shall never see another war among the great nations of Europe. . . . The influence of sound banking is everywhere and automatically opposed to war. . . . We have all the interests of commerce totally and openly opposed to war.

Yet in contrast to these optimistic views as to the rôle of economic influences in world politics, we encounter the following:

> The interlocking Directorate is a successful method in Europe. . . . It is especially the agency by which the resources of weak or barbarous countries are drawn to swell the wealth of the great centres of exploiting Christendom. . . . Through its agency war is no longer a matter of emotionalism or of patriotism. Where war is permitted it is strictly a matter of business. . . . The late Italian war had its motive . . . in the speculations of the Bank of Rome. . . . The plan of expelling the Turk [from the Balkans] found favor both in Paris and Berlin [! ! !] . . . Of the hundreds of revolutions [in Latin America] probably nine out of ten have had behind them the money of some syndicate . . . with a concession of some sort at stake. . . . The "higher politics" of the day . . . runs on all fours with the ape and the tiger. . . . Its interest lies in helping to place capital of individuals in foreign lands, where by threat or persuasion it shall be made to yield better returns than investments at home. . . . The governments of the world take the risks of imperialism; the great trading, mining and exploiting corporations receive the gains. . . . The interlocking of interests of all kinds, incident to these days of rapid transit . . . has brought the clash of exploiting interests, and the resulting accentuation of international suspicion.

If these things are so, what becomes of the previous contentions that

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commerce and finance tend to peace, and that war is dying "because it cannot pay its way"? Certainly the author has signally failed to make clear his opinion as to the effect of economic forces in causing or preventing war.

Several other economic dicta seem equally inconsistent with the general tenor and purpose of the book: notably the admission (page 78) that "tariff protection . . . may have increased the aggregate of national wealth" (through diverting capital into less productive industries); the statement (page 80) that "if anyone grows rich in a community the whole community is the richer for it" (regardless of how he gets it); and finally, the declaration (page 73) that "the cost of high living falls on the man who lives high" (even though it does check the increase of capital). All of these strike the reader with surprise, coming from the accomplished author of *The Fate of Iciodoeum*.

EDWARD VAN DYKE ROBINSON.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

The Audacious War. By CLARENCE W. BARRON. Boston, The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.—192 pp.

During the winter, the *Wall Street Journal* and several other financial papers published a series of articles describing what Mr. Barron saw and heard in England and France. These articles are reprinted with little change in the book now before us, bearing date of February 15, 1915.

The cause of the war is declared to have been economic, specifically the Bagdad railroad and the commercial treaty which Germany forced on Russia after the Japanese war, thereby turning Russia into an economic province of Germany. This treaty expiring in 1916, Russia was unwilling to renew, but required eighteen months more to complete her preparations for resistance. Germany, on the other hand, according to the author, was resolved to force its renewal at the point of the bayonet, and preferred not to wait until Russian preparations should be complete; hence the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the German ultimatum to Russia demanding demobilization within twelve hours, and the German declaration of war on Russia a number of days before the Russian ambassador had even been withdrawn from Vienna. The bulk of the book consists of summary discussions of war finances, especially in England and France.

The author is distinctly anti-German in point of view, though claiming to know Germany better than France, and predicts for the allies speedy triumphs which events have signally failed to justify.

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On the general subject of military preparation he seems not to know his own mind. In one place he declares: "The United States does not protect its trade or its citizens anywhere in the world today. It shivers in war time and borrows of everybody else when it has a panic of its own. There is only one way to make trade, and that is to pay and protect" (page 120). And again: "The United States may be dwelling in a fool's paradise from the political, military and economic point of view." On the other hand, after recalling that the German ambassador at Washington asked who could question the right of Germany to take Canada and the British West Indies, and after likewise recounting what happened to Belgium, the author declares, "Uncle Sam only smiles and frowns, *and the smile and frown are potential.*" In line with this assumed potency of the frown of unarmed America, the author also maintains that "for the United States to rush into the maelstrom of war, with organization of armies and the building of armaments, is to invite its own destruction." The reader is thus left in doubt whether Mr. Barron is a member of the Security League or of the Bryan non-resistance party.

Perhaps the explanation of these inconsistencies is the belief that in some manner nowhere clearly explained, this war is to be followed by the age of perpetual peace whose advent idealists in the past have so often and vainly announced.

EDWARD VAN DYKE ROBINSON.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Economic Aspects of the War. By EDWIN J. CLAPP. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1915.—xiv, 340 pp.

Professor Clapp's study of the effects of European interference with our trade during the war has already received wide attention in the press. Starting with a brief statement of neutral rights as they were supposed to exist previous to the war, the author traces in detail the story of arbitrary changes of sea law that have marked the present struggle, and indicates in each case the manner in which neutrals have been made to suffer. Inasmuch as Great Britain has held the seas, it is chiefly with her infractions of the older rules that he is concerned, and his book has in consequence a decidedly anti-British flavor.

It is Professor Clapp's contention that Great Britain's attempted blockade of Germany is, in international law, no blockade and that it is a failure so far as bringing Germany to terms is concerned. He holds that the losses entailed by British interference with both our export and our import trade have fallen more heavily on the United States

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than on Germany. He maintains that Germany, under pressure of necessity, is developing substitutes for many articles previously exported from this country, so that the trade will not be regained after the war. He contends that the United States, as the most important neutral nation, has not only the right but the duty to protest effectively against violations of international law, and he urges that Great Britain should be brought back to the older practice by the threat of an embargo upon shipments of arms and munitions.

It is an impressive list of interferences with trade that are here brought together, a list that will probably surprise any one who has not followed the commercial events of the past eighteen months with minute care. Whatever the reader's sympathies, he cannot fail to profit by this detailed study of the effect of war upon the fundamental commerce of our day. Nothing could show more clearly the manner in which the necessities, or supposed necessities, of belligerents inevitably result in neutral losses that run into staggering figures. While intended as a challenge to the United States to assert neutral rights against the aggression of both belligerents, it may be questioned whether the book will not be most effective in its demonstration of the commercial necessity of avoiding war. Without undue sympathy for belligerent as against neutral claims, we may fairly doubt whether the changed conditions of commercial intercourse and of marine warfare do not lend more support than Professor Clapp is willing to acknowledge to the declarations of the warring nations that they cannot avoid interfering with neutral rights. If such be the case, the pacifist argument is correspondingly strengthened.

H. R. MUSSEY.

Intervention and Colonization in Africa. By NORMAN DWIGHT HARRIS, with an introduction by JAMES T. SHOTWELL. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.—xviii, 348 pp.

Within the last few decades a new continent has become part of the world. So rapidly have events transpired in Africa, and so important were they in the domain of world politics, that history has hardly been able to keep abreast of them. Long since have we needed something more recent than J. Scott Keltie's *Partition of Africa*, published in 1895. We have it in the volume under review, which forms the first of a series on world democracy.

The introduction by Professor James T. Shotwell indicates that this series will pay particular attention to the rise of capitalized industry and commercial imperialism as new factors in international relations. This

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new imperialism, though using colonization for what it is worth, is not content with this, but prefers to let private financial interests penetrate a new country, and in due time to intervene for the protection of these citizens and their interests and establish direct control over the region. This feature of the case is neatly expressed in the subject of the book.

After an introductory chapter on European expansion, there follow sections dealing with the Congo, Germany in Southwest Africa, Germany and Britain in East Africa, France in West Africa and the Sahara, the Nigerian enterprises, South Africa, and finally chapters narrating the "reoccupation" of Northern Africa, of Tunisia, of Morocco, of Tripolitania, of Northern Egypt, and of the Sudan. Why the term "reoccupation" is used has escaped the reviewer if it is explained. There are appendices containing a well-arranged and selected bibliography, and statistics of various kinds.

Professor Harris's work is distinctly high-grade. It exhibits extensive and painstaking research and the greatest concern for accuracy. Happily the author is not overwhelmed by the mass of details, but has managed to keep a good perspective. Packed with information as this book is, one cannot expect too much of literary style. The orthodox narrative style is employed, and with good results, for the importance of the subject matter furnishes all the interest that is needed. A number of well-planned maps, some of them colored, accompany the text and add materially to its meaning and value.

Every kind of interest and conduct was displayed in the opening of Africa. Besides the natives, there were the English, French, Spanish, Germans, Italians and Turks competing for power. There was the conflict between Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism—though it is worth remarking that religion played less of a rôle than did nationalism or commercialism. There were wars, massacres, treachery, exploitation and diplomacy, often no better than trickery, commingled with endeavors to promote such worthy causes as the suppression of the slave trade and the spreading of western civilization. Amid this play and counterplay of motives and conduct it is no easy task for the historian to pick a dispassionate course, all the less because the events in question are not of the dead past but of the living present. The author's fairness and freedom from bias call for warm praise. With the exception of the chapter on South Africa, and to a lesser degree that on Egypt, which contain indications that the author approves of Great Britain's course in those two instances, the narrative is as impartial as one could wish.

EDWARD KREHBIEL.

LELAND STANFORD, JR. UNIVERSITY.

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The Panama Canal and International Trade Competition. By LINCOLN HUTCHINSON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915. —xi, 283 pp.

History can record but three great changes in the world's trade routes. The first was accomplished by the opening of the all-sea routes from Europe to the Orient in the 15th and 16th centuries; the second, by the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez; and the third, by the construction of the Panama Canal. The changes wrought by the first two events are now a matter of history; those to be effected by the last achievement are still a matter of conjecture. Professor Hutchinson in his volume, *The Panama Canal and International Trade Competition*, gives an interesting and suggestive treatment of the possible and probable changes to be wrought by the completion of the canal and discusses the commercial opportunities opened thereby to the United States. The book is written for the "business men who have or may have dealings with the countries in question or are interested in forming some opinion concerning the possible or probable commercial influence of the new canal," as well as for the "general reader or student of commercial or economic history or geography." The author has succeeded admirably in his two-fold task.

The volume presents an extensive array of statistics relating to the economic forces at work in the Atlantic and Pacific basins which render the countries of each economically interdependent. In studying the problem of the effects of the Canal upon the world's trade routes, many factors have to be considered (chapter ii). On account of their diversity and the consequent resort to limitation in making the study, the conclusions are of necessity most general in character and only indicate tendencies in the future trade development. In this connection interesting tables are worked out showing the relative cost of freight service between New York and Liverpool, as representative of the trade centers of the Atlantic, and nineteen selected ports representative of the various geographic and economic areas of the Pacific.

A careful survey of the markets and trade conditions of the countries bordering on the Pacific and the Atlantic is contained in chapters iii and iv. In view of the present emphasis placed upon the establishment of American banks abroad and the development of American shipping facilities, one is led to dissent from the extent to which the author minimizes these factors. The work of the National City Bank of New York in setting up branches and securing credit information in South America, and the efforts to secure a more adequate American

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merchant marine, are indicative of the more essential character of these elements in trade expansion. An analysis of the recent trade movement between the various groups of the Pacific countries and the great commercial centers of the Atlantic (chapter v) shows the strong position of the United States and forecasts a marked trade expansion in which the United States will secure advantage, if not supremacy, in many regions. The more general conclusions of this chapter are strengthened by a detailed examination of the commerce of the Pacific (chapters vi–viii).

The opening of the Panama Canal has created a "new facility" for the "growth of economic, commercial, social, intellectual and political intercourse." The author believes that, in view of the new opportunities afforded by the Canal, the position and interests of the United States will allow them to play an important part in the new growth.

ROSCOE R. HILL.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO.

A Chinese Appeal to Christendom concerning Christian Missions. By LIN SHAO-YANG. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911.—iv, 321 pp.

Under a Chinese pseudonym, an Englishman, named R. F. Johnston, long resident in China, presents in this volume the case against the religious proselytism of Christian missionaries in that country. Fundamentally there is, as he maintains, a want of mutual understanding. Europeans complain that the Chinese character is inscrutable: the Chinese, on the other hand, find much that is baffling and mysterious in western thought, character, and ideals. Particularly is this the case, says the author, in regard to Christian missions and the activity of their propagandism in the Far East at a time when, in lands professedly Christian, the basal principles of the faith are subject to open and persistent attack by historical and scientific investigators. In this relation he remarks:

> It seems strange to those of us who are familiar with the religious situation in Europe that, while unbelief is rapidly spreading among all classes of their own people, missionaries yet go forth in ever-increasing numbers to preach the gospel to the heathen. Do they propose to convert China and then wait for the Chinese to reconvert the West?

Pursuing the argument in this strain, the author expresses the belief that no form of western religion, not "consistent with itself and in harmony with modern thought," will find a permanent home on

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Chinese soil. Missionaries can, he contends, succeed in China only when they show by their conduct that western civilization at its best is "not necessarily aggressive and truculent in the material concerns of life, and not necessarily bigoted and hysterical in matters spiritual." He admits that missionaries are not all of the same type; that, while some of them may be described as "corybantic," others are decorous and considerate of the feelings of the people; that a large proportion of those now in China are engaged in educational and medical work, and that these are received with marks of friendship in a very large number of towns and districts.

In the course of his discussion, the author treats of monasticism in China, revivalist methods and emotional religion, the problem of evil, Christian demonology, hell and the damnation of heathen, prayer, faith and telepathy, science and prayer, Christian ethics and social prejudices, magic and word-spells, and churches, church-bells, and hymns. He compares and contrasts eastern and western civilization, and concludes with a critical examination of the effects of western education in China. What he specially dreads is the activity of reformers, Chinese or otherwise, who would create a bridgeless chasm between the Old China and the New. He believes the secret of Japan's success to lie in the fact that, in spite of her full acceptance of western teaching and example in politics and in science, she never cut wholly adrift from her social, moral and religious traditions and ideas. He would have the Chinese pursue the same course, so that, while progressing in material things, and learning to construct shipyards, battleships, mills, railways, telegraphs and aeroplanes, they may preserve their æsthetic, moral and religious qualities.

Soon after the present work was published, a question was raised by a reviewer as to whether the book was entitled to any consideration, since the author's Chinese pseudonym was a disguise for a western writer. This issue the author and his publishers did not hesitate to meet by avowing his English nationality. In a letter in *The Spectator* of London, September 23, 1911, the author, still preserving his Chinese pseudonym, stated that he had traveled in sixteen out of eighteen provinces of China; that he had journeyed from Tibet in the west to Formosa and the Luchu Island in the east, and from Chosen in the north to Burma, Siam and French Indo-China in the south; that he had met all ranks of Chinese from imperial princes and viceroys to chair coolies and dung-gatherers; that he had been the guest of governors of provinces in their yamens and of Buddhist monks in their monasteries; and that, having thus studied the literature, character

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and intellectual tendencies of the people, their manners and their religious and social ideas and observances, he regarded himself as being qualified to interpret their views even under a Chinese pseudonym. The question thus raised, except so far as it might involve the author's qualifications as an expert, does not appear in the present instance to be vitally important. The perusal of only a few pages of the book convinced the present reviewer that the Chinese name was only a *nom de plume*, which, although it may have been designed to attract attention, was also intended to emphasize the claim that the view presented was essentially that of a Chinese person. No doubt shameless impostures are often put upon the market for the purpose of deceiving the public. Imaginary conversations are narrated; places never visited and persons never seen are described with an air and profession of familiarity. Frauds of this character, which are by no means confined to those who avoid the disclosure of their identity, should be unreservedly condemned. The present volume could be placed in such a category only if it were shown that the places and things described, the passages quoted and the authorities cited had been falsified. The employment by an author of a *nom de plume* suggestive of the point of view he maintains is by no means unprecedented, and, apart from other proofs of intent to mislead, will of itself hardly suffice for the condemnation of a work as false and spurious.

J. B. MOORE.

The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry. By W. J. A. DONALD. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.—xv, 376 pp.

The Tin Plate Industry. By DONALD EARL DUNBAR. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.—133 pp.

These two recent additions to the Hart, Schaffner and Marx series are not dissimilar in their purpose and method. Both are studies of special industries in their relation to tariff legislation. Both depend on a detailed study of fact, and both attempt to draw conclusions concerning the wisdom of the legislative policy with which they are concerned.

The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry is a painstaking study of the history of iron and steel manufacture in Canada from colonial times down to the present, with a detailed examination of customs legislation and a critical estimate of the part such legislation has played in the growth of the industry. Mr. Donald considers the natural resources of Canada, the development of the market, the technical and financial problems of iron and steel making and the combination movement on

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the Canadian side of the border. His general conclusion is that the primary industry owes little of its success to protection, but that this policy did stimulate the finishing industry. He regards bounties on the whole more favorably than protective duties, but holds that they should not be resumed. He favors the abolition of the anti-dumping duties, and advocates lowering the rates on finished products.

His method involves the enumeration of a great mass of rather tedious detail, which has the merit, however, of presenting in each case the evidence on which his conclusions are based. His interest in the economic aspects of the duties has led to a rather slight emphasis on the political considerations that have played so large a part in the actual shaping of tariff rates—a criticism that applies to most economists' treatment of tariff questions. A distinct merit of the book is its recognition of the complexity of causes responsible for the progress or retardation of any industry. The work adds substantially to our knowledge of Canadian economic conditions and to the materials for judgment of the protective policy.

The Tin Plate Industry is a slighter work, its author having avowedly attempted to include no facts except those strictly to his main purpose. It gathers together in convenient form a good deal of information previously scattered in magazine articles and other sources; but it cannot be said to add greatly to existing knowledge of the tin-plate industry, though it has performed a distinct service in bringing the information down to date. The demonstration of the strong position of the American tin-plate industry at present, and the suggestion of its probable contest with Wales for neutral markets, will be new to those who have not kept closely in touch with recent developments in the industry. Likewise the suggestion that labor cost is no more important for tin plate than for steel rails or structural shapes when the nature and use of tin plate are considered, offers a point of view different from the ordinary one. The analysis of the causes of American success in the industry is also distinctly helpful. The book gains in interest through not being overloaded with facts.

Mr. Dunbar's conclusion on protection to tin plate is much like that of his predecessors: that protection was imposed at a fortunate time and that too much credit must not be given to that policy for the development which followed. The claim for protection at present has little basis. The tone of the book is eminently fair and it will be of material service to those who wish to examine the development of this industry in the protected United States and in free-trade Wales.

HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY.

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Current Economic Problems. Edited by WALTON HALE HAMILTON. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1915.—xxxix, 789 pp.

The sub-title of this work—"A Series of Readings in the Control of Industrial Development"—indicates pretty accurately the nature of the contents. The readings are intended to supplement, or to provide a substitute for, the general texts dealing with the "problems" of modern economic society.

The purpose in general seems to be, first, to show the historic origins of modern economic organization and to indicate the ideals and spirit of the early institutions from which this organization sprang. There follows a series of selections dealing with the changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution. This in turn brings up the question of the modern attitude toward the issues raised by the Industrial Revolution, and a series of selections is given covering the topic of "Social Control in Modern Industrialism." Having thus prepared his ground, the editor turns to a consideration of the practical problems that are the main objects of interest. Here his selections deal first with the pecuniary basis of our modern economic organization, and with the sub-problems, like that of the middleman, of speculation, and of the corporation, which are assumed to grow out of the emphasis on purely monetary returns. The big problems are those of the business cycle, of international trade, of railway regulation, of capitalistic monopoly, of population, of what Mr. Hamilton calls "economic insecurity," covering unemployment, accident and so on, and, finally, of labor organization and trade unionism.

A consideration of the problems naturally raises the question of solutions and, therefore, the general question of social reform. Here, quite properly, Mr. Hamilton deals first with social reform in connection with our important legal institutions, his selections bearing on such topics as the legal system, private property, industrial liberty and the courts and labor. A separate section is then devoted to social reform and taxation, while in conclusion the selections cover broadly the various comprehensive schemes of reform.

In the compilation of a book of readings obviously much depends upon the personal outlook of the editor. Each reader could suggest modifications and *addenda*, but the scope of Mr. Hamilton's material is broad enough to permit selection within the lines of the topics that he has chosen to consider. Indeed the variety of his material is amazing. Under one sub-heading in part xiv, he has selections from the following: Amos, Isaiah, John Ball, Sir Thomas More, Richard Jeffrey,

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Rousseau, Oliver Goldsmith, J. B. McMaster, *Poorman's Guardian*, Frederick Engel, A. M. Simons, *Songs of the Workers* and *A Cape Cod Fisherman*. In most cases it must be conceded also that Mr. Hamilton's selections are happy and well arranged. In the selections dealing with the tariff, for example, he gives first one from no less an economic authority than Martin Luther. This is followed by one in exactly the same tenor by an American, George B. Curtiss! Both laud protection. Subsequently we get a bit of Peter Finley Dunne's "Tariff for Politics Only." Mr. Hamilton's book has none of the forbidding statistical tables that at times affright the reader of Marshall, Wright and Field's *Material for the Study of Elementary Economics*. There is in it very little that is dull or that is likely to have a soporific effect on the hard-pressed college student. Bits of humor are by no means uncommon. The book can be helpfully used in the kind of teaching of economics on which more and more insistence is being placed.

E. E. AGGER.

Scienza delle Finanze. By ETEOCLE LORINI. Pavia, Mattei and Company, 1912.—xi, 536 pp.

Physically, Professor Lorini's book is not attractive. Five hundred and thirty pages of close, fine print, citations from no less than three hundred and twenty different authors, a scanty table of contents and a meagre index, are features that make the reader hesitate to plunge in. It is not a reference book; it should be read through or not at all. Perhaps that is why the author added the seductive sub-title which explains that the book is a "*sunto*" of the lectures delivered at the University of Pavia. Yet if this is only a "*sunto*" (summary, abridgment, syllabus) what must the lectures themselves have been? But the book is decidedly well worth reading. Its contents are stimulating and suggestive.

Professor Lorini has heretofore written mainly in the field of money. This is his first important contribution to public finance proper. Some of his most important previous publications are of a quasi-official character. In 1892 he published "by order of the minister of the treasury" a report on the "monetary question in Austria." In 1897, by the same authority, a report on "monetary reform in Russia," which was later translated into French. In 1901 came another monograph, "by order," on "contemporaneous economics and the money question in Persia." In 1902, 1904, and 1910 came in succession three volumes,

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also "by command," on "the Argentine and its greater economic and financial problems." Unofficial volumes are his treatises on "money and the principle of comparative cost," 1896, and "profits," 1901.

The lectures before us were delivered as part of a course entitled, on the official program of the University, "The Science of Finance and Financial Laws." But the author complains that he cannot cover in a single academic year both parts of the assigned subject. He holds, moreover, that the combination there indicated is pernicious, since the point of view of the science of finance should, in his opinion, be primarily economic, that of the law of finance, administrative, and that of the policy of finance—a third aspect—political. He promises us another volume on the law of finance.

This separation of the legal from the economic point of view with regard to public finance has decided advantages and is helpful at many points. The set determination to keep to the economic point of view results in introducing a number of considerations not often used. More emphasis than is usual is placed on the economic estimate of the utility of public activities and on the economic effects of taxation.

The book begins with a systematic survey of the different theories of the state and its functions. This is especially thorough and worthy of note. We have room only for the quotation of a single passage in which the author sums up his own conclusions after going over all that he has read of preceding writers. The passage is:

> Our view [i. e., of the growth and character of the state] may be summarized in the following terms: 1. the development of individual economies, by the force of the economic impulse; 2. the formation of society, which in its inception is spontaneous, under the action of economic progress; 3. a definite state constitution, economic in its aim. Thus it is, the individual, nation and state follow each other and assert themselves. The Individual is the unit of origin, but not the final objective; the Nation, the complex organism which regroups and cements together the single economies; the State is the legal phase of the life of the nation, but it is secondary to the economic purposes [literally, brood]; the Government is the state's organ of execution, formed with a view to the effective attainment of the collective economic aims.

The point of view here set forth is carried fairly consistently through the book. Whether we agree, or not, that the economic purposes are as paramount to all others as seems to be here assumed, this point of view is not hurtful in the consideration of questions that are primarily financial, and hence economic in character. From this point of view,

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then, it follows that the "why of taxation" is the satisfaction of the collective economic needs; the "amount and measure of taxation" must further be determined with the least possible disturbance or diminution of normal production; and the "source of public revenues" must be the net return above the necessities of life; that this results only in another way of coming at the faculty theory, the "leave them as you find them" theory, and progressive taxation, does not detract from the originality of the mode of attack. Less easy to follow is the author's deduction that these economic considerations lead to certain conclusions as to the electorate; for here, certainly, political considerations must override the economic. Thus it is not clear why there should be "*without taxation, no representation.*" The English quoted is Professor Lorini's. He adds for the source of his quotation: "as the Anglo-Saxons affirm"!

His discussion of the shifting and incidence of taxation is fresh and interesting, especially because it takes into consideration not merely the ultimate resting place of the taxes actually paid, but also the wider consequences of taxation in the suppression of, or promotion of, the offering of services to the community. The discussion here, which almost defies reproduction in English, shows once more the advantage which the Italian language possesses in that there are so many terms for the different processes.

Public expenditures are very briefly treated, attention being devoted largely to questions of classification.

The long discussion of revenues follows the traditional lines: revenues from the ancient domains, revenues from modern state industries, taxes, divided simply into direct and indirect taxes, and extraordinary revenues. In the discussion of the taxes on land it is interesting to note that there is no citation from Henry George. Land taxes and other taxes on funded incomes are treated as supplementary to the income taxes, as aiming at a superior ability.

Public debts are considered in a single chapter, in which the most interesting part is the discussion of the economic justification of their use. The budget is discussed under the broader title of the financial theory of accounts (*bilancio*), a setting which certainly helps to clearness.

The book closes with a study of local finance. Interesting in this part is the discussion of how much state supervision is compatible with the desirable autocracy of the local units. The author is inclined to favor a large degree of separation of the sources of state and of local revenues. In this part of the lectures the materials used are more largely Italian than in other parts.

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If on finishing the book the reader should feel a vague sense of disappointment at certain omissions on points of difficulty and at the inclusion of some things which might have been taken for granted, the reason is doubtless to be found in the audience addressed. Apparently the publication was designed to meet the peculiar needs of students, and the subject matter seems to have been shaped to fit into a definite curriculum of previous and subsequent studies.

CARL C. PLEHN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Materials of Corporation Finance. By CHARLES W. GERSTENBERG. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1915.—xxi, 1008 pp.

Many teachers have probably, like the reviewer, felt the need of source material in corporation finance. It therefore seems a pity that Professor Gerstenburg's book is unlikely satisfactorily to fill this need. The book has in the estimation of the reviewer the gravest defects which a source book can possess—poor arrangement and a failure properly to select, analyze and classify the material used.

The editor of the volume states in his introduction that "no claim is made that the order of presenting the various forms and reports is the best possible order" (page vii), and few will be inclined to disagree with this view. The order followed—but followed, be it noted, "in general" (page viii)—is this:

> Kinds of business associations; organization and legal management of corporations; kinds of stock and rights of stockholders; corporate bonds, notes and mortgages; control of the issue of securities of the state, sale of stocks and bonds to stockholders and to the public; prospectuses; Wall Street market; promotion; intercorporate relations; financial management and provision of working capital; readjustments and reorganizations.

It is unnecessary to inquire why "organization" should come in the first part and "promotion" in the last part of the volume, or why the "sale of stocks etc." should precede "prospectuses." That they do is the fact.

Besides the rather poor general arrangement of the volume there is a lack of classification and analysis of the readings in such a way as to group or arrange together the material dealing with kindred topics and points. The editor himself expresses this when he says: "It will be found necessary to refer to different parts of the book adequately to conquer any given subject" (page viii). Nor is the selection of material particularly good. This does not so much appear, however, in

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the sources from which it is drawn as it does in a failure to utilize such sources with discrimination. An illustration of this may be found in the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Report for June 30, 1914. Over one-tenth of Professor Gerstenberg's volume is devoted to reprinting this report. It is faithfully reproduced verbatim, including the names of the officers and directors. The greater portion of that report was of course given over to financial statements. Some seventy-five pages of the volume under discussion are therefore devoted to the reproduction of the innumerable balance sheets, income accounts etc. of the New Haven and its subsidiaries. It is not to be denied that there is much valuable material for the study of corporation finance in this report, such, for example, as the New Haven dissolution arrangements. But to devote a tenth of the entire book to reproducing that report seems to the reviewer exceeding ill advised.

Similarly the reviewer finds it difficult to justify a verbatim copy of the *Physical Valuation of the Chicago Telephone Companies*. Valuable though much of this report is, it contains a great amount of material of little or no importance from the standpoint of corporation finance, as, for example, the sections devoted to the history of types of conduits and methods of installation of wires, cables etc. Finally it may be said that altogether too little attention has been devoted to certain topics, such as depreciation, surplus, capitalization and underwriting.

W. H. S. STEVENS.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

Joseph Chamberlain. By ALEXANDER MACKINTOSH. New York, Hodder and Stoughton, 1914.—xix, 416 pp.

Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches. Edited by CHARLES W. BOYD. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.—Two volumes, xxiii, 372; viii, 393 pp.

Chamberlain was preëminently a House of Commons man. In the closing years of his political life he came forward with a defence of the upper chamber, but the House of Lords had never any attraction for him personally and despite his great services to England and the Empire he died a commoner. He was a commanding figure in the House of Commons from the middle years of the Beaconsfield-Salisbury parliament of 1874–1880; and from May, 1880, when he joined the Liberal administration as president of the Board of Trade, until he disappeared from parliamentary life in 1906, his position in the House was almost as great as that of Gladstone at any time between 1868 and

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the retirement of the Liberal leader in 1894. In the constituencies from 1885 to 1906, popular interest was as keen and as continuous in Chamberlain as it ever was in Gladstone: and in these twenty-one years Chamberlain did much more platform work than Gladstone did between 1868 and 1894. From the time Chamberlain first sought a seat in the House of Commons—from almost as early as the by-election at Sheffield in 1873 at which he sustained his first and only defeat at the polls—he had a larger part in the important work of popular political education than any of his contemporaries, with the single exception of John Bright. His influence in quickening political thought and in provoking controversy was unequaled in the annals of the political platform in the English-speaking world. No man in political life in England, moreover, ever wrote more political letters than Chamberlain. Like his speeches, his letters were eminently readable. They were usually full of interest; most of them were provocative of controversy; and few failed to find their way into the newspapers.

There are episodes in Chamberlain's remarkably unconventional political career, such as his opposition to home rule in 1886, while he was still of the Liberal party, and his abandonment of free trade in 1903, seventeen years after he had associated himself with the Conservatives, that only time will reveal in their true light. Otherwise his long public life was an open book—with its House of Commons pages, and pages full of municipal activities, of speeches, and of correspondence, most of which went almost before the ink was dry into the columns of the London and provincial daily press. Chamberlain's public life was consequently admirable from the standpoint of the unofficial biographer—the biographer from whom diaries and unpublished correspondence are withheld; and for a work undertaken without this assistance, Mr. Mackintosh was in a peculiarly favorable position. He went into the press gallery about the time that Chamberlain first sat with Gladstone on the treasury bench, and he was still of the gallery when Chamberlain made his last speech in the House of Commons in 1906. For a quarter of a century Mr. Mackintosh, from his box on the government side of the House, had continuous and excellent opportunity of observing Chamberlain. From 1886 to 1895, when Chamberlain joined the Salisbury administration, he faced the great Unionist leader; and in the years when Chamberlain was of the Salisbury and Balfour government, he was separated from him only by the distance from the treasury bench to the reporters' gallery. He heard all Chamberlain's speeches in the House from 1881 to 1906; and as the 400 pages of the biography bear witness, there was no speech of

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Chamberlain's in the constituencies with which he was not familiar, nor have any published letters of Chamberlain's or cartoons of him in *Punch* eluded his attention. In the biography there is an adequate and appreciative history of Chamberlain's part in the great task of modernizing Birmingham, and giving the city its lead among the municipalities of England, and also of his early and extra-parliamentary work in his radical days in behalf of elementary education. His career on the political platform is followed with almost fascinating detail. But the distinguishing feature of Mr. Mackintosh's biography is the parliamentary chapters. These owe their freshness, originality and value to the fact that night after night, session after session, for twenty-five years, Mr. Mackintosh, as London correspondent of the *Aberdeen Free Press*, was constantly keeping his eye and his mind on Chamberlain as one of the great figures in the House of Commons.

English history from the beginning of the reign of George III could be adequately and illuminatingly written from political biography. But in the whole range of this vast library of biography there is not a single book in which the House of Commons life of its subject is so fully and admirably handled as in Mr. Mackintosh's biography of Chamberlain. In general interest—from the point of view of political history and the history of political parties and political movements—the Chamberlain biography ranks with the third volume of Monypenny and Buckle's *Life of Disraeli*. There is an index which extends to nine pages, and a comprehensive bibliography of books and pamphlets on Chamberlain.

The reporting of political speeches in England since shorthand writers were of the staffs of the newspapers, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, has always been handled according to methods quite different from those usually followed in the United States. Manuscript reports of speeches in England have never been prepared in advance and handed over to the newspapers subject to release at a certain hour on a certain day. The English shorthand reporter is ubiquitous. He is of the parliamentary corps and of every newspaper staff, London or provincial, whether the newspaper is daily or weekly. There was a time when the political leaders were followed all over the country by reporters of the London newspapers in the way familiar to readers of Foster's *Life of Dickens*. But there came a change when the Press Association was organized by newspaper managers in 1865; and today, as for half a century past, it is the practice of the Press Association to issue semi-weekly circulars announcing forthcoming political speeches in the constituencies, and newspaper editors order from these circulars

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such of the speeches as they intend to publish. In these circulars speakers are graded according to their standing in political life—according to the interest that newspaper editors consider attaches to their utterances. Of a few speakers, seldom more than six or seven, verbatim reports are offered. Of others summarized reports of 1500 or 1800 words are offered; and others are in what is known as the half-column schedule.

From 1884 to 1906 Chamberlain had the distinction of being almost continuously in the verbatim group, whether he was in the government or in opposition; and after Bright's death, the daily newspapers carried more verbatim reports of Chamberlain than of any other contemporary statesman. Chamberlain's speeches were always readable; for they either evoked sympathy or provoked controversy. They will retain this quality as long as interest continues to attach to the issues that occupied the public mind of England from the third reform of the representative system in 1884–5 to the constitutional struggle with the upper house at Westminster that culminated in the Lords' Veto Act of 1911. Mr. Boyd in compiling this edition of *Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches* must have had at least a thousand or twelve hundred to draw upon, and he is to be congratulated on his fairness and discrimination; for the eighty-three selections from utterances in the House of Commons and in the constituencies represent Chamberlain at every stage of his versatile career.

It was 1874 before Chamberlain entered Parliament and 1880 before he was a member of a Liberal administration. But for five or six years before he was elected for Birmingham, he was a potent influence in the Radical wing of the Liberal party; and several of the most characteristic of Mr. Boyd's selections are from speeches made in the years when Chamberlain's fame rested only on his record of municipal service in Birmingham, and on his stirring platform appeals for a national system of elementary education free from any control by the Church of England. Mr. Boyd's compilation divides itself into sections that could not be of equal proportions. Chamberlain was of the Radical party in Parliament only from 1874 to 1886. During the next twenty years he was either of the Unionist opposition or secretary of state for the colonies in a Conservative administration; or, after 1903, a private member of the House. In the first section accordingly are speeches on municipal government, on elementary education, on parliamentary reform, and on the social questions which were brought to the front by the publication of his famous unauthorized radical program of 1885. In the second section, which occupies one-sixth of volume one and the whole

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of volume two are (1) the speeches made when Chamberlain was of the Unionist opposition of 1886; (2) when he was a supporter of the Salisbury government of 1886–1892; (3) when he was of the Unionist opposition of 1892–1895; (4) during the eight years he was colonial secretary in the Salisbury and Balfour administrations; and (5) in the years from 1903 to 1906 during which he was untrammeled by cabinet responsibility, and engaged in his propaganda to induce Great Britain to abandon the policy of free trade that was adopted in 1846.

Only a few of Mr. Boyd's selections exceed 1800 words in length. There are many which do not exceed 600 or 700 words. Only by so treating the speeches could selections be made which are representative of Chamberlain's political activities and of the extraordinary changes that from 1886 to 1903 came over his mental attitude towards constitutional, economic, and ecclesiastical questions that came within the range of practical politics. The grouping and general arrangement of the selections are excellent; and all the selections are prefaced by introductory notes that explain the occasion and the subject of the speech.

EDWARD PORRITT.

HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT.

A Great Peacemaker: The Diary of James Gallatin, Secretary to Albert Gallatin, 1813–1827. With an introduction by VISCOUNT BRYCE. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.—xiii, 314 pp.

The editor of this volume is Count Albert Gallatin, of London, England, a greatgrandson of the "Great Peacemaker," Albert Gallatin. The impression, however, seems just now to prevail that the time has passed when a book can stand before the public on its own merits. Some well-known person must become sponsor for it by signing his name to an "introduction." Two "introductions" are in some instances evidently supposed to be better. This may happen even where the name of the author himself might be assumed sufficiently to avouch the merits of his performance. On the present occasion Viscount Bryce amiably conducts the performers to the footlights, and in the space of three pages gives us an intimation of what we are to see and hear. The ruling figure is, as he says, the diarist's "illustrious father," Albert Gallatin, "a singularly reserved and to strangers cold and even austere man, the product of generations of Calvinist ancestors, an aristocrat by sentiment, and though by conviction a stern republican, yet under no illusions as to the weak sides of democracy."

In reality, two formal lives of Albert Gallatin have been published in

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the United States, one of them being in the American Statesmen series, and to students of the earlier history of the United States there is no name better known than his. Although Viscount Bryce (perhaps regarding this as proceeding from the "weak sides of democracy") states that Albert Gallatin "did not in his own day receive from the general American public the credit which his disinterestedness as well as his abilities deserved," yet it must be confessed that he did not fare badly. The career of a man of alien birth, aristocratic descent and cold demeanor, who, while speaking the language of his adopted country with a pronounced foreign accent, served in the constitutional convention and repeatedly in the legislature of Pennsylvania, was elected to the Senate of the United States before he had reached the age of legal eligibility, sat repeatedly in the national House of Representatives, became secretary of the treasury at the age of forty and held the place for twelve years, discharged numerous first-class diplomatic missions abroad, and who, although he declined the post of secretary of state and still another cabinet position and withdrew from a nomination for the vice-presidency, was for thirty-five years almost continuously in public life, may more fitly be taken as proof of a certain democratic tenderness toward aristocrats, where they are not too numerous and are fairly well behaved, than as an example of popular neglect. It is also stated that Gallatin's wife, the diarist's mother, whom Gallatin, before his marriage with her, described as "sensible, well-informed, good-natured," was "a typical New Englander of that time, altogether well-regulated, and so loyal to her Puritan piety" that she refused to attend court functions in Paris on Sunday. Although this statement may fairly be assumed to have passed muster with the lady's greatgrandson, the editor, it is proper to remark that the writer of the introduction, with his intimate knowledge of the United States, could not, if he had been furnished with the facts, have spoken of her as a New-Englander and a Puritan, since her family belonged to Maryland and Virginia, her father being Commodore James Nicholson, commander of the famous frigate "Trumbull," who was a native of Chestertown, Maryland. Two of her sisters married in Maryland, and yet another in Georgia.

The diary, as the title of the volume indicates, begins with Gallatin's peace mission to Europe in 1813, and follows him through the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent, his first mission to England, his mission to France, and his second mission to England. On all these occasions he rendered services of the greatest value, his learning, depth of understanding, keen intelligence, and thorough mastery of every subject with

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which he dealt, to say nothing of his social accomplishments, giving him a position of singular preëminence; and it is needless to say that he came into contact with the leaders of the time in European politics and society, who pass in review in these pages.

On one occasion it appears that Gallatin lost some of his austerity. In 1821, while minister at Paris, he accidentally became acquainted with the secret Trianon decree of August 5, 1810, which, if it had not been kept from the public, would, as he believed, have prevented the United States from taking the ground which ultimately led to the War of 1812. His feelings on making the discovery were already known from a letter which he wrote to John Quincy Adams. But, says the diarist: "Never before have I seen my father so angry; he absolutely lost control of himself and used the strongest language." This incident, it may be remarked, is only one of the many illustrations which history affords, of the danger of assuming that contemporary diplomatic documents, put out by belligerent governments for purposes of attack or defense, furnish to neutrals a sufficient basis for final historical judgments. I say "to neutrals," for can it be supposed that belligerent governments, while themselves engaged in publishing what suits their own purposes, will found their views on what is published by their adversaries?

We are informed by the editor that the text of the diary is offered to the public only "after weeding out large portions and suppressing anything that might offend." As the nature of the large portions weeded out is not disclosed, the effect of their excision on the historical value of the record remains an open question. In the suppression of what might offend, some discrimination would seem to have been practised. If certain passages that have been published are to be received as falling within the category of what is personally inoffensive, a few examples of matter regarded as offensive might have afforded diversion as well as illumination.

J. B. MOORE.

The Public Life of Joseph Dudley. By EVERETT KIMBALL. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1911.—viii, 239 pp.

Dr. Everett Kimball has published as the fifteenth volume of the Harvard Historical Studies a just and adequate biography of Joseph Dudley. "Prerogative men" in Massachusetts colonial history have had somewhat less attention than the early patriots, so the subject is as unhackneyed as it is attractive. Dr. Kimball writes in a style of

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severe restraint, yet contrives to reproduce some of the atmosphere of those old quarrelsome days when Sir Edmund Andros came a-regulating. Dudley's is not a character to stir enthusiasm; he was a practical man, believing that one might ride to eminence upon the wings of the Stuart empire. The wings were not strong, there were many disapproving who sought to pull him down, and Dudley's hold was often shaken. Palfrey, Doyle and the rest have made the main facts of the Governor's career fairly familiar, but Dr. Kimball has brought forth new information about Dudley as a jockeying politician in England, while the obloquy of his association with Andros, and particularly his action as a judge in the Leisler case, made residence in America less desirable for a decade. His hard work as a servant of the crown after his appointment as governor of Massachusetts in 1702 is followed with more sympathy than the older historians showed, evidencing the new imperial point of view of our scholars in colonial history; but his nepotism and meannesses of vengeance and self-seeking are not passed over with undue charity. The reader can understand why his salary went unpaid. His success as the colony financier, his military failures, his rancorous controversy with Elisha Cook and the Land Bank party, the stiff legal struggle for retention of office under the Hanoverians, all are impartially recorded, the whole followed by a critical essay on Dudley's motives.

Inclusion in the Harvard Series is a testimony to the merit of the book. One of the most praiseworthy features is the faithful adherence to the character and work of Dudley, excluding general information in the text about the time with which the readers may be supposed to be familiar. The notes show wide and careful research into the Massachusetts Archives, Acts and Resolves, and Record of the General Court together with the Board of Trade papers and the collections in the Bodleian library. It is inferable that what is to be known is told, yet the reader wishes that even more had been included anent the most interesting constitutional controversy on the governor's salary.

Like most works of monographic character this biography would win a deeper appreciation from the scholar if the author vouchsafed more copious notes. There are references to pages and volume in great sufficiency, certainly enough to pique the reader's curiosity as to the author's experiences and opinions in so large and interesting a body of data. Nobody wants the author to publish all he knows, and a great weight of fine print hung on two or three slim lines of text makes a page repellant. One can sympathize with Peter the Great, who, Rambaud tells us, warned his translators to avoid the useless digressions "with

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which the Germans fill their books to make them appear thicker, and which only serve to waste time and disgust the reader." Yet the clientele of the Harvard Series might be supposed to have a broad enough understanding of historical study to enjoy somewhat more of the supplementary comment which only the author of an intensive work can give.

DIXON RYAN FOX.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth. By EDWARD P. CHEYNEY. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1914.—Volume i; x, 560 pp.

This is one of the most notable achievements of American historiography. It is an adequate handling of a great but intricate theme. At first, perhaps, the general reader of history will be inclined to imagine that it is more than adequate; that to devote two huge volumes to the last fifteen years of Queen Elizabeth's reign indicates a specialist's lack of perspective and over-estimate of the significance of his materials. But any such impression is dispelled upon an examination of the volume itself; for it is the very antithesis of that dreary kind of fact-compendium which research men prepare with such meticulous care for the obscure and unimportant. There is ample evidence of the mastery of materials, but along with this Professor Cheyney offers, with genuine literary art, a clear view through a world of varied interest and charm. The interest ranges from the gossip of a court and the study of constitutional law in process of adjustment to the tangled international relations of England, the great sea captains and their friends and enemies the pirates. Throughout the whole narrative one finds portraits of the men and women of the time, drawn directly from the sources and retaining the freshness and quaint but life-like quality of the original.

Professor Cheyney has no theory as to the forces which dominate in history. He offers no dogmatic interpretations of events. He takes the world of Elizabeth as he finds it. The historian of the industrial history of England and the exponent of the tangled commercial relationships of the times carries his readers over into constitutional problems or the counterplay of personalities without any pretension to "interpret" in terms of any one hypothesis. And yet underlying the treatment as a whole there is a clear sense of the fact that any adequate history includes all these factors, that even the constitutional problems could not be understood without a survey of the changing society which forced them upon the England of that day. A nation just passing over

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to the relationships of capital from the medieval landed basis, just learning the laws of money-circulation and acquiring through piracy and war enough Spanish gold and silver to undertake its commercial expansion, fuses its energies and acquires self-consciousness. The rivalries of the medieval market-towns and other elements of the medieval situation are giving way before the realization of the larger prize on and beyond the high seas. A revolutionary change sweeps through English life. The "spacious times" are times of new adjustments; the nation must make institutions of a narrow past experience fit instruments for the business handling of its affairs. During the last decade English historians have been facing the problem this involves and finding in the period in question the real origin of the modern phase of English history. Professor Cheyney here gives an authoritative account of the results of recent research as well as his own.

We have just commented upon the absence of "interpretations." Was it by any chance a desire to avoid even the appearance of them that led the author to give his constitutional, or at least structural, chapters first and his narrative of the new commercial forces at the close of the volume? If so, it seems unfortunate. It is perhaps too soon to comment upon the arrangement of a history of which only one volume is yet before us; but it seems as though a truer understanding of the subject as a whole could be obtained from a survey which left the statement of administrative mechanism until the uses and needs for it were made clear. However, the present sectional divisions have the merit of clarity and ready accessibility.

J. T. SHOTWELL.

History as Literature and other Essays. By THEODORE ROOSEVELT. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913.—310 pp.

This is a collection of essays and takes its title from the first, which was the address delivered by Colonel Roosevelt as president of the American Association three years ago. While only about half of the book can be considered as dealing with history, it is perhaps not out of keeping to have such essays as that on Dante and the Bowery included alongside of the criticism of Dr. Taylor's study of the *Mediaeval Mind* and a consideration of the ancient Irish sagas; for, however these varied books may mirror the diverse interests of the author's mind, there is in the consideration of them all a certain historical attitude which in a sense brings the whole survey into a common field.

The first essay is an appeal to historians to realize that the dry-as-

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dust treatment of fact does not as effectively recall the past, in spite of the cumulation of data, as does the genuine historical imagination which allows itself to fuse the fact and the dream. Unfortunately for the argument and in spite of the genuine eloquence in which it is conveyed, the historical imagination has been allowed to play too freely in even this short history. The history of Russia, for instance, has been somewhat sadly mutilated to point the moral. One feels there a certain hesitancy, and the student of history who detects these overstatements is not likely to be convinced by the argument, which is unfortunate, since the argument is sound.

In the second essay—"Biological Analogies in History," the Romanes Lecture in Oxford for 1910—Colonel Roosevelt deals with the fallacy that nations follow the biological laws of individuals. There is much acute observation in this essay and particularly in the criticism of the national consciousness so largely overstrained in Europe today. It is to be regretted that the author did not develop this theme further, as a detailed study of nineteenth-century historians in the light of this criticism would be profitable.

Of the other essays, that on "Productive Scholarship," which deals with Taylor's *History of the Mediæval Mind* and Thayer's *Life of Cavour*, presents appreciative and valid comment on two of the most notable books by American historians. And so, from topic to topic, the survey passes through the varied items which reach the editorial chair of a man of action, and the total result is a work of more permanence than mere journalism.

J. T. SHOTWELL.

The French Revolution in San Domingo. By T. LOTHROP STODDARD. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.—xviii, 410 pp.

This volume has a certain timeliness which its author could not have definitely foreseen. Narrating, as it does, the story of the achievement of the independence of San Domingo, it appeared on the eve of the occupation of Haiti by the United States forces in 1915. This last act perhaps serves to mark the culmination of a series of events that followed the dramatic session of the French Convention on February 3, 1794, when three deputies from San Domingo—a white, a mulatto, and a negro—were admitted to seats in it. The white delegate naturally attracted little notice, but, as the official record tells us, the "black features of Bellay and the yellow face of Mills" excited "long and

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repeated applause." The "aristocracy of the skin" was declared to be "at last doomed." The president of the convention, obedient to a motion that was "carried with loud applause," received the three deputies with the "fraternal kiss." A moment later, slavery, wherever it might exist in French territory, was abolished by acclamation. At this point attention was called to the fact that a "citizeness of color," who had regularly been present at the sittings, had fainted from joy, a fact that was ordered to be entered in the minutes as a "recognition of her civic virtues."

To those familiar with the history of Reconstruction in the United States, such scenes may suggest a difference in manners rather than in fundamental assumptions. In San Domingo, the political, social and climatic conditions were all favorable to the success of such a revolution as actually took place. When, after the overthrow of French authority in the island, Napoleon sought to reëstablish the French power, malaria and yellow fever came to the aid of the former slaves, now wrought into a frenzy by the attempt to restore them to a servile condition, and delayed the work of reconquest till the British blockade assured the victory of the blacks under Dessalines. In October, 1904, this energetic but remorseless leader, after having proclaimed the independence of the country under its Indian name of "Haiti," crowned himself as emperor; and in the following year, he completed his triumph by the massacre of the whites, of whom it was estimated that scarcely a score were left alive. As Dr. Stoddard observes: "The black State of Haiti had begun its troubled history."

At this point the volume closes. Its pages bear the marks of painstaking and intelligent research. The story of the revolution is told in ample detail. The impression is indeed sometimes given of an almost excessive anxiety lest some of the facts which the author had carefully gathered might not be duly set forth or might escape the reader's recollection. Perhaps a greater confidence in the reader's memory might have conduced to the continuity of the narrative and to the avoidance of occasional repetitions. But these are minor considerations as compared with the substantial merits of the contribution which the author has made to the history of a political and social upheaval, the results of which, although it seemed for a long while to have been almost forgotten, continue now and then to force themselves upon the attention of the world.

J. B. MOORE.

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BOOK NOTES

The interest in Belgium at present has called out an English translation of Professor Henri Pirenne's short history of medieval democracy in the Netherlands, under the title of *Belgian Democracy* (Translated by J. V. Saunders; Manchester, The University Press, 1915; xi, 250 pp.), and it is to be hoped that students of history in American colleges will benefit permanently from his little work, although brought out under such tragic auspices. Professor Pirenne is easily the most competent historian of his country, and this survey of the growth and varied fortunes of the Belgian cities during the Middle Ages is written with a freer hand than he has allowed himself in his larger work, so that the reader can gather with a minimum of effort a genuine and authoritative picture of the social forces and constitutional structure of the Low Countries. The subject is not an easy one to handle, for the cities were of different types and their relationship to bishops and secular lords varied considerably among themselves and at different times. Moreover, in the history of such a complicated community there are few single personalities which stand out sufficiently from the mass to secure a name in history, and no great houses have kept their individuality from generation to generation as major forces in Flemish history. Thus the story lacks that continuity which one finds in the history of the national state under the line of its kings. To make up for that, one falls back on the story of the economic and social advance. This is told briefly but compactly by Professor Pirenne. Although he lacks the skill of the artist in history, he succeeds in presenting a body of facts for the student to work over and acquire, and the book as a whole is a distinct contribution for the college and classroom.

The local history of France has been enriched in the last few years by many researches in departmental archives. This is especially true of Paris, where the municipal library is a center for much valuable output. Under the auspices of the Préfecture of the Seine, M. Lucien Lambeau has compiled three huge volumes dealing with the history of the communes annexed to Paris in 1859. These histories—*Bercy*, *Vaugirard* and *Grenelle*—(Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1910, 1912, 1914; 506; 538; iii, 485 pp.) furnished as they are with excellent apparatus in documentation and illustration, show what scholarly historical work can do to furnish a basis for social history when supported by an intelligent administration.

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In the second, third and fourth volumes of the *Travaux juridiques et économiques de l'Université de Rennes* (Rennes, Bibliothèque universitaire, 1908–9, 1911, 1912; 111, 99, 93 pp.) Professor Charles Turgeon of the Faculty of Law of that university has a series of valuable articles on *La Conception matérialiste de l'histoire*, in which he analyzes the conceptions of Marx and Engels, Labriola and Loria, and presents the case both for and against the materialist interpretation with much clarity and detail. While he rejects the conclusions of the socialist interpreters he does not do so in the cavalier fashion of an absolutist. On the contrary he seems mainly to protest against the dogmatism and the militant conclusions of these writers, while demanding a recognition of the action of other stimuli upon society. The articles are the product of a thinking man facing the tangle of phenomena with a sense of the weakness of any unitary explanation.

The Clarendon Press has published a useful source-book for the social history of England in Mr. J. Turral's *Illustrations to British History B. C. 55—A. D. 1854* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1913; 313 pp.). It is unique in its choice of material, since it includes so much of the description of society from the days of Caesar to those of the children in the mines. Teachers of social history are in need of just such books.

The same publishers have also brought out a collection of English poems for use with history classes, *Lyra Historica: Poems of British History* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911; 96 pp.) by Mr. Turral and M. E. Windsor, but it is of less value and of more limited scope.

A valuable manual is the *Introduction to the Economic History of England* (London, A. & C. Black, 1915; viii, 552 pp.), by E. Lipson, of Trinity College, Cambridge, of which the first volume, dealing with the Middle Ages, has just appeared. It is not so much a class-room manual as a book of reference, for it states and summarizes the points of view of all those whose opinions are worth citing on matters like the growth of the manor, the origins of the three-field system, medieval towns and commerce. This makes the book very useful to turn to for rapid reference; in fact, it is in its field much what Medley's is in constitutional history. But though conscientious and adequate in its way, no breath of life is stirring within its pages. History is a series of problems. They are clearly stated, and the best that has been done toward solving them is presented impartially and checked up with cross references to the most recent critiques. This is a valuable thing to have done and perhaps it is hypercritical to expect more in a single volume, since the imaginative reconstruction of the past which restores

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its vitality to the reader seldom goes with just this kind of presentation. In its own field, Mr. Lipson's book is thorough and scholarly, and it will be a welcome guide to those who are finding the growing amount of material upon medieval economic history a little hard to control. Its contribution of original material is mainly in the chapters dealing with trade in the later Middle Ages. The treatment of the manor is, upon the whole, conventional; but in the story of the transition to modern times the author offers a wealth of detail not hitherto pulled together. The activities of the fourteenth century stand out well here. It may be a small matter, but it seems strange, that at the close of such a scholarly book the bibliography should be called a list of "authorities," and primary and secondary sources be all put together.

Mr. J. J. Webb's *Industrial Dublin Since 1698 and the Silk Industry in Dublin* (Dublin, Maunsel and Company, 1913; ix, 210 pp.) had an interesting origin; and from its success it may have as satisfactory a sequel. It is the outcome of a scholarship at the National University, a scholarship which was founded in 1904 in memory of the late W. P. Coyne, who was the first chief of the Statistics and Intelligence Branch of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, one of the most serviceable of the state departments of Ireland. The industrial history of Ireland is often thought of as including only the woolen and linen industries and shipbuilding at Belfast. But, as Mr. Webb brings out, Dublin has an industrial history which, while not so extensive, is nearly as interesting as the industrial history of London or Manchester. There is a hopeful aspect to the industrial history of Dublin. Some industries since 1681 have thriven for a time and vanished. But at the present time there are at least four industries—brewing, biscuit manufacture, silk, and steel shipbuilding—that are as prosperous as any industry in Belfast. Two of the most interesting revelations of Mr. Webb's book are the survival of the old apprenticeship system in the silk industry, and the extent to which, through the trade unions, women are excluded from the weave rooms of the silk mills in Dublin. In a preface written by Mr. T. P. Gill, of the Department of Agriculture, there is an intimation that Mr. Webb's monograph may be the beginning of a series. There are many Irish subjects awaiting investigation, and the general excellence and utility of Mr. Webb's work will help to secure a cordial welcome for similar monographs dealing with other aspects of the economic and political history of Ireland.

The Tory Tradition (London, John Murray, 1914; xiii, 143 pp.), by Geoffrey G. Butler, contains four essays on English Toryism as it

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was exemplified in the writings and speeches of Bolingbroke, Burke, Disraeli and Salisbury, given in lecture form at the University of Pennsylvania in 1914. Mr. Butler's standpoint as regards American understanding of English political parties is clearly stated in the preface:

> On former visits to the United States I have had forced upon me the desire of Americans to understand our party system. The average American thinks that he understands the aims and views of the Radical party. They are the aims and views of all sensible and enlightened men! The Tory party, on the contrary, not one in ten takes the trouble to investigate. It is the party of privilege, of rapacious mediævalism, of opposition to enlightened reform! "We have no Tories in America" he will say; "we don't stand for that type of person over here." Radical historians have taken care that both the Tory of the eighteenth century and the Tory of the twentieth century shall not stand on his merits in the land of liberty.

Mr. Butler has certainly done effective service for English Tory principles in his endeavor to offset the Radical historians. Moreover, his method is both original and attractive; for in choosing biography as his medium he ensures for himself a wider reading constituency than if he had written a thesis on Tory principles. In his studies of the careers and achievements of Bolingbroke, Burke, Disraeli and Salisbury he brings out with much clearness the contribution—constructive as distinct from merely negative Toryism—to Tory doctrine and Tory principles of each of these eighteenth and nineteenth century leaders. There is an indication of the present-day willingness of English politicians and writers to adopt American political phrases in Mr. Butler's reference to Lord Randolph Churchill's attitude in 1880 towards Sir Stafford Northcote and some of his contemporaries of the Conservative party; for when he is writing of the group within the Tory party whom Churchill contemptuously described as the "old Guard," he uses the word "stand-patters." The book is an exceedingly readable as well as permanently valuable addition to the literature of English party history.

The subject of Mr. George G. Baker's *Colonel St. Paul of Ewart, Soldier and Diplomat* (London, St. Catharine Press, 1911; two volumes: cxciv, 320, 483 pp.) was educated for the bar and was admitted to Gray's Inn. Unfortunately, he had barely entered upon his career when he was convicted of wilful murder for killing his antagonist in a duel. In order to escape the penalty of the law he fled to the continent, settling in France. Up to this time the name he had borne was Henry Paul. His last name, in conformity with a family tradition,

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as to its original form, he then changed to St. Paul. In time he drifted to the Austrian Netherlands, where, when the Seven Years' War broke out, he became an aide-de-camp to the Archduke Prince Charles of Lorraine, the governor of those provinces. In this capacity he passed in active service through the campaigns of 1757, 1758, and 1759. In the winter of 1759–60, being still in the Austrian service, he was assigned to Marshal Daun, and rose to the grade of colonel of cavalry. He afterwards lived in Vienna, where he remained till 1765. Meanwhile, he fell in with Lord Stormont, and having finally convinced the authorities in England that he was the victim of aggression, rather than the aggressor, in the duel above mentioned, and having thus obtained a pardon, he became secretary to the British Embassy at Paris, of which Lord Stormont was the head. In 1776, during a long absence of his lordship, he was promoted to the post of minister plenipotentiary for faithful and efficient service. Later in the same year he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to Sweden, but, although he visited his new post, he eventually declined the mission for private reasons. During the wars growing out of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars he raised and commanded some troops in England for local defence. A narrative of his life runs through the volumes, but their pages are chiefly devoted to the publication of diplomatic correspondence, usually relating to questions in the discussion of which he took part, such as the controversy over Dunkirk, the affair of Senegal, and the interests of the British East India Company. There is also a full and extended report on the Spanish-Portuguese quarrel over their claims in South America. The correspondence thus published presents a life-like picture of the diplomatic relations of the time, and contains much interesting historical matter.

In the younger universities of England such as Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool there has grown up a new school of historical scholarship which is a product of modern English industrial democracy. It holds that the conventional political history is superficial and unsatisfactory, that it over-emphasizes parliamentary proceedings, governmental policies and the activities of leading statesmen and neglects the forces that really mould society—that it leaves most of the story of national development untold. It insists that public opinion is more important than a division lobby and that it can best be studied from materials which have lain outside the sphere of traditional political history. Mr. George Stead Veitch, a lecturer at the University of Liverpool and a disciple of the newer school, has made an excellent study of the movement for parliamentary reform during the last half of the

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eighteenth century, under the title of *The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform* (London, Constable and Company, 1913; xxxi, 397 pp.). It is true that various reform proposals were introduced into parliament during this period and that for a brief season even the government was sympathetic toward reform, but the movement was distinctively extra-parliamentary. It centered in the propaganda of political societies and the writings of pamphleteers. In its organized form it may be said to date from the founding in 1769 of the Society of the Supporters of the Bill of Rights and to end in 1799 when the political societies were crushed by the repressive measures adopted by the government. Mr. Veitch shows that the policy of Pitt's government toward the reformers was unjustifiable and unnecessary; but he shows also that it was genuinely popular. The progress of the French Revolution and the war between England and France hardened English opinion both for and against reform, and the vast majority of Englishmen decided that reform was an evil to the state and must be put down.

Eleven years ago Professor C. S. Terry, of Aberdeen, published his admirable study of the constitution and procedure of the Scottish Parliament, devoting himself in particular to the period from 1603 to the Union. It was the first history of the Parliament so long associated with Edinburgh, written by a Scotsman. The history of the Union of 1707 has now been written by another Scotsman; and chiefly from the Scottish point of view. Professor P. Hume Brown in *The Legislative Union of England and Scotland* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1914; xii, 208 pp.) bestows most of his attention on the political, ecclesiastical and economic conditions of Scotland at the time of the Union; on the proceedings of Parliament at Edinburgh leading to the Union; on the discontent in Scotland with the Union; and on the effects of the Union in Scotland. The book is based on new material that has been published since 1904—such as the papers of the Earl of Mar and Kellie, the Seafield Correspondence, the correspondence of the second Duke of Argyle, which was edited by the late Duke of Argyle and published in 1910; and also on unprinted contemporary documents in the British Museum and the Record Office. All this new material has been put to excellent service by Professor Hume Brown. The Union became a closed question in both Scotland and England just as soon as Scotsmen who were of the forty-five at Westminster learned to use the Scottish vote in the House of Commons in the interest of Scotland, and incidentally in the personal interest of the comparatively few electors to whom Scottish members of Parliament were responsible. But Professor Hume Brown's thesis is much wider than the actual

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union. It is an enlightening study of many aspects of Scottish life at the time of the Union, which was a period of great crisis in the history of Scotland.

Even in war time there has been much speculation in London as to the authorship of *The Record of Nicholas Freydon* (New York, George H. Doran Company, n. d.; vii, 376 pp.) and as to whether the book is an autobiography or pure fiction. These are not the pages in which to continue this discussion. What is of significance here is that in the London chapters there are some of the most vivid descriptions of social conditions in the nearer and more squalid suburbs that have been written in the last half-century. The story of Freydon's migration when a boy from Chelsea to Australia and his return to England to make a place for himself in the world of journalism in London is of deep interest, whether autobiography or fiction. But what gives the book its chief interest, from the standpoint of sociology, is the earlier London portion descriptive of home conditions in some of the streets off Seven Sisters Road, South Tottenham, and in the neighborhood of Tottenham Court Road—neighborhoods in which there are families "whose weekly rental is far less than many a man spends on his solitary dinner in a club restaurant." Contrasting the lot of these people with the lot of more fortunate residents of London, the author writes:

> There is no wider divergence between the lives of tigers and the lives of men than lies between the lives of English people whose homes in some quarters I could name are separated by no more than the width of a street, a mews, and it may be a walled strip of blackened grass and tree trunks.

There are, in London, regions of more squalor than those described in *The Record of Nicholas Freydon*, regions which are the abode of the criminal or destitute classes. But Nicholas Freydon's earlier period of struggle in London was lived among men and women who give what work is in them in return for the miserable home and social conditions that are so realistically described.

For many years Professor Haskins of Harvard University has been devoting himself to the study of the history of Normandy and the Normans, especially during the eleventh century. When therefore a book by him bearing upon this subject was at last announced, if one were to judge by the scholarly miscellany which had appeared in reviews from his pen previously, one might expect a ponderous, technical manual written for medievalists only. Instead of that, however, in his *Normans in European History* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin

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Company, 1915; viii, 258 pp.) we have the charm of a genuinely human narrative, lightened by the play of humor and enriched by incident well told. To be sure there are passages that no casual reader is likely to appropriate, but the book is not for him anyway. It is written for those who will be glad to have cleared up, as they go along, the judgment of reliable and recent scholarship upon the structural problems of law and administration and questions of origins of devices destined to be vital for the national state. The fact that these chapters were delivered as lectures may perhaps have helped in the formulation of them for the general reader; in any case, so easily does the narrative run, upon the whole, that one is not likely to be fully aware of the scope of the field covered, the intricacy of it and the fact that this is the first attempt adequately to cover it upon the basis of a scientific treatment of the sources. It may not be out of place to add a special word of commendation for the delightful description of Normandy with which the book opens.

India under Curzon and After (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1911; xi, 496 pp.), by Mr. Lovat Fraser, furnishes a narrative, more or less controversial in character, of Lord Curzon's career as viceroy of India, and justifies the various acts of his administration. As the eventual judgment of the British government on some of those acts, including perhaps the most important of them all—the partition of Bengal—was unfavorable, and as perhaps the next most important act—the expedition to Tibet—is not understood to have been a success, it seems only just that the case for his lordship should be fully stated. This is done by Mr. Fraser with ability and with an entire mastery of details. Lord Curzon certainly did not spare himself; but his disposition personally to do everything, even, as Mr. Fraser tells us, to the extent of refusing to dictate to an amanuensis, no doubt accounts in large measure for the general belief that he sometimes relied overmuch on his own judgment in matters concerning which his information was not sufficiently comprehensive and on which longer reflection might have been advantageous.

Mr. H. Mitchell's *The Grange in Canada* (Kingston, Ont., The Jackson Press, 1914; 20 pp.) is the only history of the subject. The Grange prospered in Canada from 1872 to 1896. In these years it was well-established in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, and during the later part of this period it obtained a foothold in Manitoba. For a while it exercised much influence in politics, especially in the provincial politics of Ontario. Then there came a collapse, largely due to lack of success in several manufacturing and commercial enter-

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prises that were started under the auspices of the Grange. Mr. Mitchell's history, though brief, has been written with much care. It bears evidence of faithful research over quite a wide area; and it is of peculiar interest and value at this time when the grain growers' movement in Canada beyond the Great Lakes is exercising such obviously potent influence on legislation at Ottawa, and on the policies of the provincial governments at Winnipeg, Regina and Edmonton. The first of the grain growers' associations was established at Indian Head, Saskatchewan, in 1901. At the end of 1915 there were 60,000 members in the grain growers' associations of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta; and, through companies organized within these associations, two quite different plans of government-aided public ownership of country elevators have been on trial since 1910. There was a gap between the collapse of the grange movement and the establishment of the first grain growers' association. It is conceded in the prairie provinces, however, that it was the Grange and the Patrons of Industry that taught Canadian farmers the value of organization and how to organize. A scholarly study of what the Grange accomplished and why it collapsed is therefore today helpful to an understanding of the grain growers' movement—a movement, it may be added, that is worth watching, for it has already achieved much more at Ottawa and in the provincial legislatures than any popular movement since the days of the United Provinces.

The issue for 1914 of *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (Toronto, The Annual Review and Publishing Company, Ltd., 1915; 803, 51 pp.), by J. Castel Hopkins, cannot fail to be of even wider service than any issue since *The Review* was first published in 1901; for 352 of the 803 pages are devoted to the war. What may be described as the war section is divided into four chapters: the Coming of the World War, the British Empire in the War, Canada and the World War, and Conduct and Chronology of the War. Obviously the most valuable of these chapters are the second and the third. Much of the material in the first and fourth chapters is accessible in other publications; but in no other survey of the year, no matter how full or detailed, is there as comprehensive a history of the part of all the oversea dominions of the British Empire in the early stages of the war. Sections covering other of the oversea dominions than Canada are an innovation in the book; but to include these sections was an excellent idea which has been admirably carried out by Mr. Hopkins. It is to be hoped that this feature will be continued in the issue for 1915; for it is desirable that there should be a book, accepted as an authority,

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from which it will be possible to trace the part of all the oversea dominions in the great war. The chapter on Canada and the War extends to a little over 150 pages. It is so inclusive that the most diligent reader of Canadian daily and weekly newspapers and of the Hansards and other public documents of the Dominion, will find it difficult to name any aspect of the war as it is affecting Canada—political, economic or social—that has been ignored. The history of the nine provinces of the Dominion, a feature of much utility that is as old as *The Review*, is told as comprehensively as in previous years, notwithstanding the fact that nearly 200 pages are assigned to the war and to the part of Canada and its sister dominions in aiding Great Britain at the greatest crisis in her history.

Mr. Frederick Swann's *Primer on London Citizenship* (London, P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1915; viii, 113 pp.) was written for students in evening schools in England—primarily for students in London—but it is a book which well merits attention from teachers and students of political science in this country. Sir Lawrence Gomme writes the preface, and in it makes the statement that London affords the greatest problem of local self-government in the world. How this problem is being handled by the Corporation of the City of London, the London County Council, the twenty-eight metropolitan borough councils, the thirty-one boards of guardians for the relief of the poor, and by the Asylums Board, the Metropolitan Water Board, and the Port of London Authority, is excellently described by Mr. Swann. Incidentally Mr. Swann embodies quite a little of the history of the city of London and of the older and now defunct organizations for local government in the area of the metropolis which lies outside the ancient boundaries of the city of London. This today is the only unreformed municipality in England. The Common Council of the City of London is not, like the other municipal councils in England, a creation of Parliament. It is older than Parliament. To some extent it is a legislative body; and it could remodel its own constitution without asking the permission or approval of Parliament. For many years it was one of the most fiercely assailed of English institutions; but it was untouched by the reform of municipal corporations in 1835, and was left practically untouched by the reform of metropolitan London in 1888. One of the most remarkable facts in the modern history of London is that from 1888 onwards the Corporation of the City of London was freer from attack by reformers in and out of Parliament than at any time since the reform of the House of Commons in 1832. The maps, diagrams, and illustrations in Mr. Swann's little primer add much to its value and interest.

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We are fortunate in having a second edition of Professor Thomas Erskine Holland's *Letters on War and Neutrality* (Longmans, Green and Company, 1914; xii, 203 pp.). The original edition contained letters published from 1881 to 1909. The new edition includes additional letters contributed from 1909 to 1913. Taking them as a whole, they cover a wide range of topics, in the discussion of which the learned author exhibits that happy combination of conciseness with clarity and precision by which his writings have always been distinguished.

The economic interpretation of history is expounded and championed by M. Achille Loria in *Les Bases Economiques de la Justice Internationale* (Publications de l'Institut Nobel Norvegien, Kristiania, H. Aschéhoug and Company, 1912; 96 pp.). M. Loria feels obliged to admit that the economic motive of wars is not always obvious. In countries where there are free and fertile lands and where supplies of food and clothing abound, war may be, he says, little more than sport. M. Loria, however, argues his thesis well, and invests his theme with a real interest. His lack of faith in the early cessation of wars he may now regard as justified by what has taken place since his work was published.

The *Institut Nobel Norvegien* is the scientific organ of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian parliament. It was founded at Kristiania on January 1, 1904. Its object is to keep in touch with the development of relations between nations, and above all with the efforts made to adjust international conflicts in a peaceful manner. In performing this task it has the two-fold design of advising the Committee as to the award of the Peace Prize and of working to promote reciprocal respect and amity between nations, as well as international justice and fraternity. In 1912 it began the publication of a series of scientific works, the first of which was entitled *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de l'Institut Nobel Norvegien: I. Littérature Pacifiste* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912; 240 pp.). This volume, as its title indicates, is a catalogue of that part of the library of the *Institut*, embracing works of a pacifist character. It is well arranged and well printed, and will form a useful aid to students of the peace propagandism.

Dr. Norman Moore's Rede Lecture for 1915 on *St. Bartholomew's Hospital in Peace and War* (Cambridge University Press, 1915; 56 pp.) has an interest for American students of English history chiefly as showing the continuity of English institutions. The history of this famous hospital in Smithfields, London, as told by Dr. Moore, is slight and sketchy. There are places where a little more detail would have been acceptable. But much detail is not possible within

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the limits of a single lecture; and Dr. Moore's main purpose was to recall the work of St. Bartholomew's Hospital from the days of Thomas á Becket to the beginning of the present war, and to show how, in a free country like England, where everything is not dominated by the government, an ancient institution like St. Bartholomew's Hospital, whether in peace or war, "lives with the nation and in touch with the national life in every period." As far back as the Dutch wars of Charles II, eighty beds were reserved at St. Bartholomew's for the seamen of the British fleet. Two hundred beds in 1914-1915 were reserved for wounded soldiers of the British army. Members of the staff of St. Bartholomew's are in charge of a base hospital in France; and of the surgeons serving with the British forces in the first year of the war more than one thousand owed their medical training to the famous hospital, which had its beginning in a gift by William of Haverhill, who was sometime alderman of Cripplegate ward—a ward of the city of London which is still a unit in the local government of the city—and who was sheriff of London in 1189 and 1190.

The causes of the present war, chiefly from the French point of view, are set forth in a series of small brochures. Under the title *Les Causes profondes de la Guerre* (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915; viii, 120 pp.), M. Émile Hovelaque discusses the attitude of Germany towards England, maintaining that the antagonism of the former towards the latter is due to a false philosophy and to the desire for world domination.

M. J.-L. de Lanessan sets forth his reasons for believing that the Allies will be victorious, in a well sustained argument entitled *Pourquoi les Germains seront vaincus* (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915; 144 pp.).

In *Les Usages de la Guerre et la Doctrine de l'État-Major Allemand* (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915; 117 pp.) M. Charles Andler, a professor at the Sorbonne, discusses the theories of Clausewitz and his doctrine of "absolute war"—that is to say, war *à outrance*—and contends that they have led to the exclusion of considerations of humanity from the conduct of war by Germany.

M. Émile Legouis presents, under the title *Qui est responsable?* (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915; 115 pp.), a French version of Mr. Cloudesley Brereton's book on the responsibility for the war, in which the personality of the Kaiser, the policy of the mailed fist (*la main gantée de fer*), the spirit satirized in the song "Me und Gott," and the German philosophy of the State and the system of education which it ramifies, are held to have produced the conflict.

L'Angleterre et la Guerre (Paris, Armand Colin, 1915; 32 pp.) contains a lecture delivered at Paris, May 2, 1915, by Mr. Henry

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Wickham Steed of the London *Times*. He justifies the course of England in the war, and defends the government against the charge of hesitation at the beginning of the struggle.

Somewhat more pretentious is *Les Origines de la Guerre Européenne* (Paris, Libraire Armand Colin, 1915; 336 pp.), by M. Auguste Gauvain, who has guided the foreign policy of the *Journal des Débats* since 1908. Declaring that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife was merely a "domestic" and not a "national catastrophy," he maintains the thesis that the war was premeditated by Austria and Germany and that the part they played was deliberately aggressive.

The position of Russia is set forth by M. Grégoire Alexinsky, a former member of the Duma, in *La Russie et la Guerre* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1915; 368 pp.). He affirms that the Russian armies defend the cause of European democracy and human progress, although he laments the fact that, while they oppose the aggressions of Germany and her allies, they are under the control of czarism. But he reconciles himself to this apparent contradiction by the reflection that special or local interests are subordinate to general interests, and that in the action of Russia the general interest of European democracy finds support.

In *Les Causes et les Conséquences de la Guerre* (Paris, Félix Alcan 1915; vi, 416 pp.), M. Yves Guyot surveys the political and economic aspects of the conflict, and the essential conditions of a permanent peace. Dynastic traditions, the old diplomatic formulas, the falsehoods and legends of historic right, the vague conceptions of race and nationality, and inaccurate and illusory phrases, must, he thinks, be discarded, and must be replaced by the solid conception, after the manner of Bentham, of a utilitarian policy. To this end, and in order that the aspirations of the various groups may be satisfied, he declares that the political dissolution of the German Empire is indispensable, and also its moral dissolution, so that the civilization of commerce may be substituted for the civilization of "rapine."

Of the many books offering light upon the psychology of contemporary Germany, there are two which show especial penetration and power of analysis, *The German Enigma* (Paris, Georges Crès et Cie, 1914; xiii, 357 pp.) by Georges Bourdon and *The Anglo German Problem* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915; xx, 288 pp.) by Charles Sarolea. Dr. Sarolea also contributes an introduction to the translation of M. Bourdon's work, and the two go together as complementary surveys. M. Bourdon, a distinguished French journalist, gathered his impressions by travels in Germany in order to enlighten

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Frenchmen through the medium of *Figaro*, as to the ideals and forces at work in Germany before the war. Dr. Sarolea's book was also an ante-bellum production, but both of them have been amply justified by subsequent events. The particular merit of these books, apart from the keenness of their analysis, is that, being written before the war, they are free from that blindness which militant emotions are sure to bring to partisans. Dr. Sarolea's strictures upon the conservative, slow-moving English are if anything more unreserved than his comments upon German ambitions. His picture of the Kaiser in the last chapter is a real interpretation, presented, it is true, by a liberal Belgian who has had long residence in Britain, but nevertheless an honest portrait.

Mr. Jefferson Jones, a young American journalist from the staff of the *Japan Advertiser*, the leading English daily in Tokyo, has published under the title, *The Fall of Tsingtau* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915; xviii, 215 pp.), an account of the Japanese victory in China, as viewed from the "grand stand" of a mountain that dominated the scene of battle. It is a good, clear story—or would be clear if the publishers had seen fit to include a map. When Mr. Jones goes on in the latter half of the book, however, to explain the subsequent encroachments of Japan upon China, we are in another atmosphere. He is most outspoken in his charges against the imperialistic schemes of Japan, maintaining that the British are already apprehensive and that they will have reason to be still more so ere long. To force home his statement of Japanese aggression, taking only one set of the many demands upon China as example, he asks what we should do if a more powerful Mexico should some day hurl a note at us, demanding Mexican advisers in political, financial and military affairs, that we employ Mexican policemen in New York, Philadelphia or Boston to train our own police, buy fifty per cent of our munitions of war from Mexico and maintain a joint arsenal employing Mexican technical experts and the like! Such, according to Mr. Jones, is—or was—the interference planned by Japan in China. And then there is the somewhat ominous fact that the Germans seem to understand and appreciate the Japanese point of view; and the German prisoners are extremely well taken care of by the Japs. What will come of it all? At least it is clear that the war is changing the situation in the Far East perhaps in more momentous ways than in the West.

Several volumes have appeared of the new edition of the books of the La Salle Extension University dealing with business administration. As is almost inevitably the case in such a series, made up as it is of

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the work of different men, the books are somewhat uneven in quality. The general standard is, however, unusually high. Moreover, the books are beautifully bound and the typographical work is excellent. Professor Münsterberg's *Business Psychology* (Chicago, La Salle Extension University, 1915; xi, 296 pp.), which is the "feature" of the series, is truly a little volume of distinction. It provides a treatment of complicated and difficult material which is popular without being superficial. To Professor Münsterberg "business psychology is psychology or it is nothing at all" and so his book is a systematic analysis, but one in which stress is laid upon those results "of modern psychological thinking which are significant for the work of the business man." The author pays a tribute of disrespect to the "gingery talks about business . . . usually offered to business men" to which his readers will heartily subscribe. The last four chapters on "Vocational Fitness," "Individual Mental Traits," "Selection of Fit Individuals" and "Mental Tests" are of great interest and practical value.

Another book of this series, Professor Maurice H. Robinson's *Organizing a Business* (Chicago, La Salle Extension University, 1915; vi, 269 pp.) performs a real service in gathering together in a single volume material which has hitherto been considerably scattered. After a preliminary chapter in which the author places the problem of organization in relation to other economic problems, he devotes nine chapters to an analysis of the individual proprietorship, the partnership and the corporation. His treatment of the mechanism of the corporation will doubtless replace that given in Conyngton's manual in many classes on business organization. It is less exact and specific but is more comprehensive and less repetitious. The last two chapters deal with "Business Combinations and Trusts" and with the "Comparative Efficiency of the Various Types of Business Organization." In an appendix are given some fifty pages of forms.

In his volume called *Personal Efficiency, Applied Salesmanship and Sales Administration* (Chicago, La Salle Extension University, 1915; ix, 315 pp.) Irving R. Allen comes dangerously near furnishing an example of what Professor Münsterberg calls "gingery talks." The arrangement of the book is that of the many-paragraphed advertisement, and the style is so excessively informal and intimate that the serious student, after a hasty glance, is likely to despair of finding anything substantial in the volume. This is unfortunate, for much of the material, especially that dealing with hiring, controlling, training and paying salesmen, is worthy of serious consideration.

Short Talks on Retail Selling by S. Roland Hall (New York, Funk

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and Wagnalls Company, 1915; xi, 170 pp.) is a book which will be most appreciated by the ambitious salesman. It is a selection of readable and interesting articles upon salesmanship culled from the little magazine called *Selling Sense*. It is not the intention of the author to be scientific and systematic but rather to be suggestive and stimulating, and in this he succeeds very well.

Productive Sales Methods (New York, Collin Armstrong, Inc., 1913; 68 pp.) is a little volume by Clarkson A. Collins, the vice-president of a New York advertising concern. It is very well worth the short time it takes to peruse it, dealing as it does with the various features of practical advertising. It has chapters dealing with the planning of sales campaigns, preparation and detail work of an advertising campaign, newspaper and magazine copy etc.

The Perpetual Inventory, by Agnes S. Addie (Chicago, The Inland Trade Press Company, 1914; i, 19 pp.), outlines in a brief compass the actual operation of a perpetual inventory and summarizes its advantages and results.

The Job, the Man, and the Boss (New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1914; xvii, 226 pp.) by Katherine M. H. Blackford and Arthur Newcomb, is the outgrowth of many years' experience in the practical work of advising men in regard to their vocations, counseling employers in the selection of employees and increasing the efficiency of the latter. The book is divided into some fifteen chapters. The first few of these discuss labor employment in general, and propose the application of scientific methods to the employment and discharge of men. This is followed by an analysis of the "job," with reference to the characteristics, physical and mental, which it requires. A chapter is then devoted to the securing and handling of applicants. The three succeeding chapters—vii, viii and ix—which make up over one-third of the volume, are given over to "analyzing the man." These are easily the most interesting and important chapters of the work. The authors distinguish nine fundamental physical variables, i. e., color, form, size, structure, texture, consistency, proportion, expression and condition. They endeavor to show the significance of each one of these factors in human beings, and from these nine factors they develop a theory as to the characteristics and possibilities of each individual. They then show how this may be practically applied in a business concern. The balance of the book discusses the functions of the employment supervisor and of the employment department, with brief chapters also on the art of handling men, the education of employees and vocational guidance.

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Selling by Mail, by Frank L. McWade (Rochester, The Frank L. McWade Company, 1915; 140 pp.), is an interesting brief in favor of mail-order selling. It is largely anecdotal in character and is not likely to prove of much scientific value. At the same time it contains so many interesting arguments in favor of mail-order selling that it is a handy volume for one to have upon the shelves if he is interested in the marketing of commodities.

The Human Factor in Works Management (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1912; ix, 159 pp.), by James Hartness, is divided into three parts, the first dealing with the value of habit, the second with some non-technical phases of machine design, and the third with machine building for profit. As the title implies, the book discusses the applications of the principles of management to the labor force in the plant. The volume is interesting, suggestive and stimulating. At the same time, as is characteristic of many so-called discussions of scientific management, it lacks that concreteness which gives the greatest value to the work of men like Mr. Taylor. It frequently iterates and reiterates familiar truisms. It has value, but it is too general to be regarded as an especially important or significant contribution to the discussion of scientific management.

The Modern Business Course and Service of the Alexander Hamilton Institute is now offered to the "wide-awake business men" of Canada. A Canadian edition has been prepared, the first volume of which, entitled *Applied Economics*, is written by Professor James Mavor of the University of Toronto (New York, The Alexander Hamilton Institute, 1914; xxi, 487 pp.) The scope is that of the usual elementary text, particular emphasis being placed upon the practical economic problems, including those of taxation and finance. Canadian history and present-day conditions are liberally drawn upon for illustrative purposes. The book is readable and interesting and is admirably adapted to its purpose.

Mercantile Credits (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1914; vi, 288 pp.) by M.M. Kallman and others consists of fourteen lectures delivered by various gentlemen in coöperation with the Los Angeles Y. M. C. A. Practically all of the lecturers were men engaged in business, and possibly it is in part due to this fact that the volume lacks breadth of view. It can scarcely be said to be comparable for instance to Hagerty's *Mercantile Credit*. At the same time some of the lectures are valuable by reason of the fact that they represent the discussion of particular phases of mercantile credit by men who have had actual experience in meeting its problems.

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Harrison H. Brace's *The Value of Organized Speculation* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913; xii, 290 pp.), which was awarded a second prize in Class A of the Hart, Schaffner and Marx contest, is, as the author states in his preface, an attempt "to consider in a spirit of fairness the much controverted question of the value of organized speculation." Regarding prices the author reaches the conclusion that "the natural tendency of the speculative markets is toward bullishness. . . . The charge made against organized speculation that it depresses prices is utterly unfounded." In its indirect effects Mr. Brace believes that the exchange market not only for commodities but also for securities "serves to knit together all business and gives a wide field to the principle of insurance." While admitting that speculation "does not give the moral discipline seen in other forms of trade" he declares that from a practical standpoint "there is no acceptable alternative" to it.

> Any law which attempts to abolish organized speculation, or to remove essential features, will be evaded, causing in all probability more injury than benefit. . . . Speculation so organized that the transactions will be legitimate and perform a service offers the only acceptable alternative to the system of organized speculation as it exists today.

The volume shows a considerable amount of careful thinking and in general the conclusions are clearly and convincingly presented. The comparative lack of footnote citations is to be deplored.

Money and Banking (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1914; 439 pp.), by John Thom Holdsworth, is an excellently planned textbook for beginners. Comparatively little space—about one-fourth of of the book—is devoted to the principles and history of money, the greater portion being reserved for the discussion of banking. In general, Professor Holdsworth presents the monetary principles made familiar in Johnson's *Money and Currency*, while the historical and descriptive sections concerned with money deal almost exclusively with conditions in the United States. There are fifteen chapters dealing with banking which, while not giving a well-organized interpretation of banking as a part of the broad process of wealth production, do nevertheless contain a great many interesting and important descriptive details. They make available in concise form much of the information contained in the monumental *Report of the National Monetary Commission*, and they give one a pretty good idea of the present structure of the important European banking systems, as well as of our own. There is a good discussion of the Federal Reserve System, and even of the emergency measures that were taken at the outbreak of the European war.

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One of the books which has earned for itself the privilege of being kept strictly up-to-date is Professor Davis R. Dewey's standard work on the *Financial History of the United States* (New York, Longmans, Green and Company; 1915, xxvii, 550 pp.). A new edition just published now replaces the fourth edition issued in 1912. A half-dozen additional pages suffice to give an account of the recent occurrences in the field, including such important topics as the federal reserve system, the federal income tax and the Underwood tariff.

The Federal Reserve (New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1915; xiii, 342 pp.), by Henry Parker Willis, secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, commands instant and respectful attention by reason of the important part played by the author in the framing of the Federal Reserve Act, and his subsequent intimate knowledge of the operation of the new banking system. An introduction by Mr. Charles S. Hamlin, governor of the Federal Reserve Board, contains a statement which will be corroborated by every careful reader of the volume. "I feel confident," says Mr. Hamlin, "that this book, both as a history and a searching analysis of the Act will be an invaluable help to every student." The first two chapters give the background of the Federal Reserve Act. Here Dr. Willis again emphasizes the points made in his article in *The American Economic Review* last year, establishing that the Federal Reserve Act differs vitally from the Aldrich scheme. Subsequent chapters deal with the provisions of the Act itself, with the initiation of the system which the Act provided, and with its important advantages. The desirable lines of development are also indicated. The book is most readable and the author's presentation is as clear and incisive as could be desired. The only regret to be expressed is that the work is entirely too brief for a subject of such importance. It is to be hoped that Dr. Willis will find time in the future to write another book on the reserve system, going over the same ground covered in his present work, as well as new ground, and that then he will include all the interesting details in the history of the operation of the Act which no one else can supply so well as he.

Mr. Eliot Jones's *The Anthracite Coal Combination in the United States* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1914; xiii, 261 pp.) which is volume xi of the Harvard Economic Studies, is another example of the extensive and painstaking research which has characterized every volume of that series to date. The first two chapters of the study deal with the history of the anthracite industry. The next two examine historically the various combinations. The fifth chapter is devoted to the production of coal, and the sixth and seventh to the

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transportation of coal and the price and sale of coal, respectively. The legal status of the combination is examined in the eighth and final chapter. An admirable bibliography is appended, and the pages of the volume are interspersed with illustrative maps and charts. The suit of the government against the anthracite combination under the Sherman Act made available many facts in relation thereto probably not otherwise obtainable. As a result, the author was enabled to make his study a most thorough one. It seems therefore the more regrettable that in so scientific and exhaustive an examination there does not appear, so far as the reviewer can discover, any reference to the combination or alleged combination of 1871. Virtue's admirable study made no reference to it and Professor Jones seems to have followed Professor Virtue. The details of this combination are important, first, because the combination of 1871, if combination there was, seems to have been an attempt to suppress the independent coal operators; second, because it resulted in a *quo warranto* proceeding by the Attorney-General of Pennsylvania against certain companies for combining to raise the price of coal. It is possible that the reviewer may be in error, but so far as his information extends this is the first court proceeding in the United States brought against a combination by either a state or the federal government. It is true that this part of the history of the anthracite combination which is omitted by the author constitutes perhaps the most insignificant and least important portion of it. Yet in so able and complete a study the omission seems an unfortunate one.

The experiments with special land taxes of the western Canadian provinces is the subject of an able essay by Archibald Stalker, entitled *Taxation of Land Values in Western Canada* (Montreal, Printed for McGill University, 1914; 56 pp.). After a brief survey of the history of the movement and an analysis of the present situation in each province, Mr. Stalker presents statistics which, he concludes, "do not maintain the statement that under the so-called 'Single-tax,' population and the value of buildings increase at a greater ratio than do land values." He considers the western system merely a device "developed to meet conditions peculiar to those rapidly growing cities where land speculation was hindering consolidation and central development."

Super-Tax (London, Gee and Company, Ltd., 1915; 99 pp.) is a little manual, written by R. A. Wenham, an English accountant, dealing with the additional income tax imposed upon large incomes. This tax was first introduced in 1910 but the act was seriously amended in 1914. Full directions are furnished for "filling up" the official form in accordance with the provisions of the new act.

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